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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
Vol. 58 JUNE 1960 No. 8 
THE CONSTITUTIONS OF WEST GERMANY AND 
THE UNITED STATES: A COMPARATIVE STUDYt 
Paul G. Kauper* 
THE Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (herein-after referred to as the Basic Law)1 invites attention and 
study for several reasons. Constitution-making has been a signifi-
cant political development on the world scale since World War II. 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
The author acknowledges his indebtedness to Mr. Jiirgen Krumland, Referendar, 
Diisseldorf, Germany, for his valuable assistance in the preparation of this article. 
t The subject is treated under the following principal headings beginning at the pages 
indicated. 
I. Basic Principles, p. 1094. 
II. Political Freedom, p. 1097. 
III. Basic Rights, p. 1102. 
IV. The Federal Principle, p. 1138. 
V. Separation of Powers, p. 1157. 
VI. The Federal Constitutional Court, p. 1162. 
VII. The Amending Process, p. 1182. 
1 Use of the English term "Basic Law" in reference to the Constitution of West Ger• 
many is derived directly from the official German term Grundgesetz. This term is used 
rather than the term Verfassung (Constitution), since the Grundgesetz is viewed as a funda· 
mental statute designed to establish the order of the political life during the transitional 
period pending reunification of Germany and the adoption at that time of a permanent 
constitution for the German people. See the Preamble to the Basic Law. 
For the German text of the Basic Law, see GRUNDGESE'I'Z FUR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK. 
DEUTSCHLAND included in F0RSTH0FF, OFFENTLICHES R.EcHT- SAMMLUNG srAATS· UND VER-
WALTUNGSRECHTI.ICHER GESEIZE 1 et seq. (1956). The author when quoting the Basic Law 
in this article relies on the approved English translation of the text as effective on March 
15, 1955, entitled "Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany.'' This English 
version, published by the Deutscher Bundestag, was edited by the Linguistics Section of 
the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany on the basis of a translation made 
by the Legal Staffs of the Allied High Commission. Because of reliance on this 1955 
text, later amendments of the Basic Law, except those amending Part X, dealing with 
questions of finance, will be disregarded. 
For the texts of the constitutions of some of the Lander (states), in parallel English 
and German versions, see CONSTITUTIONS OF IHE GERMAN LAENDER, prepared by Civil Ad· 
ministrative Division, Office of M'tlitary Government (U.S.) (1947). 
For extended commentaries on the Basic Law, see KoMMENTAR ZUM BONNER GRUND-
GESE'I'Z (BONNER KoMMENTAR), ed. by Dennewitz and Wemicke (1949); HAMANN, DAS 
GRUNDGESE'I'Z FUR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND V. 23.5.1949 (1956); VON MANGOLDT 
AND KLEIN, DAS BONNER GRUNDGESE'I'Z, 2d ed. (1955); MAUNZ AND Dfuuc, GRUNDGESE'I'Z 
(1959). A briefer treatment is found in MAUNZ, DEUTSCHES STAATSRECHT, 8th ed. (1958). 
For an analysis of the Basic Law at the time it was adopted, see Friedrich, "Rebuilding 
the German Constitution,'' 43 AM. PoL. SCI. R.Ev. 704 (1949) (Part II); Lenhoff, "The 
German (Bonn) Constitution with Comparative Glances at the French and Italian Con-
stitutions," 24 TULANE L. R.Ev. 1 (1949). 
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Perhaps at no one time has so much energy been expended on the 
preparation of new written constitutions, with emphasis on judicial 
review and the protection of basic rights as means of furthering the 
aims of a democratic society.2 West Germany's Basic Law acquires 
added interest in the light of its antecedents,8 the manipulation 
of the constitutional structure during the Hitler regime, and the 
attempt in the new Basic Law to raise to its highest and most 
secure level the familiar conception of the Rechtsstaat, i.e., the 
conception of the state permeated and governed by the rule of law. 
Finally, for Americans the Basic Law has added interest, not only 
because American influence played some part in the shaping of 
the Basic Law but also because of the comparisons· and contrasts it 
suggests with the Constitution of the United States.4 It is evident 
that the two constitutions share many points in common: both have 
a democratic foundation in the institutions of free suffrage and 
representative government, both establish a federal structure, both 
articulate the principle of separation of powers, both define basic 
rights of the individual, and, finally, but by no means least, both 
commit the final interpretation of the written document, viewed 
as a limitation on the authority of all branches of government, to 
the judiciary in the exercise of the power of judicial review. How-
ever, even though these two constitutional systems rest on a 
common basis of fundamental principles, a comparison of the 
institutional framework designed for the implementation of these 
principles, particularly in regard to such matters as the structure 
of federalism and the instrumentalities and methods of judicial 
review, reveals conspicuous differences. The purpose of this 
article is to present a descriptive overall picture of the fundamental 
2 See Dietze, "Judicial Review in Europe," 55 MICH. L. R.Ev. 539 (1957); Dietze, 
"America and Europe-Decline and Emergence of Judicial Review," 44 VA. L. R.Ev. 1233 
(1958). See also ZURCHER, CoNSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL TRENDS SINCE WORLD WAR 
II, 2d ed. (1955); Bowm AND FRIEDRICH, Snmn,s IN FEDERALISM (1954). 
s Although no attempt will be made in this article to relate the features of the Basic 
Law to their antecedents- in German constitutional history, it should be emphasized that 
a number of fundamental principles and institutions incorporated in the Basic Law are 
derived from the earlier constitutional tradition. 
For the historical background of the Basic Law and the developments leading to its 
drafting and adoption, see Friedrich, "Rebuilding the German Constitution," 43 AM. PoL. 
SCI. REv. 461 (1949). 
For useful brief treatments of judicial review under the Weimar Constitution, see von 
Mehren, "Constitutionalism in Germany-the First Decision of the New Constitutional 
Court," 1 AM. J. CoMP. L. 70 at 71-74 (1952); Nagel, "Judicial Review in Germany," 
3 AM. J. COMP. L. 233 (1954). 
~ Except where the use of the longer term seems necessary to avoid confusion, the 
author uses the term "Constitution" in the text to refer to the Constitution of the United 
States. 
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features of the system established by the Basic Law and at the 
same time point up significant comparisons and contrasts by ref-
erence to the Constitution. Eleven years have now elapsed since 
the Basic Law went into effect, and significant decisions of the 
Federal Constitution~ Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht )/• noted 
at the appropriate points, serve to illuminate the working of the 
system established by it. 
It may be observed at the outset that the Basic Law is a more 
thorough and extensive document than the United States Con-
stitution. It consists of eleven parts, including the final part with 
its detailed transitional and concluding provisions. Substantially 
longer than the Constitution as amended, it elaborates in greater 
detail the treatment of certain corresponding items and deals at 
length with subjects not embraced by the Constitution. Thus the 
basic substantive rights of the individual set forth in Part I are 
more comprehensively stated than in the first eight amendments 
to the Constitution and in corresponding provisions of state con-
stitutions. The distribution of authority between the federal 
government (Federation) and the ten states (Lander), made ex-
plicit in a detailed recital of exclusive and concurrent powers and 
in the formulation of the role of the Lander in the enforcement of 
the Federation's laws, receives more detailed treatment than that 
accorded by the Constitution, although it should be observed that 
the concept of federalism embodied in some of these features differs 
materially from the American pattern. Finally, the Basic Law 
treats in detail some matters which under the Constitution are 
left to be worked out by Congress in the exercise of its discretion. 
Attention is called, for instance, to those features of Part X of the 
Basic Law that are concerned with budgetary matters. Whereas 
the drafters of the Constitution limited themselves to constitutional 
essentials and often employed general phrases capable of wide and 
varied interpretation that left much to legislative discretion and 
judicial interpretation, the drafters of the Basic Law evidenced by 
their product a determined effort to deal more thoroughly and 
explicitly with the matters coming within the range of the con-
stitution, and in achieving this result they framed a relatively less 
~ Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court (Entscheidungen des Bundesuerfas-
sungsgerichts) are reported in bound volumes. The abbreviation "BVerfGE" is used in 
referring to these reports. 
No attempt is made within the bounds of this article to deal with the numerous 
decisions by the other federal courts and by the courts of the Lander on constitutional 
questions. 
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elastic document. Indeed, the Basic Law, taking account of the 
range of matters and the detail included in it, is in many respects 
reminiscent of the lengthier American state constitutions. 
I. BASIC PRINCIPLES 
Turning to the substance of the Basic Law, attention is called 
at the outset to the statements of basic principles that serve as 
foundations to define the nature and objectives of the politically 
organized society governed by it. The key provisions are stated 
in Article 20 as follows: 
"(1) The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic 
and social federal state. 
" (2) All state authority emanates from the people. It is 
exercised by the people by means 0£ elections and voting and 
by separate legislative, executive and judicial organs. 
" (3) Legislation is subject to the constitutional order; the 
executive and the judiciary are bound by the law." 
The foregoing provisions are supplemented by the statement 
in the first paragraph of Article 28 that the "constitutional order 
in the Lander must conform to the principles of republican, 
democratic and social government based on the rule of law, within 
the meaning of this Basic Law." Reference should also be made 
at this point to the provisions of Article I: 
"(1) The dignity of man is inviolable. To respect and 
protect it is the duty of all state authority. 
" (2) The German people therefore acknowledges invio~ 
lable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every com-
munity, of peace and of justice in the world. 
" (3) The following basic rights bind the legislature, the 
executive and the judiciary as directly enforceable law." 
Tak.en together, these provisions state the basic premises of the 
German constitutional system. It establishes a democratic state 
that rests on the authority of the people. The form of government 
is republican in that the people's authority is made effective by 
means of elections, voting, and the institutions of representative 
government. It is a federal state that recognizes a distribution of 
authority between the Federation and the Lander. It is a social 
state in that it recognizes the positive function and authority of 
the government to promote the common weal, as well as its duty 
to respect and protect the dignity of man which becomes the 
ultimate value and furnishes the foundation of the acknowledged 
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"inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every 
community, of peace and of justice in the world." Finally, this 
constitutional order rests on "the rule of law," whereby all govern-
mental authority, operating within the framework of the separation 
of powers, is subject to legal restraints and obligations in order to 
achieve the fundamental objectives of the constitutional order.6 
The object to be achieved then is a constitutional democracy 
capable of serving the needs of the modem welfare state. Al-
though resting on the will of the people made manifest by the 
election of representatives to a parliamentary law-making body, 
it is not an unlimited democracy since the Basic Law as a limita-
tion on the legislative as well as the executive and judicial powers, 
and the source of directly enforceable rights, all ultimately vindi-
cated by an independent judiciary exercising the power of judicial 
review, serves to limit the majority will. The subjection of all 
authority to the rule of law, with the important position thereby 
accorded to the judiciary as a means of nullifying unauthorized 
governmental action as well as action violating basic rights and 
other specific limitations, elevates the idea of the Rechtsstaat to its 
highest level. Indeed, in view of the authority that may be 
exercised by the judiciary, and notably by the Federal Constitu-
tional Court, as pointed out later, the fear has been expressed that 
the new German constitutional order may be transformed from 
a Rechtsstaat (one governed by the rule of law) to a Justizstaat 
(one governed by the judiciary).7 
In adopting, on the one hand, the conception of the dignity of 
man and his right to the free development of his personality, made 
6 Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court emphasize the importance of these 
general principles as bases for constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., the opinion in the 
famous "Southwest" case, l BVerfGE 14 (1951), where the Court held invalid the federal 
statute which extended the terms of two state legislatures (Landtage) until the completion 
of territorial reorganization was effected, on the ground that this intervention in the 
legislative process of the Lander violated basic concepts of democracy and federalism. 
See von Mehren, "Constitutionalism in Germany-the First Decision of the New Consti-
tutional Court," l AM. J. COMP. L. 70 (1952); Leibholz, "The Federal Constitutional 
Court in Germany and the 'Southwest' Case," 46 AM. POL. Ser. REv. 723 (1952). 
See also the decision in 9 BVerfGE 268 (1959), where the Court relied on the mle 
of law idea in holding invalid in its application to permanent civil service officers (Beamte), 
that part of a Land law which provided that in the case of a dispute between the admin-
istration and these officers concerning appointment, promotion, and other personal matters, 
the final decision would be made by an independent commission instead of by the admin-
istration. The Court thought that it was incompatible with the rule of law to have these 
questions affecting civil service personnel of this class decided by a commission that was 
not responsible to the administration. 
7 See Rupp, "Government Under Law in Germany," 9 .ANNALES DE LA FACULTE DE DROIT 
D'IsrANBUL 101 at Ill (1959). This paper by Judge Hans Rupp of the Federal Constitu-
tional Court was originally presented by him before the Colloquium on "The Rule of 
Law in the West," held at Chicago in September 1957. 
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concrete by the detailed catalogue of basic rights, and, on the other 
hand, the conception of the social state with its responsibility for 
promoting the common weal, the Basic Law attempts a synthesis 
of the individual freedom that serves as a restraint on power and 
the individual's claim upon the state to advance and promote his 
well being.8 
The political order established by the Constitution of the 
United States also rests on the will of the people made manifest in 
the right to elect representatives under a republican form of gov-
ernment. The founding fathers were not interested in establish-
ing a democratic order in the sense of uncontrolled popular will, 
and indeed, the word "democracy" does not appear in the Con-
stitution. But with the growth of democratic ideas and institu-
tions, the political order is recognized as a constitutional democ-
racy, although it is a limited democracy in that the judiciary may 
intervene to invalidate unauthorized or prohibited legislative acts 
and to protect constitutionally-recognized rights. The term "rule 
of law" (as equivalent to Rechtsstaat) does not appear in the Con-
stitution and indeed is not generally as well favored in American 
usage as "government under law" or "supremacy of law." But 
the idea is implicit in the fundamental structure and operation of 
our system. 
To some it may appear that a fundamental difference in basic 
orientation between the United States Constitution ,and the Basic 
Law is that the Constitution was formulated with an eye principally 
to limitations on power irt the interests of human freedom. The 
structure of the federal system, with its delegation of limited power 
to the federal government, the separation of powers within the 
federal government, and the prohibitions on power together with 
the recognition of basic rights, all evidence a mistrust of power 
and the attempt to keep it within limits. In short, this view 
accepts the idea of a government of limited and divided functions, 
epitomized in Jefferson's famous statement that that government 
governs best which governs least, and emphasizes the negative 
aspects of the Constitution as a restraint on power in the interests of 
s Judge Rupp in his article, id. at 102-103, after referring to the opinion expressed 
by some German writers that the concept of a social welfare state subject to the rule of 
law (sozialer Rechtsstaat) is a contradiction in terms, goes on to say, "But the Federal 
Constitutional Court in several decisions has taken the view that a 'sozialer Rechtsstaat' 
is not a contradiction in itself, but that the 'Sozialstaatsprinzip' carries an obligation to 
the legislator and at the same time should guide the executive and the judiciary to such 
an interpretation of individual liberty which aims at the common good of all." Judge 
Rupp here cites the decisions in 3 BVerfGE 377, 381 (1954); 4 BVerfGE 96, 102 (1954); 
5 BVerfGE 85, 198 (1956). 
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freedom. By comparison the Basic Law in establishing a demo-
cratic and social order places more emphasis on the positive 
function of government in promoting the purposes of the social 
welfare state. There is merit in this comparison, but it is easily 
overemphasized. The Preamble to the Constitution states great 
and positive purposes of the government created by it-"to estab-
lish a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic 
Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general 
Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty .... " Certainly it is 
true that with the growing demands upon the government to 
promote the well-being of its citizens, the constitutional order, 
given an assist by flexible judicial interpretation responsive to the 
felt needs of the times, has been accommodated to the increased 
functions of the welfare state, notwithstanding the distribution 
and dispersal of power and the system of checks and balances 
established by the fundamental law. Indeed, the Supreme Courtg 
has been concerned with a re-appraisal of constitutional values in 
terms of their relevancy to contemporary understanding of the 
nature and purpose of a democratic society.10 
Attention will now be given to specific features of the Basic 
Law designed to implement the concept of a democratic, social 
order operating within the framework of the rule of law. 
II. POLITICAL FREEDOM 
The Basic Law, recognizing that all state authority emanates 
from the people, by means of elections,11 establishes the Bundestag 
as the primary law-making authority of the Federation. It consists 
of representatives elected in "universal, direct, free, equal and 
secret elections."12 The Basic Law incorporates the same provision 
respecting the representative bodies that govern the Lander, the 
counties and communes.13 Anyone who has attained the age of 
twenty-one years is entitled to vote for representatives in the 
9 The term "Supreme Court" will be used in the text to refer to the Supreme Court 
of the United States. 
10 In recent years the Supreme Court has accorded less judicial protection to economic 
liberty and property rights but, on the other hand, has used its power of judicial review 
more vigorously to protect freedom of expression, the procedural rights of the accused, 
and freedom from racial discrimination. This shift in emphasis finds its explanation in 
judicial accommodation of constitutional interpretation to the Court's understanding of 
the values basic to a democratic society. See K.AUPER, FRONTIERS OF CoNSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY 
18-54 (1956). 
11 Art. 20, §(2). 
12 Art. 38, §(1). 
13 Art. 28, §(1). 
1098 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58 
Bundestag and anyone who has attained the age of twenty-five is 
eligible for election.14 Qualifications for voting for representatives 
in the legislatures of the Lander are determined by the laws of the 
respective Lander. This pattern for the determination of voting 
rights and qualifications differs in some respects from that followed 
in the American system. The Constitution creates the right to 
vote for congressional representatives and senators.15 On the other 
hand, the right to vote in state and local matters is derived from the 
respective state constitutions. The Constitution without defining 
qualifications states that persons qualified by state law to vote for 
the most numerous branch of the state legislature are thereby 
qualified to vote for representatives and senators.16 Thus qualifica-
tion under state law becomes the standard for voting for both 
federal and state legislative officers. However, the express prohibi-
tions of the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments which deny 
the power to define voting qualifications by reference to race, color, 
or sex, in addition to the general prohibition against discrimina-
tion stated in the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, restrict the states in defining qualifications.17, 
The Basic Law recognizes that political parties are indispen-
sable to the functioning of a democratic society resting on the will 
of the people.18 Indeed, they are considered quasi-organs of the 
state.19 Article 21 states that political parties may be freely 
formed, that their internal organization must conform to demo-
cratic principles, and that they must publicly account for the 
sources of their funds.20 
14 Art. 38, §(2). 
15 See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). 
16 Art. I, §2, ,r I. (representatives); Amendment XVII (senators). 
l'I' Consistent with these limitations, the states are free to determine age limits for 
voting and may further define voting qualifications by reference to such factors as citizen-
ship, literacy, and the payment of poll taxes. See Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 
(1937) (payment of poll tax requirement); Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of 
Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959) (literacy test). 
Although the Constitution prohibits racial discrimination in the enjoyment of the 
voting right, some of the states by various devices have effectively denied Negroes the 
right to vote. Congress, which has the power to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments, has recently enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1960, which 
includes new remedial provisions designed to secure the right to vote free from racial 
discrimination. 
18 Art. 21, §(I). 
19 Thus under Art. 93, §(1), No. 1 of the Basic Law, dealing with the jurisdiction 
of the Federal Constitutional Court in cases brought before it and between organs of the 
state (Organstreit), a political party has standing to contest the validity of an election 
law alleged to violate its constitutional rights. 1 BYerfGE 208 (1952); 4 BYerfGE 27 
(1954); 6 BYerfGE 84 (1957). 
20 See the discussion in the text, pp. 1124-1125 infra, of Art. 21, § (2), of the Basic Law 
which provides that parties which, by reason of their aims or the behavior of their 
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The concept of political parties playing a vital role in the 
election of federal officers was unknown to the Fathers who drafted 
the Constitution of the United States. The electoral college sys-
tem for the election of President was premised on a theory of 
election that did not take political parties into account.21 The 
system of political parties has grown up as an extra-constitutional 
institution. Freedom of political association and activity is rec-
ognized as implicit in the freedoms guaranteed in the First Amend-
ment and is thereby accorded judicial protection.22 Organized 
under state law, political parties are subject to state regulation in 
a number of matters and also to federal regulation in respect to 
accounting for funds, expenditures, etc.23 As a practical matter, 
therefore, political parties have come to assume vital political and 
legal significance under the American system even though they do 
not have the constitutional status accorded to parties under the 
Basic Law. 
The Basic Law states that the deputies to the German Bunde-
stag "are representatives of the whole people, are not bound by 
orders and instructions and are subject only to their own con-
adherents, seek to impair or destroy the free democratic order or to endanger the exist-
ence of the Federal Republic of Germany are unconstitutional, and that the question of 
a party's unconstitutionality shall be decided by the Federal Constitutional Court. 
21 Art. II, §1 of the Constitution, as amended by the Twelfth Amendment, provides 
that each state shall appoint electors in a number equal to the state's total number of 
senators and representatives in Congress who shall then cast the state's votes for Presi-
dent and Vice-President. The theory here was that the electors would exercise their 
judgment in voting for the men best qualified for these offices. With the rise of political 
parties, a basic theory of the electoral college was abandoned, and under today's practice, 
the electors, chosen by their respective parties, serve the mechanical function of casting 
the state's vote in the electoral college in support of the Presidential and Vice-Presi-
dential candidates who received the highest vote in the state's popular election. The 
electoral college system is still important in that it results in the casting of the state's 
vote as a unit, regardless of the size of the vote of the defeated party. On the status of 
electors, see Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952). 
22 See the discussion in United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 
(1947). 
23 Congress has acted to outlaw the Communist Party by means of the Communist 
Control Act of 1954. 68 Stat. 775 (1954), 50 U.S.C. (1958) §§841-888. See comment, 53 
MICH. L. R.Ev. 1153 (1955). Moreover, conspiracy to organize a party in order to advocate 
overthrow of the government by force is punishable under federal legislation. See Dennis 
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). Prior to the enactment of the Communist Control 
Act of 1954, some states by legislation had denied the Communist Party a place on the 
ballot. See Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Elections of Baltimore, 341 U.S. 56 (1951); 
comment, 34 VA. L R.Ev. 450 (1948). 
This legislative treatment of the Communist Party under American law may be com-
pared with the express provision of the Basic Law [Art. 21, § (2)], which states that 
political parties which seek to impair or destroy the free democratic order or that endanger 
the existence of the Federal Republic are unconstitutional. See note 20 supra, and the 
discussion in the text, pp. 1124-1125 infra. 
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science."24 The representative character of the law-making organ 
and its freedom from popular pressure in discharging its functions 
in an area of exclusive federal competence were emphasized by the 
decision of the Federal Constitutional Court25 holding invalid the 
laws of two Lander which had authorized popular advisory ref-
erenda to be held on the question of arming the military forces 
with atomic weapons after the Bundestag had voted favorably on 
this proposal. The federal government had brought the suit be-
fore the Federal Constitutional Court to enjoin the Lander from 
proceeding to hold these referenda. In upholding the federal 
government's action and granting the requested relief, the Federal 
Constitutional Court held that the purpose of the proposed ref-
erenda in voicing popular opinion on the subject would be to 
subject the Bundestag and the federal government to unauthorized 
pressures in discharging their responsibilities in an area of exclu-
sive federal responsibility. By undertaking these referenda on 
their own responsibility, the Lander were attempting to replace 
the collective will of the Federation by the wills of the separate 
Lander. The Lander had made the argument that in any event 
it was proper for a Land to conduct a referendum as a means of 
advising the Land's representatives in the Bundesrat26 on the posi-
tion to take on this question. The Court's answer to this was that 
under the Basic Law the members of the Bundesrat represented 
the administrations of their respective Lander~ and it was therefore 
the function of these administrations and not of the people of the 
Lander to advise their representatives on how to vote on a given 
issue. 
The requirement of Article 38 of the Basic Law that depu,ties 
be elected in "equal" elections has raised problems with respect 
to attempts to limit the rights of smalL splinter parties. Although 
West Germany uses an electoral system which relies in part on the 
.24 Art. 38, § (1 ). 
25 8 BVerfGE 104 (1958). See also 8 BVerfGE 122 (1958), where the Court directed 
the administration of a Land to take appropriate steps to prevent a municipality from 
conducting a local advisory referendum on this same question. The proceeding and relief 
took this form since the Federal Constitutional Court has no direct jurisdiction over 
municipalities. See note 197 infra. 
26 The Bundesrat is the organ that gives the Lander a special representation and 
voice in the legislation and administration of the Federation. See the discussion in the 
text, pp 1153-1156 infra. It 'should not be confused with the Bundestag which is the primary 
legislative body of the Federation. 
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proportional representation principle,27 it has attempted by legis-
lation to prevent too great a diffusion of parties by requiring that 
a party display a minimum voting strength at an election in order 
to share in the proportionate distribution of seats. In dealing 
with this question the Federal Constitutional Court, apparently 
mindful of the practical considerations involved, has upheld the 
power of the federal, state and local legislative bodies to impose a 
limitation of this kind, thereby denying the absoluteness of the 
constitutional restriction and subjecting it to the general standard 
of reasonableness.28 Laws requiring such a minimum voting 
strength generally fix the standard at five percent, and the Court's 
opinions indicate that it would probably view as unreasonable any 
attempt to set the minimum at a higher level. It should be em-
phasized, moreover, that the question before the Federal Con-
stitutional Court related to the proportional distribution of seats 
after an election, and that the complete exclusion of a party from 
a ballot because of failure to display minimum voting strength at 
a prior election was not at issue.29 
Although the system of proportional representation is not 
followed in the United States except in a few instances of municipal 
elections, some related questions respecting equality of parties and 
equality of voting rights have been raised before the Supreme 
Court under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Thus it was argued that a state law requiring a cer-
tain number of signatures on a petition before a party could be 
placed on the ballot and further requiring that the signatures be 
distributed throughout the state, including areas where signatures 
27 The electoral system of West Germany combines the principle of the single-member 
district, followed in the United States in the election of representatives to the lower 
house of Congress, with a system of proportional representation. Each voter casts two 
votes in the elections for representatives in the Bundestag: one for the candidate whom 
he favors in his local constituency, the other for the party of his choice at the national 
level. The second vote determines the basis for the proportionate representation of the 
parties with respect to one-half of the membership of the Bundestag. Under this unusual 
system political development in the post-war period reveals a trend toward a two-party 
system. See Dietze, "The Federal Republic of Germany: An Evaluation After Ten Years," 
22 J- PoL. 112 at 115-118 (1960). 
28 See l BVerfGE 208 (1952) (Land elections); 6 BVerfGE 84 (1957); 6 BVerfGE 99 
(1957) (federal elections); 6 BVerfGE 104 (1957) (municipal elections). In justifying this 
kind of limitation, the Court emphasized the problems presented by splinter parties in 
jeopardizing the effective functioning of a legislative body as well as the establishment 
and work of the executive department under a parliamentary system of government. Pro-
fessor Cole states that these decisions involve a considerable amount of "judicial free-
wheeling" on the part of the Court. See his article, "The West German Federal Constitu-
tional Court: An Evaluation after Six Years," 20 J. PoL. 278 at 294 (1958). 
29 See notes 20 and 23 supra. 
1102 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 58 
for this party were difficult to procure, denied equality in voting 
right. The Supreme Court refused to intervene in this case on 
the ground apparently that this was a "political question" and not 
to be resolved by judicial decision.30 It is fair to suppose that if in 
a given case the Supreme Court does assume to pass on the validity 
of legislation that denies a given party a place on the ballot be-
cause of its limited size, it too will approach the question in terms 
of the reasonableness and fairness of the classification. 
Equality of the voting privilege under the Basic Law received 
emphasis in another interesting decision of the Federal Constitu-
tional Court holding invalid the provision of the federal income 
tax law which authorized a deduction for contributions to political 
parties.31 In its. thinking the Court gave weight to the considera-
tion that a given political party may represent in a special way the 
interests of the wealthier classes, and that to allow the supporters 
of this party to deduct their political contributions gives an un-
equal advantage to these persons and to their party. In reliance 
on the type of formal logic often employed by courts in dealing 
with problems of equality under the law, the Court might have 
said that the law dealt equally with all taxpayers in permitting 
each to take deductions for political contributions. The Court's 
reliance instead on functional considerations drawn from the 
realities of political life lends particular interests to this decision. 
III. BASIC RIGHTS 
A. Underlying Values and Principles 
The foundation for the specific rights catalogued in Part I of 
the Basic Law is found in the first two sections of Article 1 which 
state that the dignity of man is inviolable, that it is the duty of all 
state authority to respect and protect it, and that the "German peo-
ple, therefore, acknowledges inviolable and inalienable human 
rights as a basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the 
world." The reference here to inviolable and inalienable human 
rights suggests the language of the American Declaration of In-
dependence, 32 and suggests also the theory of "fundamental rights" 
so MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948). It should be noted, however, that some 
language used in the per curiam opinion in this case suggests that the Court disposed 
of the case on the merits on the theory that it was not arbitrary for the legislature to 
promote a balance of voting strength as between urban and rural areas. 
318 BVerfGE 51 (1958). 
32 "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they 
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are 
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which the Supreme Court has relied upon in the interpretation of 
the due process clause.as The word "acknowledges" as it appears in 
the Basic Law deserves emphasis. The Basic Law does not create 
these inviolable and inalienable rights. Rather it declares and recog-
nizes the natural rights of the person and furnishes positive sanc-
tion for them. The assumptions underlying Article 1 of the 
Basic Law assume further significance in the light of the idea 
expressed by German courts that there are some conceptions of 
right and justice which transcend the Basic Law and are superior 
to it and that, therefore, specific provisions of the Basic Law may 
be found to violate these supra-constitutional norms.s4 
B. Rights as Restraints Upon Both the Federal and 
State Governments 
The specific rights which are stated in the Basic Law and 
which bind the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary, 
serve as limitations not only on the Federation but operate as 
restraints also upon the exercise of governmental power by the 
Lander. This is an important facet of federalism under the Basic 
Law that distinguishes it from the federal structure under the 
Constitution. The Bill of Rights limits only the federal govern-
ment. To be sure, the body of the Constitution states some limita-
tions on the states as well as on the federal government3cs and, 
more importantly, the broad construction of the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has served as an effective 
vehicle whereby the Supreme Court has protected the so-called 
"fundamental rights" against state violation.36 But there is no 
complete correlation between the rights specified in the Bill of 
Rights as limitations on the federal government and those derived 
Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments 
are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." 
33 See the opinions in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Adamson v. Cali-
fornia, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). See also Corwin, "The 'Higher Law' Background of American 
Constitutional Law," 42 HAR.v. L. REv. 149, 365 (1928-1929). 
34 See the discussion in the text, pp. 1178-1180 infra. 
SIS See Art. I, §§9 and 10. 
36 For discussions of the fundamental rights theory, see Justice Cardozo's opinion in 
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), and the several opinions in Adamson v. Cali-
fornia, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). See also Corwin, "The 'Higher Law' Background of American 
Constitutional Law," 42 HARv. L. REv. 149, 365 (1928-1929). For an interpretation by a 
foreign observer and student of the historical development of the due process clause in 
American constitutional history and its present meaning, see DEPPELER, DUE PROCESS OF 
LA.w-EIN K.Al'ITEL AMERIKANISCHER VERFASSUNGSGFSCHICHTE (1957). 
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by implication from the Fourteenth Amendment as limitations on 
the states.87 
In this connection it may be noted that rights in addition to 
those protected under the Basic Law are guaranteed to persons as 
a matter of Land law under the separate constitutions of the 
several Lander, just as residents of each of the American states 
may claim rights as a matter of state law under state constitutions 
apart from the rights protected on the national level under the 
Constitution. 
C. Rights as Restraints Upon Governmental Action 
The third section of Article 1 of the Basic Law states that the 
specific rights thereafter enumerated bind the legislature, the 
executive and the judiciary as directly enforceable law. This 
language suggests the interesting and important question whether 
the specific rights enumerated in Part I are-to use familiar: Amer-
ican legal vocabulary-protected rights, i.e., rights which are con-
stitutionally protected only against action of the three branches 
of the government, or whether they are absolute or sumptuary 
rights in the sense that all persons are required to respect them. 
Under the Constitution of the United States the rights stated in 
the body of the Constitution, in the Bill of Rights, and the Four-
teenth Amendment are rights protected against governmental in-
terference. The Supreme Court has made clear that the rights 
here recognized do not limit freedom of private action.88 The 
duties that one individual owes another are governed by statutory 
and common law. 
Although the language of the third section of Article 1 of the 
Basic Law suggests that the basic rights thereafter enumerated are 
limitations only on governmental action, some of the specific 
87 Thus the following procedural guarantees included in the Bill of Rights as restric• 
tions on the federal government are not included in the due process concept: grand jury 
indictment, Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); trial by jury, Maxwell v. Dow, 
176 U.S. 581 (1900); freedom from double jeopardy, Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 
(1937); the privilege against self-incrimination, Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). 
On the other hand, the following substantive freedoms, expressly protected against con-
gressional abridgement under the First Amendment, are recognized as fundamental liber-
ties under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: freedom of speech, 
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); freedom of press, Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 
697 (1931); freedom of assembly, De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); freedom of 
religion, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
as See the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), holding that since the equal pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is a restriction only on the states, Congress 
in the exercise of its power to enforce this limitation could not constitutionally prohibit 
discrimination by private persons. See also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
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rights are stated in a way which makes clear that they are absolute 
or universal in the sense that third persons must respect them too, 
with the result that these rights become part of the body of private 
law. The provisions that men and women have equal rights,89 
that everyone has "the right freely to express and to disseminate 
his opinon by speech, writing and pictures . . . , "40 and the pro-
vision guaranteeing the right to form associations to safeguard and 
improve working and economic conditions,41 may be cited as 
illustrations. On the other hand, some of the specific rights as-
sume significance only as restraints on governmental action. The 
provisions that no one may be compelled against his conscience 
to render war service as an armed combatant,42 that there shall 
be no censorship, 43 and that all Germans have the right to as-
semble peacefully without prior notification or permission,44 fall 
into this category. 
The case is not so clear, however, with respect to some of the 
other rights specified in the Basic Law. Attention is called partic-
ularly to the provision of Article 3, section (1), that "[a]ll persons 
are equal before the law." While this language suggests a limita-
tion only on the action of the three branches of the government, 
the thought has been expressed by some German writers that the 
right here formulated is effective against third persons as well as 
against all forms of governmental action.45 This view, however, 
does not appear to have gained general acceptance. 
In any event it is clear that the question whether the basic 
rights are absorbed into the private law as a matter of constitutional 
imperative cannot be resolved on the basis of any broad general-
ities. Attention must be paid to the wording used in defining a 
specific right and the context in which it appears. 
But even in the case where constitutionally-sanctioned rights 
are limitations only upon governmental action, questions may 
still be raised with respect to the impact of these rights upon 
private action. In the first place, the very fact that the constitu-
tion recognizes and protects these rights may prove to be an 
influential policy factor in the shaping of the private law, so that 
39 Art. 3, § (2). 
40 Art. 5, § (1). 
41 Art. 9, § (3). 
42 Art. 4, § (3). 
43 Art. 5, § (I). 
44Art. 8, § (1). 
45 See ENNECCERUS•Nll'PERDEY, .ALI.GEMEINER TEIL DES BiiRGERLICHEN REc:Hrs, 15th ed., 
93 et seq. (1959). 
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these rights may be enforced against private persons even though 
this result is not directly required by the constitution. Secondly, 
the enforcement of private rights by branches of the government 
may so identify the government with private action that the 
constitutional restriction for the protection of right becomes 
directly applicable. The Basic Law states that the basic rights 
enumerated therein bind the legislature, the executive and the 
judiciary. Similarly, the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment operates as a restraint upon all three branches 
of the government. The application of this limitation to legisla-
tive and executive action raises no special problems. But when 
are rights violated by judicial action? The question has become 
acute in the United States with respect to the judicial enforcement 
of private contract and property rights. Starting from the· premise 
that courts are agents of the state, the Supreme Court has held 
that although private contracts raise no question of violation of 
constitutional rights, their enforcement by judicial order identifies 
the state with the policy underlying the contract and hence pre-
sents the requisite "state action" element.46 The full implications 
of this decision still remain to be explored.47 
The statement in the Basic Law that the specific rights bind 
the judiciary as directly enforceable law raises the corresponding 
question whether judicial enforcement of private rights may re-
sult in unlawful impairment of basic rights. Clearly this is the 
case where judicial enforcement of private right conflicts with an 
opposing right specificially protected by the Basic Law. Thus 
the Federal Constitutional Court declared invalid a judicial decree 
enjoining utterances that invited the boycott of a movie, where 
the decree was based on protection of the property owners' interests, 
since the freedom of expression was protected under the Basic 
Law's free speech guarantee.48 In short, a court may not act to 
protect a private right at the expense of a competing constitu-
tionally-recognized right. But this is not the same as saying that 
all judicial enforcement of private rights so identifies the state 
with the policy underlying the assertion of private right as to 
make it the equivalent of governmental action. If, for instance, it 
is assumed that the provision of the Basic Law that all men are 
46 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I (1948). 
47 Cf. with the Shelley case the decision in Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 
292 (1956), holding that no constitutional issue was raised by a state supreme court's 
interpretation of a private contract where it was alleged that the contract as sanctioned 
by the court's interpretation resulted in impairment of First Amendment freedoms. 
48 7 BVerfGE 198 (1958). 
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equal before the law is a limitation only on the three branches of 
the government, does it follow that a court in protecting the 
private rights of a proprietor who discriminates on the basis of 
race, religion or ancestry, is thereby denying equality before the 
law? Or is the court in a case like this doing no more than enforc-
ing private property rights in an equal way? It remains to be 
seen whether the Federal Constitutional Court will in a case of 
this kind take the approach followed by the United States Supreme 
Court in the restrictive covenant case.49 
D. Citizenship and the Rights Peculiar to It 
The Basic Law does not define the basis of German citizen-
ship. By contrast the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution 
provides that everyone born or naturalized in the United States 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof is a citizen of the United 
States and of the state wherein he resides. The Basic Law does 
deal with the loss of citizenship. It states that no one may be de-
prived of his German citizenship. But it also recognizes that loss 
of citizenship may arise pursuant to a law, subject, however, to the 
limitation that involuntary expatriation may arise only if the per-
son does not thereby become stateless.50 The absolute prohibition 
upon deprivation of citizenship is aimed against expatriation by 
means of direct legislative act, administrative decree or judicial 
decision. The fundamental idea here, having in mind the experi-
ence during the Hitler regime, is that expatriation shall not be used 
deliberately as a punitive device for imposing sanctions or dis-
abilities upon persons or classes of persons. On the other hand, a 
citizen's own actions may automatically result in expatriation pur-
suant to a law which defines the conditions giving rise to loss of 
citizenship, but even here the law may not force an involuntary 
expatriation if the result is that the person thereby becomes state-
less. Thus, to take an example from American law, voting in a 
foreign election could not be made the basis of an involuntary 
expatriation since no new citizenship is acquired thereby. But it is 
permissible to provide by law that a German woman shall lose 
her citizenship if she marries a foreign national and by virtue of 
the marriage acquires her husband's nationality.51 
49 See the Court's discussion of the general problem in 7 BVerfGE 198 (1958). 
50 Art. 16, § (1 ). 
51 For discussion, see HAMANN, DAS GRUNDGESETZ 160 (1956). 
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The Constitution does not expressly deal with the subject of 
expatriation. The power of Congress to enact legislation stating 
conditions resulting in the loss of citizenship, on other than a 
strictly voluntary basis, has been the subject of recent important 
decisions by the Supreme Court. These decisions, it may be noted 
parenthetically, have left a number of questions unanswered. 
By divided vote the Court has held that Congress may exercise 
a power of expatriation, even though it results in statelessness, as 
an implied means of effectuating other substantive powers. More 
specifically, the Court has held that Congress, in the exercise of its 
powers over foreign affairs, may attach loss of citizenship as a 
consequence of a citizen's voting in an election in a foreign 
country.52 On the other hand, loss of citizensp.ip may not be used 
as a punitive device where under the circumstances it appears to 
be cruel and unusual punishment.113 
Although most of the specific rights enumerated in the Basic 
Law are rights enjoyed by all within the jurisdiction of the country, 
certain ones are specified to be rights peculiar to German citizens. 
Thus the right to assemble peacefully and unarmed without prior 
notification or permission,54 the right to form associations and 
societies,55 and the right freely to choose a trade or profession,116 
are defined as rights peculiar to German citizens. Likewise all 
Germans enjoy freedom of movement throughout the federal 
territory,57 and no German may be extradited to a foreign coun-
try.58 Aliens, therefore, cannot claim these privileges as a matter 
of constitutional right. 
Under the United States Constitution the basic rights pro-
tected against governmental invasion may be asserted by both 
citizens and aliens. The protections of the Bill of Rights and of 
the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment extend to all persons. The distinctive privileges of 
citizenship are those peculiar to the relationship between the 
citizen and the government and arising from the nature of the 
52 Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958). Earlier the Court had upheld legislation 
which provided for suspension of an American woman's citizenship while she remained 
married to a foreign national, where as the result of the marriage she had acquired the 
husband's nationality. Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915). 
lS3 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
54Art. 8, § (1). 
55 Art. 9, § (1 ). 
56 Art. 12, § (1). 
57 Art. 11, § (1). 
58 Art. 16, § (2). 
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federal system.59 These include the right to vote for federal officers 
and to run for federal office, 60 to assemble for the purpose of dis-
cussing matters within the domain of federal authority and peti-
tioning the federal government for redress of grievances,61 and the 
right to travel freely throughout the United States.62 
Although, as stated above, aliens may claim the protection of 
the Bill of Rights and of the Fourteenth Amendment under the 
Constitution of the United States, their status as aliens does sub-
ject them to some disabilities to which citizens are not subject. 
Congress, which has paramount control over aliens, may impose 
some special restrictions upon them, 63 and even though aliens 
come within the reach of the equal protection clause the states 
may within narrow limits discriminate against aliens in the enjoy-
ment of some privileges, where the classification by reference to 
alienage is deemed reasonable and appropriate. 64 
59 Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. (73 U.S.) 35 (1868); Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 
(83 U.S.) 36 (1873). See also Justice Stone's dissenting opinion in Colgate v. Harvey, 296 
U.S. 404 at 436 (1935), and his concurring opinion in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 at 518 
(1939). 
60 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). 
61 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876). 
62 Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. (73 U.S.) 35 (1868); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 
160 (1941). In the Edwards case the Court held invalid a California statute designed 
to keep indigent persons from establishing residence in the state. A part of the Court 
found the statute invalid on the theory that it was an unwarranted restraint on the 
freedom of interstate commnce, but other members of the Court premised the holding 
on the ground that the statute resulted in abridgment of the citizen's right to travel. 
The Basic Law recognizes that the German citizen's right to travel may be restricted by 
law in order to deal with the situation where communities may be subjected to special 
burdens in supporting persons without means of support, to protect youth against 
neglect, to combat the danger of epidemics or to prevent crime. Art. 11, § (2). 
The right to travel suggests the further question whether a citizen has a right to 
travel abroad. This question becomes pertinent in connection with administrative limita-
tions on the issuance of passports to citizens. The Supreme Court has held that a citizen's 
right to travel abroad is a liberty protected under the due process clause and that it 
cannot be abridged except pursuant to statutory authorization. See Kent and Briehl v. 
Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 144 (1958). Cf. the holding of the 
Federal Constitutional Court that the administrative denial of a passport to a German 
citizen on the ground that he would make use of it to the detriment of the Federal 
Republic did not violate the freedom to travel throughout the federal territory as guaran-
teed by Article 11, 6 BYerfGE 32 (1957). 
63 See the discussion in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952), where the 
Court upheld the validity of legislation requiring the deportation of aliens who were 
members of an organization advocating overthrow of the government by force. 
64 Thus a state may provide that contractors engaged in public works shall employ 
only citizens, Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915), and it may deny aliens the right to 
engage in certain occupations with harmful tendencies, Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 
(1927). But in general the states may not discriminate against aliens in the licensing 
of legitimate occupations, nor may they require private employers to discriminate against 
aliens. See Takahashi v. Fish &: Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Truax v. Raich, 
239 U.S. 33 (1915). 
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The status of aliens suggests the further question as to. the 
status of corporations in the enjoyment of basic constitutional 
rights. The Basic Law states the general rule that the basic rights 
enumerated by it apply also to domestic juristic persons to the 
extent that the nature of such rights permits.65 This position of 
corporations finds a parallel under the United States Constitution. 
Thus, despite some controversy over the subject, corporations are 
recognized as persons within the meaning of the due process and 
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.66 Like-
wise they may claim the protection of provisions of the Bill of 
Rights, although some of the rights enumerated there, like some 
of the fundamental rights protected under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, are by their nature relevant only to natural persons.67 
E. Limitations on Basic Rights 
Some of the basic rights set forth in Articles 2 to 18 of the 
Basic Law are stated in an absolute form. For instance, Article 4 
states that freedom of faith and of conscience, and freedom of 
religious or ideological beliefs are inviolable. Others are stated 
to be subject to the provisions of general laws. Thus the rights 
associated with freedom of expression under Article 5 are "limited 
by the provisions of the general laws, the provisions· of law for the 
protection of youth and by the right to · inviolability of personal 
honor." But Article 19 provides that insofar as under the Basic 
Law a basic right may be restricted by or pursuant to a law, the 
law must apply generally and not solely to an individual case. 
Furthermore, the law must name the basic right, indicating the 
article, and in no case may a basic right be infringed upon in its 
essential content. 
By comparison it may be pointed out that in general it is recog-
nized under the Constitution of the United States that the substan-
tive freedoms protected against the federal and state governments 
are not absolute in character and that they may be limited by ap-
propriate exercises of the legislative power in the public interest. 
The principle that the fundamental rights protected under the 
65 Art. 19, § (3). 
66 See Justice Jackson's separate opinion on this question in Wheeling Steel Corp. 
v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562 at 574 (1949). See also comment, 48 MICH. L. R.Ev. 983 (1950). 
67 Despite earlier suggestions that corporations could not claim the benefit of the 
"liberty" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, later cases accept by implication the 
standing of a corporation to assert freedom of the press as a fundamental right protected 
under this amendment. See, e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). 
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due process clause are subject to a reasonable exercise of the 
police power on behalf of the public health, safety, morals and 
general welfare is a familiar one.68 But the Supreme Court re-
serves the final authority to determine the reasonableness of the 
legislation, and in exercising this power it resorts to the pragmatic 
process of balancing the respective public and private interests at 
stake.69 Even in the interpretation of the First Amendment with its 
categorical prohibition on the power of Congress to pass laws 
abridging freedom of expression, the Supreme Court, notwith-
standing strong dissent on this question, has continued to hold 
that these rights may be restricted by Congress by legislation ap-
propriate to its delegated powers, 70 although the nature of this 
freedom leads the Court in these cases to make more searching 
scrutiny into the legislative justification for the abridgment of the 
right than it does in the cases dealing with the implied funda-
68See, for instance, Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), holding valid a state 
law regulating milk prices as against the contention that it violated the economic liberty 
secured by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; West Coast Hotel Co. 
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), upholding a state law fixing minimum wages for women 
and minors as against the same contention; Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 
U.S. 365 (1926), holding that a municipal zoning law did not result in an unconstitutional 
deprivation of property rights; Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), holding that 
a state race libel law did not unconstitutionally impair the freedom of the press protected 
under the Fourteenth Amendment; Roth v. United States, Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 
476 (1957), holding that the federal and state governments may punish the transportation 
and sale of obscene literature. 
69For a recent illustrative case, see Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960), holding 
that a municipality had not proved an adequate public interest that warranted a require• 
ment that a non-profit organization disclose its membership list at the expense of the 
fundamental right of freedom of association. 
70 See American Communications Assn., CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950), upholding 
congressional legislation requiring officers of labor unions to file non-Communist affidavits 
as a condition to the unions' continued enjoyment of privileges under national labor 
legislation; Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), holding valid federal legislation 
punishing conspiracy to advocate overthrow of government by force or to organize a 
party advocating the same; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959), holding that 
Congress may lawfully authorize a committee investigation of Communist activities and 
that a witness may not claim the privilege by virtue of the First Amendment to refuse 
to answer questions relating to Communist Party affiliation. 
Justices Black and Douglas have taken the position that in view of the wording 
and policy of the First Amendment, any law which is found to abridge freedom of speech, 
press, assembly or religion is unconstitutional, and that it is improper for the Court to 
balance allegedly public interests against these freedoms in upholding restrictive legisla-
tion. See their dissenting opinions in the cases cited in the preceding paragraph. They 
take the position also that the First Amendment, interpreted to prohibit all laws abridg-
ing freedom of expression in its various forms, is made applicable to the states by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and so they reject the balancing process also in dealing with 
state and local laws that restrict these freedoms. See their dissenting opinions in Beau-
harnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Roth v. United States, Alberts v. California, 354 
U.S. 476 (1957). 
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mental rights under the due process clause.71 The approach made 
by the Supreme Court in determining the reasonableness of legis-
lation impinging upon private right by weighing and balancing 
the competing interests at stake may be useful to the Federal 
Constitutional Court in deciding when a law which restricts one 
of the basic rights, which is recognized under the Basic Law to be 
subject to restriction by or pursuant to a law, goes too far in that 
it infringes upon the essential content of this right. 
F. General Right: Free Development of Personality 
A broad underlying type of right is recognized in section (1), 
Article 2, of the Basic Law which states that everyone has the 
right to the free development of his personality insofar as he 
does not violate the rights of others or offend against the consti-
tutional order --0r the moral code. Here is a general provision 
which admits of wide and elastic interpretation. The central 
emphasis here is upon the individual's freedom of self-expression 
in the full development of his faculties. It derives its inspiration 
from the concept of the dignity of man as a supreme value in a 
democratic society. The purpose of the social order is to promote 
his well-being. But this same section of the Basic Law recognizes 
also that man is a social creature, that individual freedom is 
meaningful only in the context of a social order that maintains 
the conditions of liberty, and that the freedom of the individual 
is not to be identified with unrestrained license. The individual's 
basic freedom to express himself by word and conduct in further-
ance of the development of his personality is therefore subject to 
the stated conditions that he not violate the rights of others or of-
fend against the constitutional order or offend the moral code. 
The content of any specific liberties derived by interpretation 
from this basic freedom must therefore be determined in the light 
71 The Court has frequently stated that the First Amendment freedoms are "pre-
ferred freedoms," since they are indispensable to the functioning of a democratic society 
and should, therefore, receive added judicial protection. Note the following statement 
taken from Justice Rutledge's opinion in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 at 529-530 (1945): 
"The case confronts us again with the duty our system places on this Court to say 
where the individual's freedom ends and the State's power begins. Choice on that border, 
now as always delicate, is perhaps more so where the usual presumption supporting legis-
lation is balanced by the preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the indis-
pensable democratic freedoms secured by the First Amendment . ••• That priority gives 
these liberties a sanctity and a sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." Emphasis added. 
For discussion of the "preferred freedoms" concept and its practical implications in 
terms of judicial techniques in dealing with legislation restricting freedom of expression, 
see McKay, "The Preference for Freedom," 34 N.Y. UNIV. L. REv. 1182 (1959). See also 
KAUPER, FRO~ OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY 55.99 (1956). 
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of these limitations. But these are the only limitations that govern 
in this situation since the right to the free development of per-
sonality is not made subject to restriction by law. The interpre-
tation of this section requires a judicial balancing of this basic 
freedom and the rights derived from it against the social interests 
stated as limitations. 
The concept of the right to the free development of personality 
suggests by way of parallel the broad interpretation that has been 
given by the United States Supreme Court to the due process 
clause as a vehicle for the protection of the so-called fundamental 
rights, and which has served as a powerful vehicle for judicial 
review of legislative, as well as executive and judicial, activities.72 
Thus the Court said some years ago that "the liberty" mentioned 
in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "means 
not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical 
restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed 
to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of 
all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live 
and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful 
calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation and for that pur-
pose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary 
and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the 
purposes above mentioned.''73 
Although the "free development of personality" concept stated 
in the Basic Law suggests a possible breadth of interpretation that 
may parallel the Supreme Court's construction of the due process 
clause, an important consideration militates against this result. A 
number of specific rights which are essential to the individual's 
development of his faculties are dealt with, separately in the Basic 
Law. For instance, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, free-
dom to form associations and societies, freedom of movement, and 
freedom to choose a trade or profession, to mention some of the 
specific rights which have been characterized as "concretizations 
of" the basic right to the free development of personality,74 arc 
given express recognition in the Basic Law. Hence, the content 
of these rights and any limitations that may be imposed upon 
them are governed not by the first section of Article 2 but by the 
articles that apply specifically to them. 
72 For discussions of the "fundamental rights" interpretation of the due process clause, 
see Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), and the several opinions in Adamson v. 
California, 3!12 U.S. 46 (1947). 
73Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 at 589 (1897). 
745ee I BYerfGE 264 at 274 (1952); 4 BYerfGE 52 at 57 (1954). 
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Even though its reach and usefulness is limited by the separate 
enumeration of a number of specific rights in the Basic Law, the 
"free development of personality" section still admits of elastic 
interpretation as a source of specific liberties not otherwise de-
tailed in the Basic Law, and it is not surprising that this section 
has been invoked in many cases. Although the Federal Constitu-
tional Court has not yet squarely held a statute invalid as violating 
this section,75 the lower courts have given it frequent application. 
Phases of economic liberty have been held to be protected by it, 
including freedom of contract, freedom of competition and free-
dom of advertising.76 This emphasis on facets of economic liberty 
as derivations from the broad right to the free development of 
personality presents an interesting contrast to the reduced emphasis 
by the United States Supreme Court in recent years on economic 
liberty as a fundamental right protected under the due process 
clause.77 
G. Specific Rights 
Attention will now be given to specific rights protected under 
the Basic Law.78 
The Right to Life and Inviolability of the Person; Freedom 
of the Individual. The second section of Article 2 of the Basic 
Law declares that everyone has the right to life and to inviolability 
of his person and that the freedom of the individual is inviolable. 
These rights may only be encroached upon pursuant to a law. 
Although it may appear inaccurate to speak of these rights as 
specific rights in view of their general nature, it seems clear that 
the purpose is not to duplicate the "free development of person-
ality" idea set forth in the first section of this article but rather 
to stress the elementary idea, paralleled by the basic procedural 
significance of the due process clause in the United States Con-
75 See the discussion in 4 BVerfGE 7 at 15 (1954). 
76 See HAMANN, DAS GRUNDGESEI'Z 81 (1956). 
77 See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), upholding legislation regulating the 
price of milk; West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), upholding legislation 
fixing minimum wages for women and children. For a significant statement on the decline 
of economic liberty as a substantive right protected under the due process clause, see 
Justice Black's opinion in Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron &: Metal 
Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949). See also on the subject, KAUP.ER, FRONTIERS OF CoNSTITIJTIONAL 
LIBERTY 33-54 (1956). 
78 The restrictions on deprivation and loss of citizenship under Art. 16 of the Basic 
Law have already been discussed, p. 1107 supra, and the freedom of movement, guaran-
teed under Art. 11, is referred to in note 62 supra. Consideration of these matters is, 
therefore, excluded from the discussion that follows in the text. 
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stitution, namely, that no person shall be deprived of life or 
liberty except pursuant to law and in accordance with the pro-
cedures established by law. Articles IO I, I 03 and 104 of the Basic 
Law detailing protections for persons charged with crime and 
placing limitations on the actions of the police serve in a practical 
way to implement the freedoms specified in the second section of 
Article 2.79 
Although the provisions of Article 2, section (2), are directed 
primarily against illegal deprivations of life or liberty, i.e., depriva-
tions not authorized by a law, the freedoms here mentioned ap-
pear to be the source of substantive rights as well in the sense 
that no law encroaching upon them may infringe upon their 
essential content as stated in Article 19. Indeed, the right to life 
acquires added significance from the Basic Law itself since it 
expressly abolishes capital punishment.80 The individual's right 
to inviolability of his person suggests important substantive rights 
with respect to freedom from impairment of physical faculties. 
The Supreme Court of the United States, for instance, has faced 
the question whether legislation directing sexual sterilization of 
persons in certain categories violates the fundamental liberty of 
the person protected under the due process clause. Although the 
Court has sustained legislation authorizing the sterilization of 
mental defectives where the record in the specific case before the 
Court clearly showed hereditary weakness,81 it has also indicated 
that it will closely scrutinize any extension of the sterilization treat-
ment to other classes of persons.82 
Equal Protection of the Laws. Article 3 of the Basic Law 
states, first of all, the general proposition that all persons are equal 
before the law. This parallels the Fourteenth Amendment's pro-
vision that no state shall deny to any person the equal protection 
of the laws, a limitation which the Supreme Court has said is also 
implicit in the notion of due process of law in the Fifth Amend-
ment as a restriction on the federal govemment.83 The general 
79 See the discussion in the text, pp. 1134-1136 infra. 
so Art. 102. The Constitution of the United States does not prohibit capital punish-
ment, although the Eighth Amendment does prohibit "cruel and unusual punishment." 
Capital punishment has been abolished in a number of states either by statute or by 
constitutional amendment. 
81 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
82 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), where the Court held invalid a 
state statute requiring the sterilization of certain classes of habitual criminals. 
83 See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), holding that legislation which required 
racial segregation in the public schools of the District of Columbia, an area under federal 
control, was invalid under the Fifth Amendment. 
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equality section has already been frequently invoked before the 
Federal Constitutional Court, just as in American constitutional 
litigation it is a frequently-invoked article in connection with a 
claim that a statute is preferential or discriminatory in its treat-
ment of persons or classes. The Supreme Court in the interpreta-
tion of the equal protection clause has taken the general position 
that this limitation does not prohibit legislation that establishes 
classifications so long as they are reasonable.84 Likewise, the Federal 
Constitutional Court has said that the matter of classification is a 
legislative matter and that it will not be disturbed as a denial of 
equality unless it is arbitrary or capricious in the sense that there 
is no rational ground for classification.85 As a result the general 
84 The following oft-quoted statement, taken from the opinion in Lindsley v. Natural 
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 at 78-79 (1911), characterizes the Supreme Court's general ap-
proach to equal protection problems: 
"The rules by which this contention must be tested, as is shown by repeated decisions 
of this court, are these: I. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
does not take from the State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but 
admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is 
done only when it is without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary. 
2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely 
because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some 
inequality. 3. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state 
of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of 
facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails the classifica-
tion in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any 
reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary. • . ." 
As a result of this judicial tolerance of legislative classification, the Supreme Court, 
despite the frequent claims made upon the basis of the equal protection clause, is not 
likely to invalidate classifications established by tax laws and by laws regulating business 
enterprise and economic and proprietary matters, as distinguished from classifications that 
discriminate on the basis of race, color or religion. In one of the few exceptional cases 
arising in recent years, the Supreme Court invalidated a statute which subjected com-
panies issuing travelers' checks to a system of regulation but expressly exempted the 
American Express Co. This was found to be a conspicuous case of unlawful preference. 
Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957). For cases illustrating the Court's readiness to rational-
ize and justify legislative classification, see Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), sus-
taining a state statute requiring the licensing of bartenders but prohibiting the licensing 
of a female unless she was the wife or daughter of the male owner of a licensed liquor 
establishment. 
85 In his paper entitled "The Role of Supreme Courts in Insuring Equality Under 
the Law," delivered before the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Asso-
ciation, Washington, D.C., September 10, 1959, Judge Hans Kutscher of the Federal 
Constitutional Court, after stating that the Court had adopted the views expressed by 
Professor Gerhard Leibholz (now a judge of the Federal Constitutional Court) in his book 
[Dm GLEICHHEIT VOR DEM GESETZ (1st ed., 1925; 2d ed., 1959) ], continued as follows: 
" ••• According to the Federal Constitutional Court the principle of equality pro-
hibits arbitrary action by the legislature, that is, it prohibits arbitrary differential treat-
ment of that which is essentially equal. It is up to the legislature to decide what factual 
situations shall be considered essentially equal or unequal. It is not up to the Federal 
Constitutional Court to decide whether a statute provides the most effective or the most 
reasonable or the most equitable or the wisest solution of a problem. The court can 
declare a statute unconstitutional only if the legislature exceeds the limits of its discre-
tionary power, that is if no plausible reason for differential treatment can be found in 
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equality provision of Article 3 has not resulted in invalidation of 
any major legislation.86 
More effective as limitations on the legislative power are the 
specific provisions of Article 3. Section (2) states that men and 
women have equal rights. The importance of this provision, which 
may be attributed at least in large part to the economic contri-
butions made by women during and immediately after World War 
II and their increased participation in all phases of national life, 
is attested by the recent decision of the Federal Constitutional 
Court which held invalid the provision of the federal family law 
which gave the husband-father the ultimate power of decision in 
matters concerning control of children. The Court held that 
pursuant to several provisions of the Basic Law, including section 
(2) of Article 3, the wife was entitled to an equal voice in these 
matters.87 The full implications of this decision in terms of control 
of the family remain to be developed. 
The specific assurance of equal rights for women found in 
the Basic Law has no parallel in the United States Constitution. 
At most the equal protection clause serves as a vehicle for deter-
mining the validity of legislation that discriminates between the 
sexes, and early decisions of the Supreme Court do not support 
the idea that the equal protection clause requires equal legal 
which cas'e the statute must be considered arbitrary. You will realize that the court has 
followed more or less the same trend as the United States Supreme CourL" 
For cases, see I BVerfGE 208 (1952); 2 BVerfGE 266 (1953); 3 BVerfGE 162 (1953); 4 
BVerjGE 144 (1955); 7 BVerjGE 305 (1958). 
86 In his paper referred to in the preceding footnote, Judge Kutscher states that 
despite the frequency with which the general equality clause has been invoked before it, 
the Federal Constitutional Court has invalidated provisions of only three or four relatively 
unimportant statutes on the basis of this limitation. 
8710 BVerjGE 59 (1959). The Court rested its decision on §§ (1) and (2) of Article 
6, which state that marriage and family enjoy the special protection of the state and that 
the care and upbringing of children are the natural right of the parents, in conjunction 
with §(2) of ArL 3, stating that men and women have equal rights, and §(3) of ArL 3 
which provides, inter alia, that no one may be prejudiced or favored because of his sex. 
Attention may also be called in this connection to the Court's earlier decision hold-
ing invalid the provision of the federal income tax law requiring husbands and wives 
to pool their incomes in determining the applicable tax rate. 6 BVerjGE 55 (1957). 
Although one of the arguments before the Court was that this provision violated the 
equal rights of women and was, therefore, invalid under Art. 3, the Court's decision 
rested on the ground that the statute by subjecting married persons to a tax disadvantage 
violated the provision of Art. 6, §(1), that marriage and family enjoy the special pro-
tection of the state. This decision may be compared with the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Hoeper v. Tax Commission, 284 U.S. 206 (1931), holding invalid 
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment the provision of a state in-
come tax law which required the family to be treated as a unit in determining taxable 
income and the applicable rate. 
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rights between the sexes.88 Indeed, it required an amendment to 
the Constitution to assure equal voting rights for women.89 It is 
probably true, however, that with the growing recognition of the 
equal status of women as a matter of political, social and economic 
development, a development mirrored also in the trends evident 
in statutory and case law,90 the Supreme Court is likely at present 
to scrutinize more closely legal restrictions discriminating against 
women.91 
The third section of Article 3 of the Basic Law states another 
rule of equal protection in that no one may be prejudiced or 
favored because of his sex, his parentage, his race, his language, his 
homeland and origin, his faith, or his religious or political inclina-
tions. In short, the Basic Law in this section declares these factors 
irrational per se as a basis for classification. Except for the Fif-
teenth Amendment which expressly prohibits discrimination in 
voting rights because of race, color, or previous condition of servi-
tude, the Constitution does not explicitly invalidate discrimination 
based on the factors mentioned in Article 3 of the Basic Law, and 
any comparable results must be based on the equal protection 
clause. The whole recent development in interpretation of the 
equal protection clause to prohibit discrimination against Ne-
groes, 92 including prohibitions on legislation which requires racial 
segregation,93 makes clear that freedom from classification based 
on race or color is a fundamental right under the equal protection 
clause.94 Again, it may be said that the effect of the decisions is to 
88 See Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. (88 U.S.) 162 (1875), holding that a state law 
which limited the right to vote to males was not unconstitutional. 
89 The Nineteenth Amendment adopted in 1920. 
90 See the Supreme Court's review in Hoeper v. Tax Commission, 284 U.S. 206 (1931), 
of the changes in the law of Wisconsin that had led to the "emancipation" of women 
and decline of the unitary theory in respect to the husband-wife relationship. 
91 See, for instance, the dissenting opinion in Goesaert v_ Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 at 467 
(1948), where the majority sustained a statute requiring the licensing of all bartenders 
but prohibiting the issuance of a license to a female unless she was the wife or daughter 
of the male owner of a licensed liquor establishment. 
92 See, e.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), holding that Negroes cannot 
be excluded from party primary elections; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), holding 
that covenants designed to exclude Negroes from use of residential property may not be 
enforced. Also in a series of decisions the Court has invalidated discrimination in fact 
against Negroes in the choice of persons for jury service. See, e.g., Cassell v. Texas, 339 
U.S. 282 (1950). 
93 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), holding invalid legislation 
requiring racial segregation in public schools. The Court here rejected and overruled the 
"equal but separate" doctrine first enunciated in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
94 The Court has also in recent years invalidated state legislation discriminating 
against persons of Japanese ancestry. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); 
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948). On discrimination against 
aliens, see the discussion in the text, pp. 1108-1109 supra, and the sources cited in notes 63 
and 64. 
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recogmze that classification by race is inherently irrational and 
arbitrary. It seems clear also that any discrimination based on 
religious or political grounds would also be regarded as uncon-
stitutional, in view of the express recognition of religious freedom 
and in view of the recognition given to political opinions as a 
phase of the free expression of ideas protected under the First 
Amendment.95 
Freedom of Belief and Religion. Article 4 of the Basic Law 
declares that freedom of faith and of conscience and of religious 
and ideological creeds is inviolable. Moreover, the undisturbed 
practice of religion is guaranteed. Finally, this article states that 
no one may be compelled against his conscience to render war 
service as an armed combatant. These provisions, at least in part, 
suggest for comparison the general idea of freedom of thought im-
plied in the First Amendment to the Constitution and also regarded 
as a fundamental right protected under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,96 as well as the First Amendment's guarantee of the free 
exercise of religion, also a right recognized as fundamental under 
the due process clause.97 The Basic Law in its language transcends 
the language of our First Amendment with respect to religious 
freedom by placing all forms of ideological belief in this category, 
although again this is not a substantial distinction.98 What is 
significant about Article 4, by way of contrast with our system, is 
that it rests on a constitutional footing the right of a conscientious 
objector not to be compelled to render war service as an armed 
combatant. The Supreme Court's decisions indicate that no one 
may invoke freedom of conscience or freedom of religion as a 
basis for refusal to render military service.99 It may be mentioned, 
however, that the right of a conscientious objector to refuse to 
serve as an armed combatant or even to serve in the army on a 
non-combatant basis is now recognized by federal legislation. 
95 But the Communist Party and its members may be subjected to discriminatory 
treatment in view of the factors which distinguish this party from other political associa-
tions. See American Communications Assn., CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Harisiades 
v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). 
96 In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), where 
the Court held that a school board could not constitutionally impose penalties on a 
parent and child because of the child's refusal, based on religious grounds, to take part 
in a flag salute exercise, Justice Jackson, who wrote the majority opinion, said (at 642): 
" ••. If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high 
or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other 
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If 
there are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us." 
97Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
98 See West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, referred to in note 96 supra. 
99 Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918). 
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Although the Basic Law assures freedom of religion, nothing 
contained in Article 4 specifically recognizes the general principle 
of separation of church and state.100 The Supreme Court has held 
that the provisions of the First Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States, stating that Congress shall pass no law re-
specting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof, in effect prescribe a general principle of separation of 
church and state, and that this means, in addition to requiring 
that the free practice of religion be undisturbed, that the state 
cannot prefer one religion over another or, indeed, give any aid to 
religion even on a non-preferential basis.101 
Not only does the Basic Law not require separation of church 
and state as known in American constitutional law, but German 
practices repudiate the notion that the state cannot use its power 
and facilities to aid religion. Thus in the German Lander a spe-
ical church tax is collected by the government and distributed to 
the churches for their financial support.102 Such a practice in the 
United States would be a clear violation of the constitutional 
conception of church-state relations.103 
Freedom of Expression, Assembly, Petition and Association. 
Article 5 of the Basic Law which deals more generally with the 
freedoms of expression secures to everyone the right freely to ex-
100 The relations between church and state are stated more definitively in the con-
stitutions of some of the Liinder. Note, for instance, the following statement found in 
Art. 29 of the Constitution for Wuerttemberg-Baden: 
"The importance of the churches and of the recognized religious and ideological 
societies in the safeguarding and strengthening of the religious and moral foundations of 
human life is recognized. They organize and administer their affairs independently with-
in the law which is binding upon all and may, in so doing, develop freely. They fill their 
offices without the concurrence of the state or Gemeinde. The institutions and activities 
of the churches and societies recognized under this Article of the Constitution may not 
be misused for purposes of party politics. The civic rights and religious and moral 
duties of those in the service of the churches and religious societies in public life 
remain unaffected hereby. 
"Requirements for the recognition of a religious or ideological society are pre-
scribed by law." 
101 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). On the general subject, see 
PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND Flu:EDOM (1953); KAUPER, FRONTIERS OF CoNSTITUTIONAL 
LIBERTY 100-144 (1956). On the question of religious instruction in the public schools, 
see the discussion in the text, pp. 1126-1127 infra, and the cases cited in note 129. 
102 In theory the tax is levied by the churches, and the government's function is to 
serve as an agency in collecting and distributing the tax. See in this connection Art. 31 
of the Constitution for Wuerttemberg-Baden which states that those recognized religious 
societies which are public law corporations have the right to levy taxes on the basis of 
the official tax lists. The church tax is voluntary in the sense that a taxpayer by ter-
minating his church membership thereby relieves himself from payment of the tax. 
103 "No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious 
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt 
to teach or practice religion." Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 at 16 (1947). 
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press and disseminate his opinion by speech, writing and pictures 
and freely to inform himself from generally accessible sources. 
Freedom of the press, and freedom of reporting by radio and 
motion pictures, are expressly guaranteed, and censorship is pro-
hibited. The First Amendment to the Constitution by way of 
comparison states that Congress shall make no law abridging free-
dom of speech or of the press. Moreover, these First Amendment 
freedoms which the Supreme Court has characterized as "preferred 
freedoms"104 are also given protection as fundamental liberties 
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.105 
However, the express recognition in the Basic Law that everyone 
has the right freely to inform himself from generally accessible 
sources as an important conception underlying freedom of ex-
pression does not find explicit expression in the First Amendment, 
which is directed to the right of the person to express himself. But 
an appreciation of the function of free speech as an indispensable 
institution for influencing people's minds in the vital areas of 
public concern is implicit in the high value the Supreme Court 
has placed on the First Amendment freedoms even though the 
Court has not formally distilled the right of the people to hear, 
learn and know as a right implicit in the free speech guarantee.106 
The freedom of reporting by motion pictures, expressly guaranteed 
by the Basic Law, comes within the free press guarantee of the 
First Amendment.107 The express prohibition of censorship under 
the Basic Law finds its parallel in the Supreme Court's decisions 
holding that prior restraint is a particularly objectionable restric-
tion on freedom of the press.108 
104 See note 71 supra. 
105 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (freedom of speech); Near v. Minnesota, 
283 U.S. 697 (1931) (freedom of press). 
106 See MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960) for stress on the thesis that free 
speech is important because it is relevant to the right of citizens in a democratic society 
to be able to inform themselves and make decisions on matters of public concern. 
107 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). 
lOBNear v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). The emphasis upon freedom from prior 
restraint has led the Court to invalidate laws which prohibit the distribution of hand-
bills, religious literature, etc., without the prior approval of a governmental authority 
vested with discretionary power in the matter. See, e.g., Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 
444 (1938). 
Although the Supreme Court has not squarely held that all censorship of movies is 
invalid, it has in a series of decisions invalidated censorship orders prohibiting the show-
ing of specific films where it appeared that the standard stated in the statute vested the 
board with discretionary authority that was too broad or too vague, or that the ground 
for decision by the censorship board did not serve as a valid ground for limiting freedom 
of the press. Some members of the Court have made clear that they regard all movie 
censorship as an invalid form of prior restraint. See Justice Douglas' opinion in Kingsley 
International Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the University of the State of New York, 360 
U.S. 684 (1959). 
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The Basic Law declares that art and science, and research and 
teaching are free, although freedom of teaching does not absolve 
from loyalty to the Constitution.109 In so far as these freedoms are 
recognized under the Constitution it is either because they are 
regarded as facets of freedom of speech and press, or are otherwise 
viewed as fundamental liberties. Thus the Supreme Court has 
recognized academic freedom as a fundamental right protected 
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.110 
Under Article 8 of the Basic Law all Germans have the right to 
assemble peaceably and unarmed without prior notification or 
permission. In regard to open-air meetings, however, this right 
may be restricted by or pursuant to a law. The right of peaceable 
assembly should be coupled with the provision of Article 17 
stating that everyone has the right individually or jointly with 
others to address written requests or complaints to the competent 
authorities and to the representative assemblies. These provisions 
are matched by the specific clauses of the First Amendment 
securing the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to 
petition the government for redress of grievances, a right rec-
ognized as fundamental also under the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.111 In a series of decisions interpreting 
the due process clause, the Supreme Court has recognized that 
religious as well as non-religious groups have a right to use public 
places such as parks and streets to conduct their services and hold 
meetings, and that any requirement of prior approval by way of 
a license is invalid if it vests discretionary power in the licensing 
authority,11 2 although a regulation requiring prior notification or 
permission is valid if it is designed to do nothing more than 
regulate the orderly scheduling of meetings and is not used as a 
vehicle for censoring unpopular causes.113 
The right of all Germans to form associations and societies is 
expressly recognized under Article 9 of the Basic Law. While this 
general right is not expressly formulated in the Constitution, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that the right to form associations 
directed to the expression of ideas or to improvement of the status 
109 Art. 5, §(3). 
110 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957). 
lllDe Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937). 
112 See, e.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); 
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951). 
113 Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953). 
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of the group's members is a fundamental facet of liberty protected 
under the due process clause.114 
Mention may be made at this point of the distinction drawn 
in the Basic Law between those phases of freedom of expression 
which are stated in absolute terms and those with built-in limita-
tions in the sense that they are stated to be subject to restriction 
by law. Thus the freedom of faith and conscience and the right 
to undisturbed practice of religion under Article 4 of the Basic 
Law are put in absolute terms. The same is true of the right of 
Germans under Article 8 to assemble peacefully and unarmed 
without prior notification or permission. Similarly the right of 
Germans under Article 9 to form associations and societies appears 
unlimited except for a restriction dealt with below. Also the 
freedom of art and science, research and teaching appears to be 
absolute, except for the qualification that freedom of teaching 
does not absolve from loyalty to the constitution. On the other 
hand, the general freedoms of speech and press, enumerated in 
the first section of Article 5, are limited under the second section 
by "the provisions of the general laws, the provisions of law for 
the protection of youth and by the right to inviolability of per-
sonal honor." Likewise, under Article 8, the right to assemble 
peacefully may be restricted by or pursuant to a law in so far as 
this right extends to open-air meetings. 
The Basic Law thus recognizes that certain of these freedoms 
are subject to restrictions imposed by general laws, protecting ap-
propriate public interests which in the familiar American thinking 
and terminology come within the range of the legislative police 
power. Article 5 recognizes, for instance, the power to enact leg-
islation punishing the publication of obscene or libelous matters. 
As previously pointed out,115 Article 19 states that in so far as 
the Basic Law recognizes that a right may be restricted by or pur-
suant to a law, the law must apply generally, must name the basic 
right, indicating the article, and may not infringe upon the right 
in its essential content. 
By comparison, the freedoms of expression categorized in the 
First Amendment and protected also under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment against state violation are recognized to be subject to 
114NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
115 See the discussion, pp. 1110-1112 supra. 
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limitations appropriately enacted in the public interest,116 al-
though the Supreme Court has characterized these freedoms as 
preferred freedoms and for this reason subjects restraints on them 
to a closer scrutiny and employs various techniques that emphasize 
the Court's conception of its vital role in protecting the freedoms 
it regards as indispensable to the functioning of a democratic 
society.117 Indeed, so far as freedom of religion is concerned, the 
Court's numerous decisions in favor of this freedom suggest that 
not only is it regarded as a preferred freedom, but that it stands 
at the pinnacle of the preferred freedoms and is virtually absolute 
in character.118 
Apart from the provisions specifying that certain basic rights 
may be restricted pursuant to general law, the Basic Law incor-
porates other features designed to prevent abuse of rights at the 
expense of the free democratic basic order. Although Article 9 
guarantees to all Germans the right to form associations and 
societies, it directly prohibits associations, the objects or activities 
of which conflict with the criminal laws or which are directed 
against the constitutional order or the concept of international 
understanding. Moreover, Article 18 declares that whoever abuses 
freedom of expression of opinion, and in particular freedom of the 
press, freedom of teaching, freedom of assembly, freedom of as-
sociation, secrecy of mail, post, and telecommunications, property, 
or the right of asylum in order to attack the free democratic basic 
order forfeits these basic rights. The forfeiture and its extent 
are pronounced by the Federal Constitutional Court. Finally, 
although the right to form political parties is recognized under 
116 Thus Congress may make it a criminal offense to advocate overthrow of the 
government by force or to conspire to do so [Dennis v. United States, 342 U.S. 494 (1951)], 
require the deportation of aliens who belong to an organization advocating violent over-
throw [Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) ], require disclosure by witnesses 
of Communist Party affiliation in connection with committee investigation of sub• 
versive activities [Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959)], and require union 
officers to file non-Communist affidavits as a condition to the union's continued enjoy• 
ment of privileges under the national labor legislation [American Communications Assn., 
CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) ]. 
Similarly both the federal government and the states may punish the circulation, 
distribution and sale of obscene matters [Roth v. United States, Alberts v. California, 354 
U.S. 476 (1957) ], and the states may punish the publication of libelous matters, includ-
ing so-called group libels that incite to racial or religious hatred [Beauharnais v. Illinois, 
343 u.s 250 (1952) ]. 
J.17 See note 71 supra. 
118 But overt conduct, even though sanctioned by religious belief, may be prohibited 
by legislation that embodies accepted notions of public morality. See Reynolds v. United 
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879), upholding a federal statute prohibiting bigamy in federal 
territories as applied to persons who practiced polygamy as a matter of religious convic-
tion. 
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Article 21, section (2) of this same article declares unconstitutional 
all parties· which, by reason of their aims or the behavior of their 
adherents, seek to impair or destroy the free democratic basic 
order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic~ The 
Federal Constitutional Court decides on the question of unconsti-
tutionality. Pursuant to this provision the Federal Constitutional 
Court handed down its important decision finding that the Com-
munist Party existed in order to attack the free democratic basic 
order and was for this reason unconstitutional.119 This decision 
may be compared with the decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court upholding congressional legislation imposing disabilities 
on persons by reference to Communist Party membership, up-
holding the constitutionality of the Smith Act in its application 
to Communists charged with conspiracy to advocate overthrow of 
government by force and to organize a party engaged in such 
advocacy, and upholding provisions of federal legislation requiring 
the deportation of Communists.120 The important difference be-
tween the two constitutional systems in dealing with Communism 
as a subversive movement is that whereas under the Basic Law 
the Federal Constitutional Court is directly charged with respon-
sibility for dealing with the problem, any restrictions under 
American law originate with Congress or the state legislative 
bodies. It is the Supreme Court's function to decide whether the 
statutory restriction either on its face or in its application violates 
the First Amendment freedoms, and the Court's decisions have 
made clear that these freedoms may be abridged pursuant to 
legislation designed to protect vital interests. 
Marriage, Family, and the Rights of Parents and Children. 
The Basic Law states that marriage and family enjoy the special 
protection of the state, declares that the care and upbringing of 
children are the natural rights of the parents and a duty primarily 
incumbent upon them but that the state watches over the per-
formance of this duty, and provides that children may be separated 
from the family against the will of the persons entitled to bring 
them up only pursuant to a law, if those so entitled fail in their 
duty or if the children are otherwise threatened with neglect.121 
119 5 BVerfGE 85 (1956). For comment on this decision, see McWhinney, "The Ger• 
man Federal Constitutional Court and the Communist Party Decision," 32 !No. L.J. 295 
(1957). In an earlier decision the Court had similarly held the neo-fascist Socialist Reich 
Party unconstitutional, 2 BVerfGE I (1952). 
120 See the cases cited in note ll6 supra. 
121 Art. 6, § § (I)· (3). 
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The importance of these provisions is highlighted by the decisions 
of the Federal Constitutional Court holding unconstitutional the 
provision of the family law giving the husband-father the power 
of decision over matters concerning the control and education of 
the children122 and the provision of the income tax law requiring 
the pooling of the separate incomes o~ husband and wife in deter-
mining the applicable tax rate.123 The law giving the father the 
controlling voice over the children was found to violate the wife's 
equal right to participate in these matters, and the income tax 
provision was held to discriminate against the family relationship. 
Although the United States Constitution does not deal ex-
pressly with family matters, it should be noted that the Supreme 
Court has recognized the natural right of parents with respect to 
the care and education of their children as a fundamental right 
protected under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.124 
Article 6 of the Basic Law further asserts the rights of mothers 
to the protection and care of the community and the duty of the 
legislature to provide illegitimate children with the same op-
portunities for their physical and spiritual development and their 
position in society as are enjoyed by legitimate children. Provisions 
of this type, oriented toward a program of social welfare legislation, 
are not generally found in American constitutions which are con-
cerned with political . and personal freedoms and are instead re-
garded as a matter appropriate for the usual law-making processes. 
Education and Religious Instruction. The Basic Law deals 
at length with the important matter of education. Article 7 states 
at the outset that the entire educational system is under the super-
vision of the state. The persons entitled to bring up a child have 
the right to decide whether it shall receive religious instruction 
which forms part of the ordinary curriculum in the state and muni-
cipal schools except in secular schools. Without prejudice to the 
state's right of supervision, religious instruction is given in ac-
cordance with the tenets of the religious communities, but no 
teacher may be obliged against his will to give religious instruc-
tion. Although the right to establish private schools is guaranteed, 
12210 BVerfGE 59 (1959). See note 87 supra for a statement of the several grounds 
on which the Court rested its decision and also the discussion in the text at that point. 
123 6 BVerfGE 55 (1957). See the prior reference to this case in note 87 supra. 
124 See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), holding invalid a state 
statute which required all children to attend public schools on the ground that this 
interfered with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the education of children 
under their control. 
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these schools when serving as a substitute for state and municipal 
schools require the approval of the state and are subject to the 
laws of the Lander, but this approval must be given if certain 
conditions stated in the Constitution are satisfied. These provi-
sions suggest interesting points of comparison and contrast with 
constitutional aspects of education in the United States. The 
Supreme Court has recognized that a parent has a right to deter-
mine whether his child shall receive religious instruction. Indeed, 
the Court has held that the right to send children to a parochial 
school is fundamental and that state legislation that forces all chil-
dren to attend public schools is unconstitutional as an interfer-
ence with the freedom of the parents.125 Perhaps the most inter-
esting point of contrast here is the recognition under the Basic 
Law that religious instruction forms part of the ordinary curricu-
lum in state and municipal schools (although a child's attendance 
at this instruction is subject to the decision of the parents), and 
that this religious instruction is given in accordance with the 
tenets of religious communities.126 As pointed out earlier,127 the 
Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment to require 
separation of church and state and to forbid all forms of state aid 
to religion. Pursuant to this interpretation, the Court has made 
clear that religious instruction and practices may not be included 
as part of the public school program.128 Indeed, the release of 
children from their public school classes for one hour during the 
week to receive religious instruction from teachers supplied by 
the churches is unconstitutional if the instruction takes place 
on the school premises.129 It must be remembered, however, in 
this connection that there is no general provision in the Basic Law 
which requires separation of church and state or which otherwise 
prohibits the government from giving aid to religion.130 The 
Basic Law, therefore, is much more flexible in regard to these 
matters, although it does explicitly recognize religious and intel-
lectual freedom. 
Privacy of Home. Article 13 of the Basic Law states that the 
home is inviolable and that searches may be ordered only by a 
125lbid. 
126 Art 7, §(3). 
127 See the discussion in the text, p. 1120 supra. 
128 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. I (1947). 
129 McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948). But a released time 
program is valid if conducted off the school premises. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 
(1952). 
130 See note 100 supra. 
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judge or, in tp.e event of danger in delay, by other organs as pro-
vided by law and may be carried out only in the form prescribed 
by law. Otherwise, this immunity may be encroached upon or 
restricted only to avert a common danger or a mortal danger to 
individuals, or, pursuant to a law, to prevent imminent danger 
to public security and order, especially to alleviate the housing 
shortage, to combat the danger of epidemics or to protect en-
dangered juveniles. In general, this presents a counterpart of the 
Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States 
which states a freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, a 
freedom which has also been recognized as fundamental under 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.131 The 
provision in Article 13, authorizing searches in certain situations 
without regard to the usual formal authorization, suggests the 
problem recently before the Supreme Court in the case132 where 
it held that a municipal ordinance could impose a fine upon a 
person for refusing to open his home for inspection by a health 
officer when the officer had reason to suspect a condition that was 
dangerous to public health. 
Freedom To Choose and Pursue Occupation. The Basic Law 
secures to all Germans the right freely to choose their trade or 
profession, their place of work and their place of training.133 In 
tum it provides that the practice of trades and professions may 
be regulated by law. The Basic Law here recognizes both the 
specific right to choose one's trade or profession and the specific 
right to practice or pursue the same. These rights fall in the 
category of emanations of the right to the free development of 
personality and but for their special treatment would be protected 
under and governed by section (1) of Article 2. Under Article 12, 
section (1), a distinction is drawn between the right to choose one's 
trade or profession which appears to be absolute in character, and 
the right to practice one's trade or profession which is subject to 
131 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
Wire-tapping is not considered a form of search and seizure that comes under the 
Fourth Amendment's restrictions. See Olmstead v. United States, 2:17 U.S. 438 (1928). 
Similarly it does not appear that wire-tapping comes within the search provisions of Article 
13 of the Basic Law. Article 10 of the Basic Law, however, states that secrecy of the 
mail and secrecy of posts and telecommunications are inviolable and that restrictions may 
be ordered only pursuant to a law. In the United States these matters are dealt with 
by federal legislation in the absence of corresponding constitutional limitations. See 
Dobry, "Wire-tapping and Eavesdropping: A Comparative Survey," 1 J. INTI.. COMM. 
JUR. 319 (1957). 
182 Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959). 
133 Art. 12, § (I). 
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the reservation that it may be regulated by law. Because of the 
close interrelationship, however, between the choice and practice 
of a trade or profession, the Federal Constitutional Court has 
recognized that the choice of trade or profession may be restricted 
by law but only if the public interests served by the restriction 
cannot be achieved by regulations governing the practice. The 
right to choose and enter a trade or profession stands on the 
higher level. 
Three interesting cases decided by the Court give a good pic-
ture of the practical significance of these rights and the theory 
followed in interpreting and applying them. In the well-known 
Apotheke case134 the Court had before it a Bavarian statute which 
provided for the licensing of apothecaries and which empowered 
the licensing authority to take into account as a condition of 
granting the license the question whether there were not already 
enough apothecaries serving the area so that further competition, 
therefore, was undesirable, both from the viewpoint of protecting 
those already in the business and protecting the applicant from 
embarking upon a losing venture. In this case the applicant had 
been denied a license by reference to these economic consider-
ations. The Court held that the part of the statute authorizing 
denial of a license on this ground was unconstitutional under 
section (I) of Article 12. This clearly was a restriction on the right 
to choose a profession. Recognizing that some restrictions could 
be imposed on this right, the Court distinguished between sub-
jective and objective qualifications. The legislature may properly 
impose subjective qualifications, relating to such matters as pro-
fessional competence, training, character and fitness, since the ap-
plicant has a chance to meet these qualifications and thereby help 
determine the result. But objective qualifications or conditions 
which are beyond the applicant's power to influence, such as the 
economic considerations relied upon in denying the license in 
this case, cannot be sustained, consistent with a person's constitu-
tional right to choose a profession, unless justified by weighty and 
compelling public considerations and unless the possibility of 
achieving the desired results by means of subjective qualifications 
are first exhausted. In the case before it the Court found no justi-
fication for denial of the license. 
134 7 BYerfGE 377 (1958). See Hamann, "Die Freiheit der Berufswahl," 11 NEUE 
JurusnsCHE WoCHENSCHRIFT 1801 (1958). 
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Thereafter the Court held invalid the provision of a milk 
control law which authorized the licensing authority to refuse to 
license a person who would not daily market a prescribed min-
imum amount of milk.135 Again this was held to be an unlawful 
restriction on the right to choose a trade. The Court rejected the 
argument that this was a health measure on the theory that smaller 
establishments would be less likely to observe hygienic standards 
and that a large number of small establishments selling milk 
would make inspection more difficult. Health and inspection 
measures could properly be enforced in regulating the business, 
but establishing a daily minimum quota of milk to be sold· was 
not essential to achieve these purposes. 
Notwithstanding its decisions in the two cases discussed above, 
the Federal Constitutional Court sustained the law which gives a 
monopoly to the apothecaries or pharmacists in respect to the sale 
of most ready-packaged, non-prescriptive drugs.136 Although it 
was argued that this created a monopolistic privilege at the expense 
of other businesses which claimed the constitutional right, pur-
suant to Article 12, to sell these drugs, the Court in advancing 
grounds to sustain this legislation emphasized not only the im-
portance of having drugs dispensed by those who have special 
technical knowledge but laid stress also on the interesting argu-
ment that as an economic matter pharmacists could not afford to 
carry on their important function of filling prescriptions unless 
they could count on the profits from the sale of ready-packaged 
non-prescriptive drugs.137 The Court's reliance on functional 
economic considerations to justify this legislation is noteworthy 
in view of its rejection in the earlier Apotheke case of the economic 
arguments advanced in support of the regulation there declared 
invalid. 
The role assumed by the Court, as evidenced in all three cases, 
in determining the criteria to be employed in passing on the 
validity of legislation impinging upon the freedom to choose 
and pursue a trade or profession and in effect deciding whether 
the restrictions were reasonably required, furnishes an interesting 
commentary on the functioning of judicial review in the protection 
of these phases of economic liberty. 
135 9 BVerfGE 39 (1958). 
1369 BVerfGE 73 (1959). 
137 The Court treated the regulation in this case as a regulation of the practice of 
their professions by both the apothecaries and the operators of other types of stores 
that were excluded from the sale ef ready-packaged non-prescriptive drugs. Hence, the 
legislation was not seen as imposing a restriction on the freedom to choose a profession. 
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Although important phases of economic liberty are protected 
both under the specific provisions of Article 12 and by derivation 
from the general right to the free development of personality 
under Article 2, neither the Basic Law nor the decisions inter-
preting it furnish a basis for postulating a general concept of free-
dom of private enterprise. In short the Basic Law does not 
provide a constitutional sanction for a laissez-faire theory of eco-
nomics. Indeed, the Federal Constitutional Court has said that 
the Basic Law is neutral on this matter, and that the legislature 
is free to develop its own conception of the proper type of economic 
order provided that its legislation does not violate rights protected 
by the Basic Law.138 
By way of comparison, it may be noted that although the 
Supreme Court at one time interpreted the due process clause to 
incorporate a broad concept of economic liberty, consistent with 
the ideas of free enterprise and a laissez-faire economics, this 
interpretation has been substantially devitalized in recent years 
by decisions upholding legislation imposing various types of eco-
nomic controls, with the result that while economic liberty still 
has recognition as a fundamental right, it is subject to a broad 
exercise of the police power limited only by a loose standard of 
reasonableness.139 The individual's right to choose and pursue 
his trade or occupation continues, however, to be regarded as an 
important liberty, and arbitrary exclusion of an individual from a 
profession is subject to attack as a denial of due process of law.140 
In connection with the right to choose and practice one's 
trade or profession, and as a phase of the broader concept of eco-
nomic liberty, mention may be made also at this point of the 
express recognition in the Basic Law of the right to form labor 
unions.141 Agreements which seek to hinder this right are null 
and void. In the United States the right of collective bargaining 
and the duty of employers not to discriminate against employees 
because of union affiliation is recognized by the national labor 
138 See the opinion in 7 BV erfGE 377 (1958). 
130 See the references cited in note 77 supra. 
140 See Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957), holding that the 
refusal of bar examiners to certify an applicant for admission to the bar was a denial 
of due process of law since the record did not support a finding that the applicant had 
failed to establish his good moral character or had failed to show that he did not ad-
vocate overthrow of the government by force. See also Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 
(1959), where the Court stated (p. 492) that the right to hold specific private employment 
and to follow a chosen profession free from unreasonable governmental interference 
comes within the "liberty" and "property" concepts of the due process clause. 
141 Art. 9, §(3). 
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legislation. In upholding this legislation the Supreme Court 
stated that the right of collective bargaining must now be rec-
ognized as a fundamental right.142 
Freedom From Involuntary Servitude. Article 12 of the Basic 
Law which states that no one may be compelled to perform a 
particular work, except within the framework of a traditional 
compulsory public service which applies generally and equally 
to all, and that forced labor may be imposed only in the event 
that a person is deprived of his freedom by the sentence of a court, 
parallels the Thirteenth Amendment, which, while prohibiting 
involuntary servitude, expressly recognizes that forced labor may 
be permitted as punishment for crime and which has been con-
strued to permit types of compulsory public service needed in 
the public interest.143 
Property Rights. The Basic Law guarantees property and the 
rights of inheritance, and states that their contents and limits are 
determined by the laws.144 This article further declares that 
property imposes duties and that its use should also serve the 
public weal. Expropriation is permitted only in the public weal, 
and the compensation in case of expropriation shall be determined 
upon just consideration of the public interest and of the interests 
of the persons affected.145 In case of dispute regarding the amount 
of compensation, recourse may be had to the ordinary courts. 
The results reached under the United States Constitution in 
respect to property rights bear close resemblance to the express 
provisions of the Basic Law. The right to own, possess and enjoy 
the use of property is recognized as a fundamental right in the 
interpretation of the due process clause.146 Private property may 
be taken by the government for a public use but only upon the 
142 NLRB v. Jones &: Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 at 33 (1937). 
143 See Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328 (1916). Likewise, legislation prohibiting strikes 
under circumstances where vital public interests would be affected does not violate the 
involuntary servitude prohibition. See International Union, UA W-AFL, Local 232 v. 
Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245 (1949). 
144 Art. 14, § (1). 
145 Art. 14, § (3). This section requires that a statute which authorizes a taking 
of property provide the means of compensation. If it fails to do so, it is unconstitutional. 
It is not the function of the judiciary to order a means of compensation in such a case. 
See 4 BVerfGE 219 (1955). On the general subject, see Schubert, "Compensation Under New 
German Legislation on Expropriation," 9 AM. J. COMP. L. 84 (1960). 
146See, e.g., Chicago, B. &: Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897); Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). But the right of an owner to dispose of his 
property by will has not been regarded as a fundamental or natural right. Magoun v. 
Illinois Trust&: Savings Bank, 170 U.S. 283 (1898). 
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payment of just compensation.147 Whether property is taken, 
whether it is taken for a public use, and what constitutes just 
compensation are questions for judicial interpretation.148 But 
property rights are not absolute, and the use of property may be 
subjected to reasonable restrictions imposed by the legislature in 
the public interest in the exercise of the police power.149 The 
line between permissible restrictions on the use of property and 
restrictions which are invalid either because they are arbitrary 
or because they amount to an attempt to take property without 
payment of compensation is not easily drawn, and any court 
forced into a decision on a question of this kind is inevitably re-
quired to employ an empiric process that weighs and balances such 
factors as the degree of impairment of private right, the breadth 
and nature of the public interest served, and the reciprocity of 
benefits accruing to private owners.urn 
Article 15 of the Basic Law states that land, natural resources 
and means of production may, for the purpose of socialization, be 
transferred to public ownership or other forms of publicly con-
trolled economy by a law which provides for the kind and extent of 
the compensation. This programmatic provision makes clear that a 
socialization program would not be incompatible with the con-
147 This restriction is expressly stated in the Fifth Amendment as a limitation on the 
federal government. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been 
interpreted to impose the same restriction upon the states. Chicago, B. 8e Q. R. Co. v. 
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). 
Attention should also be called to the provision of Art. I, §10 of the Constitution, 
prohibiting the states from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts. This 
serves as an added protection against retrospective legislative impairment of one class 
of vested rights. No corresponding provision appears in the Basic Law. 
148 On the "taking" question, see United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), 
holding that the flight of government aircraft over a private farm in such a manner as 
to interfere with the owner's effective use of his land constituted a compensable taking. 
The term "public use" as a limitation on the eminent domain power is no longer 
strictly construed by the Supreme Court. Property is taken for a public use if it is 
taken for a use that serves the public interest and general welfare. See Berman v. Parker, 
348 U. S. 26 (1954), upholding the use of the eminent domain power in connection with 
a project for the redevelopment of a part of the District of Columbia. The Court further 
indicated in this case that the question whether a public purpose would be served by the 
exercise of the eminent domain power was a matter primarily for determination by 
Congress and that the Court had a very narrow function to perform in review of this 
question. 
On the judicial function in determining "just compensation," see Monongahela Navi-
gation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893). 
149See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U. S. 394 (1915) (the use of property 
in a manner injurious to the health and safety of the public may be prohibited); Village 
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926) (use of land may be limited by 
comprehensive zoning laws that define permissible use classifications). 
lliO Helpful discussions are found in the opinions in the Village of Euclid case, note 
149 supra, and the Pennsylvania Coal Co. case, note 146 supra. 
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stitutional order established by the Basic Law and further supports 
the idea that the Basic Law is neutral in respect to the nature of 
the economic system within the constitutional order. At an earlier 
period in American constitutional history the Supreme Court 
employed the due process clause as a means of protecting the 
private enterprise system, and as part of this conception placed 
limitations on the use of public funds to engage in proprietary 
enterprise by finding that the due process clause prohibited the 
use of public funds for other than a public purpose, which was 
defined to exclude enterprises normally conducted by private per-
sons and corporations.151 These interpretations of the due proc-
ess clause appear to have little or no vitality at present,152 although 
limitations found in state constitutions continue to serve as re-
strictions on the powers of state legislatures to embark upon pro-
grams of proprietary enterprise.153 So far as Congress is concerned, 
taking into account its broad power to regulate and promote com-
merce154 and its equally broad power to spend for the general 
welfare,155 it is doubtful whether the Constitution imposes any 
substantial barriers to a program of governmental socialization 
of industries basic to the national economy, provided, of course, 
that compensation is paid in the case of expropriation of private 
property for this purpose. 
Limitations on Criminal Liability. Before concluding this 
review of rights protected under the Basic Law, reference may be 
made to the rights of those charged with crime. These rights 
occupy an important position in the United States Constitution,156 
151 See Citizen's Savings & Loan Assn. v. Topeka, 20 Wall. (87 U.S.) 655 (1875). 
152 See Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 233 (1920), where the Court upheld the power of 
a state to operate a bank, warehouse, grain elevator, flour mill and home building project. 
153 State constitutions commonly provide that public funds may be expended only 
for "a public purpose," and it is the function of the state courts in interpretation of this 
limitation to determine what is properly a "public purpose." 
154 U.S. CONST., Art. I, §8, ,r 3. Thus, incident to its power to regulate commerce, 
Congress may authorize federal proprietary enterprise at the expense of private enter• 
prise, as in the case of federal hydroelectric projects on navigable waters. The Tennessee 
Valley Authority program is a prime example. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 
(1936); Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939). 
155 U.S. CONST., Art. I, §8, ,r 1. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Steward 
Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). The breadth and general character of the 
federal spending power scarcely admit of limitation by judicial interpretation. 
156 The Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution detail a number of pro-
cedural limitations applicable in the case of federal prosecutions: indictment by grand 
jury, the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, freedom from double 
jeopardy, the privilege against self-incrimination, the right of the accused to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining wit-
nesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. The Fourth 
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as well as in the various state constitutions, and bulk large in the 
Supreme Court's interpretation of the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.1117 Although some rights of this kind 
are recognized under the Basic Law, they are included in Articles 
101, 103 and 104 in Part IX, dealing with the administration of 
justice and are not categorized as basic rights under Part I. 
In brief these provisions prohibit extraordinary courts, pro-
hibit a person's removal from the jurisdiction of his lawful judge, 
secure the accused's right to a hearing in accordance with the law, 
prohibit ex post facto laws and double jeopardy, place restraints 
on police action in restricting the individual's freedom by requir-
ing the restriction to be based on law and with due regard to the 
forms prescribed therein, prohibit the mental and physical ill-
treatment of detained persons, strictly limit the period in which 
police may hold a person in custody before bringing him before 
a judge for a preliminary hearing, and require prompt notice to 
be given to a relative of the person detained, or a person enjoying 
his confidence, of any judicial decision ordering or extending a 
deprivation of liberty. Many of these restrictions have their 
parallels in American constitutional limitations,1118 although some 
Amendment, previously discussed in the text, protects against unreasonable search and 
seizure, and the Eighth Amendment prohibits excessive bail, excessive fines and cruel 
and unusual punishment. 
Article I, §§ 9 and 10, prohibits both the federal government and the states from 
passing bills of attainder and ex post facto laws. 
1117 Since the express provisions of the Bill of Rights, referred to in note 156 supra, 
apply only to federal prosecutions, the limitations derived from the Constitution on state 
criminal procedure, except in respect to the bill of attainder and ex post facto prohibi-
tions, result from the Supreme Court's interpretation of the due process clause which has 
been construed to protect those rights which are basic according to the Court's con-
ception of fundamental fairness and justice. Not all the procedural rights specifically 
catalogued in the Bill of Rights as limitations on the federal government are regarded 
as fundamental. See the cases cited in note 37 supra. 
158 The right to hearing in accordance with the law accords with the central idea 
of the due process clause, namely, that a person shall not be deprived of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law, which reduced to its essentials means that a person 
may not be punished except after notice and a fair hearing in accordance with the pro-
cedures established by law. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). 
The body of the Constitution expressly prohibits both the federal government and 
the states from passing ex post facto laws. Art. I, §§ 9 and 10. 
The Sixth Amendment, applicable to the federal government, states that no person 
shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. This 
provision is commonly found in state constitutions as well. But the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, as a federal restriction on the states, does not require 
the states to observe the double jeopardy limitation in the same sense in which it applies 
to the federal government. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937). 
The federal statute requiring persons arrested by federal officers to be brought 
promptly before a federal magistrate has recently received a strict construction from the 
Supreme Court which has declared the rule that confessions obtained during a period of 
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of the details are not governed by constitutional provisions but 
instead are spelled out in the federal and state laws defining 
criminal procedure.159 The common American constitutional 
provisions are more concerned with protections of the accused in 
the course of the trial, such as the right to jury trial, the right to 
counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to- con-
front witnesses, and the accused's rights to have compulsory proc-
ess for obtaining witnesses in his favor. On the other hand, while 
restraints on police conduct assume a major significance in the 
Basic Law, the important protections for the accused in the course 
of the trial are left for legislative treatment in the Code of Criminal 
Procedure. In this connection it should also be noted that any 
comparison of American and German criminal trial procedures 
must take into account the basic consideration that trial by jury 
and grand jury indictment are not a part of the German legal 
system. 
H. Conclusions 
The recognition of fundamental rights under the Constitution 
rests on the classic assumption of constitutional liberalism that the 
freedom of the individual must be protected against the power of 
the state. The Basic Law, true to its general character as a docu-
ment which fuses the traditional concept of democratic liberalism 
with the evolving concept of the modern public service state, 
postulates some social rights that depend for their fulfillment upon 
positive action by the state. The provisions respecting the family 
and education may be cited in this connection. But most of the 
rights guaranteed under the Basic Law are concerned with con-
stitutional freedom of the individual in the classic sense. Com-
parison with the Constitution reveals recognition of a common 
illegal detention are inadmissible at the trial later. See Mallory v. United States, 354 
u. s. 449 (1957). 
The Supreme Court employs the due process clause as a means of curbing lawless 
actions of state police in subjecting prisoners to abusive practices by holding inadmissible 
at the trial confessions secured by the police under circumstances which are basically 
unfair to the prisoner and which impair the voluntary character of the confession. See, 
e.g., Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957); Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315 (1959). 
159 Thus the period of time within which police must present an arrested person 
for arraignment before a magistrate is often detailed by statute. The federal statute 
provides that this shall be done "without unnecessary delay." In Mallory v. United 
States, 354 U. S. 449 (1957), this requirement was held violated where the police had 
the opportunity to present the prisoner before a magistrate immediately after arrest but 
waited until the next morning to do so. 
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core of basic rights. Freedom of religion, speech, press and 
assembly, the right to equal protection of the laws, the right to 
compensation in the case of expropriation of property for a public 
use, the right to a fair trial and other protections for the accused 
are guaranteed under both constitutions. The Basic Law is much 
more comprehensive, however, and also more precise in its state-
ment of basic rights. It recognizes some rights which are left to 
implication under the Constitution either in the interpretation of 
rights specifically enumerated or in the interpretation of the 
fundamental rights protected under the due process clause. The 
freedom of art, science, research and teaching, the equal rights of 
men and women, the right of parents in regard to the care and 
upbringing of children, the right to form associations and societies, 
the freedom of movement, the right to choose a trade or profession, 
and the rights of property and inheritance all fall into this category. 
On the other hand, some of the specific rights catalogued in the 
Basic Law, such as the rights of conscientious objectors, are not 
recognized either expressly or by implication under the Constitu-
tion. 
An important difference between the Basic Law and the Con-
stitution relates to church-state matters. Although it guarantees 
complete freedom of religious and ideological views and the right 
to the undisturbed practice of religion, the Basic Law does not 
state a general theory of separation of church and state. The 
express provision of the Basic Law authorizing religious instruc-
tion in the public schools furnishes an interesting contrast to 
American practice as limited by the separation concept. 
A notable feature of the Basic Law is that unlike the Con-
stitution it defines more precisely the scope of the various rights 
guaranteed by it. Some of the rights may be asserted only by 
citizens. Moreover, some rights are recognized to be absolute in 
character whereas others are subject to restriction by law, but in 
the latter case the law must be general in character, must name 
the basic right it is restricting, and in no case may it infringe upon 
the right in its basic content. Such built-in limitations are not 
found in the Constitution. It is the responsibility of the Supreme 
Court to determine the scope of the rights expressly or impliedly 
protected under the Constitution, and in general it has followed 
the theory that these rights may be limited in the reasonable ex-
ercise of the legislative power to protect appropriate public 
interests. 
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IV. THE FEDERAL PRINCIPLE 
The Basic Law provides that the federal territory shall be re-
organized by federal law with due regard to regional ties, historical 
and cultural connections, economic expediency and social struc-
ture, and that such reorganization should create Lander (states) 
which, by their size and capacity, are able effectively to fulfill the 
function incumbent upon them.16° Further provisions deal with 
the procedure to be followed by means of popular initiative and 
referendum respecting changes regarding the Land boundaries 
established by the reorganization of the Lander after May 8, 
1945.161 The procedure regarding any other changes in the ter-
ritory of the Lander is to be established by a federal law which 
requires the consent of the Bundesrat and of the majority of the 
members of the Bundestag. But the basic principle that the 
Federation shall be divided into Lander cannot be changed by an 
amendment of the Basic Law.162 Thus, while the boundaries and 
the number of the Lander may be changed, it is not possible, con-
sistent with the Basic Law, to eliminate the Lander altogether in 
order to achieve a unitary state. The insistence upon this principle 
must be understood in light of the experience under the Hitler 
regime when the states as political entities were abolished and the 
federal principle as established under the Weimar Constitution 
was discarded. The important role of the Lander in the post-war 
160 Art. 29, § (I). 
161 Article US, included in the transitional and concluding provisions of the Basic 
Law, dealing specially with the reorganization of the territory comprising the Lander 
Baden, Wuerttemberg-Baden and Wuerttemberg-Hohenzollern, in the southwestern part 
of Germany, authorized reorganization by agreement between the Lander concerned and 
provided that if no agreement was reached, the reorganization was to be regulated by a 
federal law which had to provide for a referendum. The federal statutes enacted to 
deal with this matter gave rise to the first major case (the "Southwest Case'') before 
the Federal Constitutional Court and the first decision holding federal legislation un-
constitutional. 1 BVerfGE 14 (1951). See von Mehren, "Constitutionalism in Germany-
the First Decision of the New Constitutional Court," I AM. J. COMP. L. 70 (1952); 
Leibholz, "The Federal Constitutional Court in Germany and the 'Southwest Case,'" 46 
AM. PoL. SCI. REv. 723 (1952); Klein, "Bundesverfassungsgericht und Siidweststaatfrage," 77 
(Vol. 38, New Series) ARCHIV DES OFFENTLICHEN R.ECHTS 452 (1951-1952). See also note 6 
supra. 
Actually the decision in the Southwest Case, while holding parts of the federal legis-
lation unconstitutional, sustained its essential features with the result that the referendum 
as authorized by the reorganization statute was held on December 9, 1951. The pro-
posed reorganization of the three Lander into a single new Land known as Baden-Wuert-
temberg was approved by the necessary majority votes. The Saar was added as a new 
Land on January 1, 1957. At present the Federation consists of the following ten Lander 
(exclusive of West Berlin which has a special status): Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bavaria, 
Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland Palatinate, 
Saarland, and Schleswig-Holstein. 
162 Art. 79, § (3). 
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constitutional development is reflected in the key role played by 
the Lander's representatives in the drafting and ratification of the 
Basic Law.162a 
A. Distribution of Legislative Power 
Article 70 of the Basic Law defines the basic theory respecting 
the division of legislative authority as between the Federation and 
the Lander. The Lander have the power to legislate in so far as 
the Basic Law does not confer legislative power on the Federation. 
This finds a parallel in the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States which reserves to the states or to the people 
the powers not delegated to the United States. 
The division of authority between the Federation and the 
Lander is determined by the provisions of the Basic Law concern-
ing exclusive and concurrent legislative powers. Article 73 lists 
eleven categories of exclusive legislative powers of the Federa-
tion163 and with respect to these the Basic Law provides that the 
Lander shall have authority to legislate only if, and to the extent 
that, a federal law explicitly so authorizes them.164 Article 74 lists 
twenty-three categories of concurrent legislative powers,165 and 
162• The Basic Law was prepared and drafted by the Parliamentary Council which 
consisted of delegates elected by the Landtage (legislatures) of the several Liinder (eleven 
at that time). By its terms (Art. 144), the Basic Law became effective for all the Liinder fol• 
lowing ratification by the Landtage of the two-thirds of the Liinder. Ten of the eleven 
Landtage voted to ratify. Although the Bavarian Landtag voted to reject the Basic Law, 
it nevertheless voted in support of a declaration that Bavaria was a part of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. 
163 The Federation's exclusive legislative powers extend under Art. 73 to (1) foreign 
affairs as well as defense, including both military service for males from their completed 
age of 18 years and the protection of the civilian population, (2) citizenship in the 
Federation, (3) freedom of movement, passports, immigration and emigration, and 
extradition, (4) currency, money and coinage, weights and measures, as well as computa• 
tion of time, (5) the unity of the customs and commercial territory, commercial and 
navigation agreements, the freedom of movement of goods, and the exchanges of goods, 
and payments with foreign countries including customs and frontier protection, (6) 
federal railroads and air traffic, (7) postal and telecommunication services, (8) the 
legal status of the persons employed by the Federation and by federal bodies-corporate 
under public law, (9) industrial property rights, copyrights and publication rights, (10) 
cooperation of the Federation and the Lander in matters of criminal police and of protec-
tion of the Constitution, establishment of a federal office of the criminal police, as well 
as international control of crime, and (II) statistics for federal purposes. 
164Art. 71. 
165 The concurrent legislative powers extend to the following matters: 
"I. civil law, criminal law and execution of sentences, the system of judicature, the 
procedure of the courts, the legal profession, notaries and legal advice (Rechts-
beratung); 
2. registration of births, deaths, and marriages; 
3. the law of association and assembly; 
4. the law relating to residence and establishment of aliens; 
5. the protection of German cultural treasures against removal abroad; 
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with respect to these the Lander have authority to legislate as long 
as, and to the extent that, the Federation does not use its legislative 
power.166 
In the sphere of concurrent legislative powers, the Federation 
has the right to legislate only to the extent that a need for a 
federal rule exists because (I) a matter cannot be effectively dealt 
with by the legislation of individual Lander; or (2) dealing with 
the matter by a Land law might prejudice the interests of other 
Lander or of the entire community; or (3) the maintenance of 
legal or economic unity, especially the maintenance of uniformity 
of living conditions beyond the territory of a Land, necessitates 
it.167 
The statement in Article 70 that the Lander have the power 
to legislate in so far as the Basic Law does not confer legislative 
powers on the Federation does not tell the whole story, since the 
Lander may legislate by express authority of the Federation in the 
6. the affairs of refugees and expellees; 
7. public welfare; 
8. citizenship in the Liinder; 
9. war damage and reparation; 
10. benefits to war-disabled persons and to dependents of those killed in the war, 
assistance to former prisoners of war, and care of war graves; 
11. the law relating to economic matters (mining, industry, supply of power, crafts, 
trades, commerce, banking and stock exchanges, private insurance); 
12. - labor law, including the legal organization of enterprises; protection of workers, 
employment exchanges and agencies, as well as social insurance, including un-
employment insurance; 
13. the promotion of scientific research; 
14. the law regarding expropriation to the extent that matters enumerated in Articles 
73 and 74 are concerned; 
15. transfer of land, natural resources and means of production into public owner-
ship or other forms of publicly controlled economy; 
16. prevention of the abuse of economic power; 
17. promotion of agricultural and forest production, safeguarding of the supply of 
food, the import and export of agricultural and forest products, deep sea and 
coastal fishing, and preservation of the coasts; 
18. dealings in real estate, land law and matters concerning agricultural leases, 
housing, settlements and homesteads; 
19. measures against epidemic and infectious diseases of humans and animals, ad-
mission to medical and other professions and practices in the field of healing, 
traffic in drugs, medicines, narcotics, and poisons; 
20. protection with regard to traffic in food and stimulants as well as in necessities 
of life, in fodder, in agricultural and forest seeds and seedlings, and protection of 
trees and plants against diseases and pests; 
21. ocean and coastal shipping as well as aids to navigation, inland shipping, meteor-
ological services, sea watenvays and inland waterways used for general traffic; 
22. road traffic, motor transport, and construction and maintenance of long dis-
tance highways; 
23. railroads other than federal railroads, except mountain railroads." 
166 Art. 72, § (1). 
167 Art. 72, § (2). 
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areas of the Federation's exclusive legislative powers, and may 
exercise concurrent legislative powers as long as the Federation 
does not occupy the field by its own laws. What is really meant 
by Article 70 is that the Lander have exclusive powers to legislate 
in areas not embraced by the Federation's powers. It is a point 
worth emphasis that the Lander derive their authority from a 
constitutional distribution of power, that they do not owe their 
existence and powers to the Federation, and that within the sphere 
of their exclusive jurisdiction they exercise autonomous sovereign 
authority. 
The Federation's exclusive legislative powers parallel in im-
portant respects the expressly granted power of Congress under 
the Constitution.168 When account is taken, however, of the con-
current powers also, it is clear that the Federation's powers extend 
to many matters not coming within the powers of Congress, al-
though it should be noted that some of the concurrent powers, 
such as those relating to regulation of economic matters, including 
commerce, labor law, and promotion of agriculture, parallel the 
reach of congressional power either as expressly or impliedly 
granted.169 Perhaps one way to look at the concurrent powers 
under Article 7 4 is that they deal, at least in large part, with 
matters which in the United States fall within the implied powers 
of Congress. On the other hand, it is also evident that the Federa-
tion, in view of its concurrent authority to deal with civil law, 
criminal law, and dealings in real estate and land law, has a much 
broader authority than our Congress does, since the matters of 
strictly private law do not generally come within the express or 
168 Apart from the tax powers discussed later, the important powers expressly 
granted to Congress under Article I of the Constitution include the power to regulate 
foreign and interstate commerce, establish uniform rules of naturalization and bank• 
ruptcy, coin money and regulate the value thereof, fix the standards of weights and meas-
ures, establish post offices and post roads, enact laws relating to patents and copyrights, 
declare war, and provide for the armed forces. The primary power to regulate foreign 
affairs is vested in the President under Art. II. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Ex-
port Corp., 299 U. S. 304 (1936). However, Congress has power to legislate in respect to 
foreign affairs both because of the reach of its express powers in regard to such matters 
as regulation of foreign commerce, and because this power inheres in the national 
government. See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U. S. 44 (1958). 
169 Under the power to regulate commerce among the several states, Congress has 
the authority to regulate labor-management relations in industries affecting commerce 
[NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. l (1937) ], fix labor standards for em-
ployees engaged in commerce or in production for commerce [United States v. Darby 
Lumber Co., 312 U. S. 100 (1941) ], and regulate agricultural production [Wickard v. 
Filburn, 317 U. S. 111 (1942) ]. 
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implied powers of the national government.17° Indeed, it is fair 
to say that the combination of exclusive and concurrent powers 
under the Basic Law gives to the Federation a totality of legisla-
tive power considerably in excess of that granted to Congress, with 
the result that the areas that are exclusively left to the Lander 
under the Basic Law are very limited in scope. It appears that 
education and culture, along with matters relating to local ad-
ministration, are the only major areas over which the Lander have 
an exclusive legislative authority. 
The Basic Law recognizes a third category of legislative powers 
of the Federation, apart from the categories of exclusive and con-
current powers. Article 75 authorizes the Federation to enact 
what for lack of a better term we may tall general framework laws 
(Rahmenvorschriften). These have to do with (I) the legal status 
of persons in the public service of the Lander, communes and 
other bodies-corporate of public law; (2) the general rules of law 
concerning the status of the press and motion pictures; (3) hunt-
ing, protection of nature and care of the countryside; (4) land 
distribution, regional planning, and water conservation; (5) mat-
ters relating to registration and identity cards. Here the legisla-
tive power of the Federation extends to the enactment of general 
rules as distinguished from complete treatment of the subject. 
The Lander, in turn, have the authority to implement the general 
rules by detailed regulations of their own. In short, this category 
embodies the idea that these matters have a national aspect and yet 
admit of diversity of treatment in their particularized application. 
According to the classic interpretation of the United States 
Constitution, originating with Chief Justice Marshall's opinion 
in McCulloch v. Maryland,171 the Congress may exercise not only 
the powers expressly enumerated in Article I of the Constitution 
but also the powers implied from those granted. The implied 
power doctrine, coupled with the general theory of liberal con-
struction propounded in the McCulloch case, has contributed in 
an extraordinary way to extension of congressional legislative 
power. This principle of construction has its roots in the con-
170 Congress has the implied power to enact criminal laws with respect to matters 
coming within its legislative jurisdiction, but it lacks jurisdiction to enact general crim-
inal laws. 
Not only does the federal government not have legislative authority over matters 
of private law, i.e., contracts, torts, and property law, but federal courts in dealing with 
questions of private law coming before them must follow the law of the state, whether 
statutory or case law, where the federal court sits. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 
(1938). 
1114 Wbeat. (17 U.S.) 316 (1819). 
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stitutional language which authorizes Congress to make all laws 
which shall be "necessary and proper" for executing its enumerated 
powers and all other powers vested by the Constitution in the 
federal government.172 The Basic Law contains no "necessary 
and proper" clause. In view of the range of the powers delegated 
to the Federation, it is understandable that such a clause was not 
included. However, despite the absence of a clause of this kind, 
the Federal Constitutional Court, without formulating a broad or 
liberal theory of implied powers, has accepted two ideas that con-
tribute to a limited implied power doctrine. 
The Federation is said to have powers not expressly granted 
which relate to functions which by their nature (N atur der Sache) 
inhere in the very creation and constitutional organization of the 
Federation.1,.3 But the consideration that with respect to a given 
subject matter it would be expedient to have a uniform federal 
law instead of a diversity of laws of the several Lander is not in 
itself enough to show that the subject matter involves functions 
that by their nature fall within the competence of the Federation. 
In accordance with this principle the Federal Constitutional Court 
expressed the opinion that while land planning on a national level 
was a function which by its nature gave rise to a legislative power 
in the Federation to deal with the subject, the same could not be 
said with respect to building law taken as a whole (Baurecht als 
Gesamtmaterie) even though specific phases of building law came 
within the express delegations of authority to the Federation.174 
A second principle of construction that suggests a limited doc-
trine of implied powers is that an express grant of power to the 
Federation to deal with a specific subject matter carries with it the 
implied authority to enact regulations which are indispensable to 
the full exercise of the express power (Sachzusammenhang), even 
though the Federation may thereby extend its authority into fields 
of regulation not specifically embraced within its express powers. 
This comes the closest to the American "necessary and proper" 
idea, but any such analogy should be viewed with caution, since the 
emphasis given by the Federal Constitutional Court appears to 
stress what is strictly necessary to the implementation of the express 
power.175 
112 Art. I, §8. 
173 See the discussion in the advisory opinion reported in 3 BVerfGE 407 (1954). 
1743 BVerfGE 407 (1954). 
175 For discussion, see the advisory opinion in 3 BVerfGE 407 (1954). Here the Court 
concluded that the power to enact a building law was not necessary to the implementation 
of the Federation's legislative powers. See also the opinion in 8 BVerfGE 143, where the 
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A further comparison may be made at this point between the 
distribution of power under the Basic Law and under the United 
States Constitution. The Constitution in delegating power to 
Congress does not explicitly define these powers as either exclusive 
or concurrent and does not state any general rule respecting the 
continuing power of the states in these areas. Any powers given 
to Congress may be deemed exclusive by virtue of the provisions 
of the Constitution only to the extent that there are express 
prohibitions on the power of the states to legislate or to deal with 
certain areas, such as the express prohibition on the power of the 
states to make treaties or to enter into alliances or confederations, 
coin money, emit bills of credit, or make anything but silver and 
gold coin a legal tender in payment of debts.176 Likewise, no 
state may, without the consent of Congress, lay imposts or duties 
on imports or exports, lay any duty or tonnage, keep troops or ships 
of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with 
another state, or with a foreign nation, or engage in a war unless 
actually invaded or in such imminent danger as will not admit of 
delay.177 The federal power to deal with these matters is not in 
every case strictly exclusive, since it is recognized that the states 
may exercise authority in some of these areas with the consent of 
Congress. This does suggest a parallel with the Basic Law since 
even the so-called exclusive powers of the Federation are exclusive 
only in the sense that the Lander may not exercise legislative 
power in these areas without the express approval of the Federa-
tion. 
Apart, however, from the express denials of certain powers to 
the states, whether the denial is absolute or conditioned on ap-
proval by Congress, the Constitution states no general rules for 
determining whether or not powers granted to Congress are ex-
clusive or whether they admit of a subordinate concurrent power 
on the part of the states. These problems have been worked out 
by the Supreme Court in its role as umpire of the federal system. 
They have arisen most frequently in respect to the regulation of 
commerce. The Constitution grants to Congress the power to 
Court develops the idea that a legislative power granted the Federation implies a police 
power incident to the execution of the power. 
For extended and critical discussion of the subject of implied powers, see Kiichenhoff, 
"Ausdriickliches, stillschweigendes und ungeschriebenes Recht in der bundesstaatlichen 
Kompetenzverteilung," 82 (Vol. 43, New Series) AR.CHIV DES OFFENTLICHEN.RECHTS 413 (1957). 
176 Art. I, §10, 111. 
177 Art. I, §10, 112. 
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regulate commerce among the several states. In the absence of an 
indication of congressional policy respecting the power of the 
states to make their laws applicable to commerce, the Supreme 
Court has provided solutions by employing various theories which 
in the end permit states at least a limited authority to extend their 
police regulations and tax laws to commerce within the limits of 
their territorial jurisdiction. In the end it does not make much 
difference whether the Court says that the power to regulate 
commerce is exclusive but the states may exercise their police 
power to affect commerce,178 or whether it says that the states have 
a subordinate concurrent power to regulate the local phases of 
commerce,179 or that the states may regulate commerce as long as 
there is a valid local interest that outweighs the national interests 
in the freedom of commerce.180 Whatever the theory, a substantial 
amount of state regulation and taxation is permitted, consistent 
with the basic freedom to do business on the interstate market. In 
this sense, therefore, it can be said that the states do have a con-
current power to regulate commerce subject to the paramount 
power of Congress and its expressed or implied policy respecting a 
given phase of regulation. On the other hand, some phases of 
regulation of commerce have been denied to the states absent 
authorization from Congress.181 To this extent it may be said that 
the power of Congress over the subject is exclusive in the sense that 
this term is used in the Basic Law. What emerges as the central 
principle is that Congress has the superior power over the subject 
and that by its legislation it may expressly or impliedly deny to the 
states the power to deal with the subject182 or expressly authorize 
178 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) I (1824). 
179 Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia, 12 How. (53 U.S.) 299 (1851). 
180 Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). The opinion in this case 
contains an excellent discussion of the subject, and the approach here taken appears to 
represent the Court's current position on this problem. 
181 Thus the states may not regulate the degree of competition in interstate commerce 
[Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925), H. P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 
(1949)], subject commerce to conflicting requirements [Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 
U.S. 520 (1959)], discriminate against interstate commerce [Dean Milk Co. v. City of 
Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951)], or tax the privilege of doing interstate business [Spector 
Motor Service v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951)]. 
182 Legislation having this effect may assume either of two forms. Congress by its 
own substantive legislation in the exercise of the commerce power may occupy or pre-
empt the field and thereby impliedly displace state power, or the statute may by its 
express terms indicate the extent to which state power is displaced. The problem of 
displacement by implication has arisen most frequently in recent years in regard to the 
power of states to deal with labor matters in view of federal legislation in this area. 
See, e.g., Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. I (1957). For an extended discussion 
and application of the pre-emption doctrine in its relevancy to internal security legisla-
tion, see Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956). Congress, without enacting its own 
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the states to extend their authority over a given subject in inter-
state commerce.183 
The express authority of the Federation under the Basic Law 
to enact general standard or framework laws with details to be 
supplied by the Lander184 has no parallel under the Constitution, 
although it does suggest a familiar pattern with respect to the 
relationship of state and municipal authority under the several 
state constitutions. Congress may adopt local laws in some in-
stances, 185 may permit details in some statutes to be determined by 
reference to local law,186 and may condition the exercise of a 
federal right by the observance of state law,187 but at most these 
patterns suggest only imperfect analogies to the idea of a general 
framework statute as authorized by the Basic Law. 
B. Tax Powers 
The distribution of taxing authority is dealt with specially in 
Part X of the Basic Law as amended December 23, 1955. The 
Federation has exclusive power to legislate on customs and fiscal 
monopolies,188 and a concurrent power to legislate on excise and 
transaction taxes, taxes on income, property, inheritances and 
gifts, and taxes on real estates and businesses.189. But while the 
Federation occupies the dominant position in respect to these 
major tax powers, so far as the enactment of tax legislation is con-
cerned, the Basic Law stipulates that the receipts from certain taxes 
accrue to the benefit of the Lander whereas others are earmarked 
substantive legislation, may expressly deny a state the power to subject commerce to 
specific burdens or restraints. Thus in 1959 it enacted the Interstate Commerce Tax Act, 
expressly providing that no state may levy an income tax on a foreign corporation doing 
solely interstate business within the state. 73 Stat. 555 (1959), 15 U.S.C. (Supp. 1959) 
§§381-384. 
183 Thus Congress has expressly provided that the insurance business shall be subject 
to state regulatory and tax laws. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946). 
J.84Art. 75. 
185 Thus Congress in the Assimilative Crimes Act has adopted state criminal legisla-
tion in defining criminal liability in areas under exclusive federal jurisdiction. This 
statute was upheld in United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1958). 
188 Under the federal bankruptcy act certain property exemptions are governed by 
state law. 11 U.S.C. (1958) §24. On the validity of this provision, see Hanover Nat. Bank 
v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902). 
187 Thus Congress in the Webb-Kenyon Act prohibited interstate shipments of liquor 
intended for use or possession in violation of the laws of the state of destination. This 
statute was upheld in Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311 
(1917), as a proper exercise of the congressional power to regulate interstate commerce. 
See KALLENBACH, FEDERAL COOPERATION WITH THE STATES UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
(1942). 
188 Art. 105, § (I). 
189 Art. 105, § (2). 
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for the Federation's benefit.19O The receipts from federal income 
and corporation taxes are apportioned on a percentage basis with 
about two-thirds going to the Lander.191 In order to equalize 
financial capacity of the Lander, taking into account differences in 
tax revenues and differences in burdens of expenditures, the Fed-
eration may grant special subsidies to some Lander at the expense 
of the share of resources that would normally be distributed to 
other Lander.192 
In summary, the tax provisions of the Basic Law contemplate 
a centralization of the important tax powers in the Federation, 
but with earmarking of a part of the receipts for Lander purposes. 
By contrast, under the United States Constitution, the national 
government and the states have independent taxing powers.193 
Both Congress and the state legislatures may, for instance, levy 
income taxes, death taxes, and numerous forms of excises. As a 
practical matter pre-emption may occur if federal tax rates are so 
high as to discourage the states from levying a similar type of tax. 
Custom and experience have also indicated a line of division in 
tax matters. For instance, the federal government does not levy 
property taxes,194 and in turn this is a principal source of revenue 
to the states and their political subdivisions. Moreover, in deter-
mining the total fiscal picture account must be taken of the broad 
spending power of the federal government, which may use its 
spending power as a means of redistributing back to the states 
moneys collected through federal taxes, and in doing so it may act 
100 Art. 106, §§ (1) and (2). 
191 Art. 106, § (3). 
192 Art. 107, § (2). 
193 Under Art. I, §8 of the Constitution, Congress has the power to lay and collect taxes, 
duties, imposts and excises. Duties, imposts and excises are required to be uniform 
throughout the United States. Direct taxes are_required to be apportioned among the 
states on the basis of population. Art. I, §9. Under the Sixteenth Amendment (1913) 
Congress is expressly authorized to lay and collect taxes on income. The income tax is 
now the major source of federal revenues. 
The power of the states to levy taxes is derived from their own constitutions. Apart 
from limitations imposed by their respective constitutions, the states in exercising their 
taxing powers are subject to some limitations derived from the Constitution. The states 
may not levy taxes on imports and exports without the consent of Congress, Art. 1, §10. 
Because of the grant of power to Congress to regulate commerce, the states may not levy 
taxes on the privilege of doing interstate business. See Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor, 
340 U.S. 602 (1951). Likewise, according to the doctrine of implied intergovernmental 
immunities, the states may not levy taxes directly on the federal government or its instru-
mentalities except as the immunity is waived by Congress. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 
4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316 (1819); United States v. Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958). 
194 Any federal property tax would have to be apportioned to the states on the basis 
of population. See note 193 supra. 
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to correct inequalities between the states so far as their own re-
sources are concerned.195 
C. Federal Supremacy 
Article VI of the United States Constitution reads in part as 
follows: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, 
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, 
shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... " States may not ex-
ercise authority in conflict with the supreme law of the land as 
thus defined. By comparison, a limited form of the supremacy 
clause is found in Article 31 of the Basic Law which reads as 
follows: "Federal law overrides Land law." Implicit here in the 
reference to federal law is that it is. law compatible with the Basic 
Law. Article 31 can be translated to mean that all federal law, in 
so far as it is compatible with the Basic Law, is the supreme law of 
the land, notwithstanding any law of the Lander to the contrary. 
One difference between Article 31 of the Basic Law and Article VI 
of the Constitution is the failure in Article 31 to include a reference 
to the supremacy of treaties made under the authority of the 
Federation. It is true that Article 25 provides that the general 
rules of public international law form part of the federal law, take 
precedence over the laws and directly create rights and duties for 
the inhabitants of the federal territory. But the phrase "general 
rules of public international law" appears to refer only to the 
commonly accepted principles and usages of international law and 
does not include within its reach the provisions of special interna-
tional agreements as distinguished from multilateral conventions 
that are the source of commonly accepted rules. More in point is 
Article 59 of the Basic Law which provides that treaties which 
regulate the political relations of the Federation or relate to 
matters of federal legislation require the consent or participation, 
in the form of a federal law, of the bodies competent in any 
specific case for such federal legislation. Under this provision it 
follows that if the Bundestag by law consents to or participates in 
a treaty that relates to a matter of its legislative competence, this 
law, pursuant to Article 31, overrides any Land law to the contrary. 
195 Under Art. I, §8 of the Constitution, Congress has an independent substantive 
power to spend for the general welfare. United States v. Butler, 2(j'/ U.S. 1 (1936); Steward 
Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). 
For discussion of the financial aspects of American federalism and of the system of 
federal grants-in-aid to the states, see United States Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR TRANSMITIAL TO CONGRESS (1955). 
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But suppose a treaty relates to a matter over which the Federa-
tion does not have legislative competence? This question came 
before the Federal Constitutional Court in the well-known case 
involving the Concordat which Hitler had entered into with the 
Vatican, pursuant to which Catholic children were entitled to 
special privileges in regard to religious education in the German 
schools. The question presented before the Court was whether a 
post-war law of one of the Lander which did not recognize these 
special privileges was invalid as being inconsistent with obligations 
under a valid treaty. In a long opinion, the Court, after establish-
ing at great length that the Concordat, although often breached 
by Hitler, had not been renounced, that it had continued to have 
validity as an international obligation, and was, therefore, still an 
obligation of the Federation,196 held that the treaty, nevertheless, 
imposed no obligation upon the Lander, since under the Basic 
Law the control of education is reserved to the Lander.197 Con-
sequently they may or may not, at their option, elect to comply 
with the provisions of the Concordat. 
The Concordat decision presents an interesting contrast to the 
famous decision of the United States Supreme Court in Missouri v. 
196 The second section of Art. 23 of the Basic Law, included in the part which 
contains transitory and concluding provisions, is specifically directed to the question 
whether treaties entered into by the former Reich continue in force after the establish-
ment of the Federal Republic of Germany. It reads as follows: 
"Subject to all rights and objections of the interested parties, the state treaties con-
cluded by the German Reich concerning matters for which, under this Basic Law, Land 
legislation is competent, remain in force, if they are and continue to be valid in accord-
ance with general principles of law, until new state treaties are concluded by the agencies 
competent under this Basic Law, or until they are in any other way terminated pursuant 
to their provisions." 
It will be noted that while this ambiguous article contemplates the continued validity 
of treaties entered into by the former Reich concerning matters for which, under the 
Basic Law, Land law is competent, it provides no express answer to the question whether 
the Lander are required to conform to such treaties. 
197 6 BVerfGE 309 (1957). In its opinion the Federal Constitutional Court considered 
the question whether the Bundestreu principle required the Lander to respect and carry 
into effect treaties that were binding on the Federation. The Court has declared that 
this principle, which means in effect that each of the Lander must view itself as an 
interdependent part of an organic whole and must, therefore, act in a way consistent with 
the interests of Federation and of the other Lander, is implied from the nature of the 
federal structure as established by the Basic Law. Thus the Court, in reliance on this 
principle, has held that a Land was under a duty to take appropriate steps to prevent 
a municipality from conducting an advisory referendum on the question whether the 
army should be equipped with atomic weapons. (The Court was without jurisdiction 
to deal directly with municipal corporations.) 8 BVerfGE 122 at 137-141 (1958). See 
note 25 supra, and the discussion in the text at this point. In the Concordat case, how-
ever, the Court declared that the Bundestreu principle did not require a Land to give 
effect to a federal treaty dealing with a matter over which the Lander had exclusive 
legislative jurisdiction. 6 BVerfGE 309 at 361-362 (1957). 
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Holland,198 which held that when the federal government entered 
into a treaty dealing with an appropriate matter of international 
concern, Congress had the implied power to legislate in implemen-
tation of the treaty and that its legislation overrode state law, even 
though Congress had no independent legislative power to deal 
with the subject. The Tenth Amendment was not deemed to be 
a bar to this conclusion, since it reserves to the states only the 
powers that are not delegated to the federal government, and 
Congress under the necessary and proper clause may enact legisla-
tion appropriate to the implementation of a valid treaty. 
The problem presented in the Concordat case and in Missouri 
v. Holland is identical and arises in any federal system. Whether 
there are such fundamental differences between the Basic Law and 
the Constitution of the United States as to require a difference in 
result in the treatment of this problem is debatable. Justification 
for the Federal Constitutional Court's decision in the Concordat 
case must be found in the Court's conviction that according to the 
superior will of the constitution makers control of education is a 
matter reserved to the Lander and that the treaty power cannot be 
used as a means of impairing the Lander's freedom of action in this 
area. Under the Constitution it cannot be said that the states 
possess any exclusive powers since they retain only the powers not 
granted to the federal government, and the powers of the federal 
government are capable of progressively-widened interpretation. 
The Federal Constitutional Court's solicitude for state autonomy 
in the field of education is understandable, since this is one of the 
few important areas reserved to the legislative authority of the 
Lander. It should be noted, however, that the decision in the 
Concordat case has not gone unchallenged and has been criticized 
with respect to its impact on international law and the ability of the 
Federation to carry out its treaties.199 
D. Role of States in Administration of Federal Law 
Any discussion of the general features of federalism under the 
Basic Law would be incomplete without reference to the provisions 
found in Part VIII of the Basic Law relating to the execution and 
administration of federal laws. Without any attempt at detailed 
analysis, it is sufficient to note that the Lander execute the federal 
198 252 U .s. 416 (1920). 
199 See Kaiser, "Die Erfiillung der volkerrechtlichen Vertrage des Bundes durch die 
Lander," 18 ZEITSCHRIFT FiiR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTI.ICHES R.EcHT UND VoLKERRECHT 526 
(1957-1958). 
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laws as a matter of their own concern to the extent that the Basic 
Law does not otherwise provide or permit.200 Likewise they may 
execute federal laws as agents of the Federation.201 Whether act-
ing as agents of the Federation or acting on their own concern, it 
is the business and duty of the Lander to enforce federal laws. The 
important difference between acting as agents of the Federation 
and acting on their own concern is that when acting as agents they 
may expect to be compensated by the Federation for supplying 
this service. As it works out in practice, the federal laws are for 
the most part administered by officers and employees of the Lander 
with the result that the citizen actually has very little contact with 
federal authorities. The Lander in executing the federal laws as 
a matter of their own concern provide for the establishment of 
authorities and the regulation of administrative procedures in so 
far as federal laws do not otherwise provide.202 The federal gov-
ernment may issue general administrative rules and exercise its 
supervision to ensure that the Lander execute the federal laws in 
accordance with applicable law.203 When the Land authorities 
are executing federal laws as agents of the Federation, they are in 
addition subject to the instructions of the appropriate highest 
federal authorities.204 
Although in conformity with these provisions a large share of 
the administration of federal law is conducted by officers and em-
ployees of the Lander, the Basic Law requires that the foreign 
service, the federal finance administration, the federal railroads, 
the federal postal service and the administration of the federal 
waterways and of shipping be conducted as matters of federal ad-
ministration with their own subordinate administrative struc-
ture.205 
This interesting aspect of federalism under the Basic Law, 
which points to integration of federal and state administration in 
the enforcement of federal laws206 presents a striking contrast to 
the duality of administration that is a characteristic feature of 
federalism under the Constitution of the United States. As a 
200Art. 83. 
201 Art. 85, § (I). 
202 Art. 84, § (I). 
203Art. 84. 
204 Art. 85, § (3). Where the Liinder execute federal laws as a matter of their own 
concern, the federal government may issue individual instructions for particular cases 
but only if authorized by a federal law requiring the consent of the Bundesrat. Art. 84, § (5). 
205 Art. 87, § (I). . 
206 For discussion, see Merkl, "Executive-Legislative Federalism in West Germany,'' 
53 AM. Pot. SCI. REv. 732 (1959). 
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general proposition, federal laws are administered by federal au-
thority, and state administrative machinery is not utilized in 
carrying federal laws into effect. Certainly there is no duty on the 
part of the states to administer federal laws. It is true that a high 
degree of cooperation between federal and state administrative 
and enforcement authorities is found in some situations. Thus 
in the enforcement of their respective criminal laws, federal and 
state officers often work closely together in the detection of crime 
that raises questions of violation of both federal and state laws. 
Likewise, there is a substantial amount of exchange of information 
of common concern to federal and state agencies. Joint inspection 
by federal and state officers occurs in some areas, and state officers 
may occasionally be vested with authority to serve as federal in-
spectors or otherwise to help administer federal Iaws.207 But these 
situations by no means represent the usual rule or practice, and 
certainly within the limits of the constitutional system patterns of 
cooperative relations can be more fully explored and developed 
than they are at present.208 
E. The Judicial System 
The integration of federal and Lander authority in the ad-
ministration of federal laws, representing a much more highly 
developed "cooperative federalism" than exists in the United 
States, is paralleled also by the integrated judicial system, estab-
lished under Part IX of the Basic Law. The total judicial au-
thority of the Federal Republic is vested in the judges and is 
exercised by the Federal Constitutional Court, by the higher 
federal courts provided for in the Basic Law and by the courts of 
the Lander.209 Higher federal courts are required to be and have 
been established in the fields of ordinary, administrative, finance, 
labor and social jurisdiction.210 It should be emphasized that the 
207 See Kauper, "Utilization of State Commissioners in the Administration of the 
Federal Motor Carrier Act," 34 MICH. L. R.Ev. 37 (1935); Koenig, "Federal and State 
Cooperation Under the Constitution," 36 MICH. L. R.Ev. 752 (1938). 
20s The Commission on Intergovernmental Relations appointed by President Eisen-
hower has urged greater attention to the potentialities of cooperative relationships and 
recommends an enlarged use of state personnel and machinery in the administration and 
enforcement of federal laws. See chapter 3, "National Responsibilities and Cooperative 
Relations," of its REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR '!'RANSMI'ITAL TO CONGRESS 59-89 (1955). 
209 Art. 92. The Federal Constitutional Court is discussed pp. 1162-1181 infra. Pro-
vision is also made in Art. 92 for the Supreme Federal Court whose function according to 
Art. 95 will be to decide cases in which the decision is of fundamental importance for the 
uniformity in administration of justice by the higher federal courts, but this court has 
not yet been established. 
210 Art. 96, § (1). 
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only federal courts, apart from the Federal Constitutional Court, 
are the so-called "higher federal courts," and these, within their 
respective jurisdictions in areas of federal law, are really the high 
courts of the judicial system. These courts operating on the 
highest level rest on a foundation of lower courts that are courts 
of the Lander but which administer federal law as well as the local 
law of their respective jurisdictions. These lower court judges 
are appointed for life by the Lander authorities and their status is 
regulated by special laws of the Lander subject to general rules 
enacted by the Federation.211 Within the spheres of their jurisdic-
tion, the lower Lander courts operate as arms of the unitary judicial 
system. In short, there is no system of dual courts of the Federation 
and of the Lander. Just as administrative authorities of the 
Lander are used to enforce federal law, so the Lander courts con-
stitute the lower level of the judicial system in the interpretation, 
application and enforcement of federal law. The lower courts 
have jurisdiction also over matters arising distinctively under the 
laws of their respective Lander. This unified German court system 
is radically different from the American pattern which features 
sharply differentiated federal and state judicial systems, each with 
its own complete layers of trial and appellate courts, and with the 
United States Supreme Court having jurisdiction over the highest 
courts of the states only with respect to decisions on questions 
arising under the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United 
States.212 
F. The Role of the Bundesrat in Representing the Lander 
A distinctive feature of federalism under the Basic Law is the 
institutional role of the Bundesrat,213 designed to serve as an 
211Art. 98, §§ (3) and (4). 
212 Under Art. III of the Constitution the federal judicial power extends to cases 
arising under the Constitution, treaties and laws of the United States, as well as to certain 
categories of cases depending on the nature of the parties, including cases between citizens 
of different states. The jurisdiction of state courts is derived from their respective state 
constitutions and most of the cases coming before them deal with matters arising under 
state law. But the two judicial systems are not mutually exclusive in terms of jurisdiction. 
Thus state courts in dealing with cases before them must often deal with questions of 
federal law arising under the Constitution, treaties and laws of the United States. Indeed, 
Congress may vest state courts with authority to entertain civil causes of action arising 
under federal statutes. See Mondau v. N.Y., N.H. & H. Ry. Co., 223 U.S. 1 (1912). On 
the other hand federal courts in exercising their jurisdiction in cases turning on the 
nature of the parties are required to give effect to state law in the determination of these 
cases. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
213 The provisions establishing the Bundesrat and determining its composition and 
organization are found in Articles 50-53 of the Basic Law (Part IV). 
1154 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 58 
agency for giving the Lander a special voice in the determination 
of the affairs of the Federation and thereby serving to protect the 
place of the Lander in the federal order. 
Article 50 states that the Lander participate through the 
Bundesrat in the legislation and administration of the Federation. 
The Bundesrat consists of members of the Lander governments 
which appoint and recall them.214 The reference here to the 
Lander governments means the administrative authorities of the 
Lander.2115 Each Land has at least three votes in the Bundesrat 
and those with larger populations have more.216 The votes of each 
Land may be cast only as a block vote by members present or their 
substitutes.217 
Without detailing the procedures followed by the Bundesrat 
it is sufficient here to note that although the primary legislative 
authority of the Federation is vested in the Bundestag, the 
Bundesrat plays an important part in the total legislative process 
in two different ways. First of all, it must be consulted on all 
legislative matters, and, depending on its action or inaction, the 
Bundesrat may exercise a limited veto power on the action of the 
Bundestag by forcing the latter to reconsider and re-enact a law to 
which the Bundesrat objects. If the Bundesrat rejects the law by 
a simple majority vote, the Bundestag may re-enact it by a simple 
majority vote; if the Bundesrat rejects it by a two-thirds vote, the 
Bundestag may then re-enact it only by a two-thirds majority 
vote.21s 
In respect to a number of specified matters coming within the 
legislative competence of the Bundestag but which are of special 
concern to the Lander, the Bundesrat' s consent is required in 
order for the law to become effective.219 Also, in those spheres of 
administration where the Lander authorities administer federal 
laws, the power of the Federation to prescribe rules governing the 
214Art. 51, § (1). 
21rs The accountability of the Bundesrat representatives to the governments of the 
Liinder was emphasized by the Federal Constitutional Court in its decision holding un-
constitutional the advisory referenda proposed to be held by several Liinder on the 
question of arming the military forces with atomic weapons. 8 BVerfGE 104 (1958). In 
answer to the argument that the advisory expression of opinion would be helpful to the 
Land's representatives in the Bundesrat, the Court stated that these representatives were 
to be guided by instructions from the government of the Land. See the discussion in 
the text, p. UOO supra. 
216 Art. 51, § (2). 
211 Art. 51, § (3). 
218 The procedures arc spelled out in Art. 77. 
219 See, e.g., the provisions of Arts. 105-107 relating to tax matters. 
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same is subject to approval by the Bundesrat.220 Moreover, a two-
thirds concurrence by the Bundesrat is required in case of amend-
ment of the Basic Law. 
The formal provisions of the Basic Law respecting the func-
tions of the Bundesrat do not tell the whole story. Actually the 
Bundesrat is emerging as a stronger and more influential political 
body than was perhaps contemplated by its establishment.221 A 
steadily increasing number of federal legislative enactments have 
been interpreted to require the consent of the Bundesrat with the 
result that the Bundesrat is on its way to becoming an important 
second chamber of the legislative branch of the federal govern-
ment.222 
The Bundesrat suggests some comparison with the Senate of 
the United States but the comparison should not be pushed too 
far. Like the Senate the Bundesrat may be characterized as a 
second house of the national legislature. But there is a wide dif-
ference in that whereas the Senate has an equal voice with the 
House of Representatives in the enactment of federal legislation, 
i.e., affirmative votes are required by both the Senate and House 
for the enactment of laws, the Bundesrat' s affirmative participation 
is required only in respect to legislation affecting the special in-
terests of the Lander, and with respect to other, legislation it has a 
consultative voice and may even assert what amounts to a veto 
power. In a sense, then, the Bundesrat exercises in part functions 
performed by the United States Senate and in part a function 
served by the President so far as his formal participation in the 
legislative process by means of the veto power is concerned. With-
in the limits of the functions assigned to it, and, as pointed out 
above, with its role in the legislative process gradually becoming 
more prominent, the Bundesrat represents in a special way the 
interests of the Lander and thus is an institution designed to help 
preserve the integrity of the federal system. A further comparison 
may be made with the Senate of the United States on this point. 
It is a matter of history that the provisions of the Constitution 
creating the Senate and determining its composition represented a 
220 See Arts. 84 and 85. 
221 See Neunreither, "Politics and Bureaucracy in the West German Bundesrat," 53 
AM. PoL. SCI. R.Ev. 713 (1959); Katzenstein, "Rechtliche Erscheinungsformen der Macht-
verschiebung zwischen Bunl und Landero seit 1949," 11 Dm 6FFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG 
593 (1958). 
222 Up to April 1958, no less than 50% of all enacted federal laws had been recognized 
to fall in the category of laws requiring the consent of the Bundesrat. NEUNREITIIER, id. 
at 718. 
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compromise between the big and small states entering the Union. 
In order to offset the preponderant influence the larger states 
would have had by determining representation solely on the basis 
of population-the standard used for determining the House of 
Representatives-equality of representation and vote in the Senate 
was seen as a compensating feature to protect the interests of the 
smaller states. It is, therefore, accurate to say that the Senate of 
the United States was designed, like the Bundesrat, to serve partic-
ularly as the branch of the national legislature which represented 
the states' interests in a special way. This was emphasized by 
the provision that the senators would be elected by the legisla-
tures of their respective states. This feature, however, was aban-
doned with the adoption in 1913 of the Seventeenth Amend-
ment which authorizes popular elections of senators. Thus the 
combination of a number of factors, including the accountability 
of senators to the electors instead of the state legislature or ad-
ministration, the Senate's general participation in the federal 
legislative process, and the increased concern in American political 
life with matters of national interest, has served over the years to 
alter the role of the Senate as the body peculiarly designed to 
represent state interests in the federal legislative process, and 
sharply differentiates it from the Bundesrat.223 
G. Conclusions 
The Basic Law creates a federal system and distributes power 
between the Federation and the Lander. It states a theory similar 
to a basic idea of American federalism in that it recognizes that the 
Lander have the power to legislate in so far as the Basic Law does 
not confer power on the Federation, although the practical signifi-
cance of this should not be overestimated in view of the large and 
important areas in which the Federation may exercise legislative 
powers and the correspondingly limited areas of Lander autonomy. 
Federal law within the sphere of its competence is supreme as 
recognized in Article 31 which provides that federal law overrides 
Land law, and which in some respects resembles the supremacy 
clause of Article VI of the United States Constitution. The 
features of the Basic Law that authorize the Federation to enact 
general laws with power in states to implement them with details 
and, more strikingly, the employment of state officers and agencies 
223 It should be stressed that a Land's representatives in the Bundesrat are appointed 
by the Land's administration and are accountable to it. 
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to administer federal laws in many areas and the integration of 
the entire judicial system under the Basic Law all mark consider-
able departures from American federalism. Indeed, these various 
features suggest that German federalism, when compared with the 
American pattern, is a substantially diluted form of federalism, and 
that the Lander occupy a significantly less important role in the 
Federation than do the states of the American Union. Certainly 
there is a much greater centralization of legislative authority, and 
the use of the administrative and judicial authority of the Lander 
to enforce federal laws, suggests either that the position of the 
Lander may be described in terms of constitutional home rule or 
that the general federal structure under the Basic Law may be 
characterized in terms of centralized power and decentralized ad-
mm1stration. But this would be a superficial conclusion. The 
retention of legislative power in some significant areas, the use of 
state administrative personnel to enforce federal laws, the control 
by the Lander of the integrated judiciary at the subordinate levels, 
and the distinctive and significant role of the Bundesrat in repre-
senting the Lander's interest in the federal legislative and admin-
istrative processes, as well as in the important process of con-
stitutional amendment, are all institutional arrangements that 
strengthen the position of the Lander and contribute to a genuine 
federalism.223a Perhaps the net conclusion to be drawn is that it is a 
less rigid and more economical type of federalism than its Ameri-
can counterpart and certainly one that more fully utilizes the 
principle of cooperative federalism. The federal principle admits 
of many diverse applications that take account of historical, 
political and geographical factors. To mention only the geograph-
ical factor, one must expect substantial differences between a 
federal structure accommodated to West Germany's limited and 
compact territory and the federal structure designed for the gov-
ernment of the vastly larger domain of the United States. 
V. SEPARATION OF POWERS 
The separation of powers theory is postulated as a fundamental 
feature of the constitutional system established by the Basic Law. 
"All state authority emanates from the people. It is exercised by 
223a See Mason, "Federalism -The Bonn Model," in ZURCHER, CONSTITUTIONS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL TRENDS SINCE WORLD WAR II, 2d ed., 134-153 (1955), for an analysis and 
appraisal of what the author describes as the federal and non-federal features of the system 
established by the Basic Law. 
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the people by means of elections and voting and by separate 
legislative, executive and judicial organs."224 This principle is 
implemented by the provisions establishing the organs of govern-
ment and defining their authority.225 The Bundestag exercises 
the primary legislative function of the Federation.226 The Bun-
desrat as pointed out earlier in the discussion of federalism is a 
special organ whereby the Lander have a voice in the legislative 
and administrative processes of the Federation. The Federal 
President who is the titular head of state has limited but important 
executive functions.227 His office, however, is not to be compared 
to that of the President of the United States who is the nation's 
chief executive officer.228 Under the parliamentary-cabinet sys-
tem of government prescribed by the Basic Law, the Federal 
Chancellor and the Federal Ministers constitute the "Federal 
Government" as this term is used in the Basic Law.229 (To use the 
familiar American terminology, the Federal Chancellor and the 
Federal Ministers constitute the "federal administration.") It is 
the Chancellor who is the important executive head of the govern-
2M Art. 20, § (2). 
225 See the earlier discussion of the judicial system, pp. 1152-1153 supra, as part of the 
analysis of federalism under the Basic Law. 
226 See Basic Law, Part III (Articles 38-49). 
227 The Federal President is elected for a term of five years without debate by the 
Federal Convention which consists of the members of the Bundestag and an equal number 
of members elected by the representative assemblies of the Lander, Art. 54. He repre-
sents the Federation in its international relations, concludes treaties with foreign states 
on behalf of the Federation, and accredits and receives envoys. Art 59, § (1). He 
proposes the Federal Chancellor for election by the Bundestag, Art. 63, § (1), dismisses 
the Chancellor and appoints a successor as provided in Art. 67, dissolves the Bundestag 
under the conditions specified in Art. 63, § (4), appoints and dismisses Federal Ministers 
upon the proposal of the Federal Chancellor, Art. 64, § (1), appoints and dismisses the 
federal judges and the federal civil servants unless otherwise provided for by law, Art. 
60, § (1), and exercises the power of pardon in individual cases on behalf of the Federa-
tion, Art. 60, § (2). Laws duly passed and countersigned become effective after they are 
signed by the President and promulgated in the Federal Gazette. Art. 82. 
The President's authority to represent the Federation in its international relations 
appears to be chiefly ceremonial in character, while the substantive power of determining 
foreign policy resides in the Chancellor and the cabinet. This question received extended 
discussion in 1959 when Chancellor Adenauer announced his intention (later revoked) 
of running for the Presidency. See Dietze, "The Federal Republic of Germany: An Evalu-
ation After Ten Years," 22 J. PoL. 112 at 113 (1960). 
228 Art. II of the Constitution vests the executive authority in the President and also 
names him as commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy. He negotiates and concludes 
treaties with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate, appoints ambassadors 
and other public ministers and consuls, heads of departments and other officers, and 
federal judges with the advice and consent of the Senate, receives ambassadors and other 
public ministers, exercises the pardoning power, proposes legislation, has the power to 
veto legislation which can thereafter be re-enacted by the Congress only by a two-thirds 
vote, has the authority to convene special sessions of Congress, and is vested with the 
general duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. 
229 See Basic Law, Part VI (Articles 62-69). 
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ment and who also because of his political position plays the lead-
ing role in the determination of legislative and foreign policy. 
The Basic Law makes clear in numerous ways that the ad-
ministration is not to encroach on the legislative power. Restric-
tion on basic rights, if permitted, may be accomplished only by 
and subject to law. Thus the fundamental rights of freedom of 
expression may be limited only by the provisions of the general 
laws.230 Although the President represents the Federation in its 
international relations, concludes treaties with foreign states on 
behalf of the Federation, and accredits and receives envoys, all 
treaties which regulate the political relations of the Federation or 
relate to matters of federal legislation require the consent or 
participation, in the form of a federal law, of the bodies competent 
in any specific case for such federal legislation.231 This may be 
contrasted with the situation in the United States where a treaty, 
pursuant to Article VI, is the supreme law of the land and may, 
depending on its nature, become the source of domestic law with-
out the necessity of implementing or ratifying legislation by Con-
gress.232 
Only in one situation does the Basic Law recognize a power in 
the administration to make a law effective without the enactment 
by the Bundestag.233 If the Federal Chancellor fails to secure a 
vote of confidence on motion put by him and the President fails 
to dissolve the Bundestag, the President may, at the request of the 
administration and with the consent of the Bundesrat, declare a 
state of legislative emergency with respect to a bill if the Bundestag 
rejects the bill even though the administration has declared it to 
be urgent. Following this declaration, the bill is deemed to have 
been passed if the Bundesrat assents to it even though the Bundes-
tag again rejects the bill or adopts it in a version declared to be 
unacceptable to the adminstration. But the state of legislative 
emergency may not continue for more than six months during the 
Chancellor's term of office.234 
230 Art. 5, § (2). 
231 Art. 59, § (2). 
232 For an illustrative case, see Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1880). See 
also the opinion in Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580 at 598 (1884). 
233 See Art. 81. 
234 On the question whether the President of the United States has power to deal 
with internal emergencies on the basis of his own executive prerogative, see the several 
opinions in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), where the 
majority of the Court held invalid the President's seizure of the steel mills as a means 
of averting a strike. Although two of the justices comprising the majority rested their 
decision on the theory that the President had attempted to exercise a legislative power 
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Although the Constitution is silent on the subject, the Supreme 
Court has declared the general principle that Congress may not 
delegate its legislative power to the executive or to administrative 
agencies.235 This result is based both on the general principle of 
separation of powers and on the theory that delegated power can-
not be redelegated. To be sure the principle has been greatly 
diluted by the judicial recognition that liberal grants of the rule-
making power and of discretionary authority to administrative 
agencies is necessary in the structure of modern government,236 
although even here the Court has insisted that Congress define the 
general policy of the legislation and employ standards or norms 
that will serve to limit administrative discretion. Carte blanche 
delegations of authority without reference to policy objectives or 
definable standards have been held unconstitutional.237 
The Basic Law is explicit on this point.238 While recognizing 
that the administration, a federal minister or the governments of 
the Lander may be authorized by law to issue ordinances having 
the force of law (Rechtsverordnungen), it provides that the con-
tent, purpose and scope of the powers conferred must be set forth 
in the law. The legal basis must be stated in the ordinance. Further-
more, if a law provides that a power may be further delegated, 
an ordinance having the force of law is necessary in order to 
delegate the power. Thus the Basic Law, while permitting a dele-
gation of a subordinate law-making power, states restrictions de-
signed to avoid carte blanche delegations.239 
without authorization from Congress, the other four justices included in the majority 
group based their decision on the narrower ground that whatever prerogative authority 
the President could claim to deal with an internal emergency, it could not be exercised 
in a way that conflicted with the declared policy of Congress within the sphere of its 
legislative competence. 
235 See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); Schechter Poultry Corp. 
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
236 See Justice Jackson's opinion in Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 US. 245 (1947). 
237 See the cases cited in 235 supra. 
238Art. 80, § (1). 
239 Some delegations of power have been held invalid by the Federal Constitutional 
Court on the ground that they violated the limitations set forth in the Basic Law. See, 
e.g., I BVerfGE 14 (1951), holding invalid the broad delegation of authority to the Federal 
Minister of the Interior "to issue such decrees having the force of law as are required" 
to implement the provisions of the law providing for reorganization of the Lander in 
the Southwest territory; 9 BVerfGE 83 (1959), holding invalid a decree of the Defense 
Council authorizing the Minister of Interior to make rules respecting the packaging and 
sale of ready-packaged drugs, subject to exceptions granted by him. Cf. the decision in 
8 BVerfGE 274 (1958), holding valid the delegation of power to the Federal Minister of 
Economics and to the Lander governments to fix prices for goods and services except 
wages by executive order. 
1960] WEST GERMAN AND U. S. CONSTITUTIONS 1161 
Transcending the specific provisions of the Basic Law is the 
underlying conception of the Rechtsstaat with its emphasis on 
legality and the subjection of administrative action to judicial 
review to determine its lawfulness.240 This is accented by the 
establishment of separate courts, as authorized by the Basic Law, 
with jurisdiction over administrative, tax, labor and social mat-
ters.241 Indeed, it appears that the German system for judicial 
review to determine questions of law and legality in spheres of 
public administration is more extensive and penetrating than 
review by United States courts of the determinations and acts of 
federal executive and administrative agencies. It must be re-
membered in this connection that in the American system the 
regular courts have jurisdiction over all legal questions in the 
spheres of both private and public law, as contrasted to the con-
tinental system which establishes special courts for review of 
matters in the area of public administration. 
Whether the law-making power may be exercised only by the 
enactment of laws of general application, as distinguished from 
special laws dealing with specific situations, is a question that 
becomes pertinent in any discussion of the rule of law. The Basic 
Law does not state such a general principle, but it does require 
the observance of this idea in one situation. Article I 9 provides 
that when under the Basic Law a basic right may be restricted 
by or pursuant to a law, the law must apply generally and not 
solely to an individual case. Furthermore, the law must in this 
instance name the basic right, indicating the article. Special laws 
aimed at depriving certain persons of their rights are thereby 
prohibited. German writers have advanced the argument that 
the idea that laws must have a general application is implicit in 
the concept of the law-making power and the rule of law,242 but 
whether the Federal Constitutional Court will give this argu-
ment constitutional sanction remains to be seen.243 
240 See Art. 20, § (3), stating that the executive and the judiciary are bound by the 
law, the provision of Art. 28, § (1), that the constitutional order in the Liinder must 
conform to the principles of republican, democratic and social government based on the 
rule of law, and the important provision of Art. 19, § (4), that if any person's right is 
violated by public authority, recourse to the court shall be open to him, and if no other 
court has jurisdiction, recourse shall be to the ordinary courts. 
241 Art. 96, § (1). See also Art. 19, § (4), referred to in note 240 supra. 
242 See HAMANN, DAS GRUNDGESE'IZ 49 (1956) with further citations. 
243 The decision of the Federal Constitutional Court in sustaining the validity of a 
special assessment levied by the Bundestag on German business enterprise (gewerbliche 
Wirtschaft) in order to provide funds to aid basic industries, while relevant to the ques-
tion under discussion, offers no basis for any broad generalizations on the subject. See 
4 BVerfGE 7 (1954). 
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The Constitution does not expressly limit the Congress to the 
enactment of general laws within the spheres of its legislative 
competence,244 although a number of state constitutions prohibit 
the enactment either of all special laws or special laws dealing with 
specified subjects. Congress usually enacts many special laws at 
each session. These special laws generally confer benefits on the 
persons involved. But special laws passed by Congress imposing 
burdens or disabilities or depriving persons of constitutional rights 
can be attacked either as bills of attainder,2415 or as a form of dis-
criminatory legislation that violates the due process clause of the 
Fifth Amendment. It is conceivable also that certain types of 
special acts aimed at specific purposes could be regarded as an 
unlawful attempt to interfere with the executive function or to 
invade the sphere of judicial authority.246 
VI. THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
A. Authority and I urisdiction 
The Basic Law not only recognizes the principle of judicial 
review but also establishes a special tribunal, the Federal Con-
stitutional Court, to pass on constitutional questions. Indeed, 
the Federal Constitutional Court may properly be characterized as 
the most important development in post-war German constitu-
tionalism.247 As a special tribunal charged with the important 
244 Under Art. I, §8, Congress is authorized to establish a uniform rule of naturaliza-
tion and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies. Similarly, all duties, imposts and 
excises are required to be uniform. This has been held to refer to geographical uniformity 
and to mean that taxes falling in these categories must apply to all parts of the country 
alike. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900). So far as the naturalization power is con-
cerned, it has not been supposed that Congress is limited in the exercise of this power 
to the enactment of general laws. Congress has in numerous cases conferred citizenship 
in specific cases by special laws. 
245 Art. I, §9, prohibits bills of attainder by Congress. A bill of attainder is defined 
as a legislative act prescribing punishment. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 
(1946), holding invalid as a bill of attainder a provision of a federal appropriations act 
which declared that certain named persons, then employed by the federal government, 
would be ineligible to receive salary payments out of federal appropriations. Congress 
was attempting by this means to compel the dismissal of these employees. 
246 Thus in United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), referred to in note 245 supra, 
the Court's decision might well have been based on the ground that Congress was attempt· 
ing thereby to assert executive authority over the dismissal of federal employees. 
247 For excellent discussions of the Federal Constitutional Court, see Cole, "The West 
German Federal Constitutional Court: An Evaluation After Six Years," 20 J. PoL. 278 
(1958); Rupp, "Judicial Review in the Federal Republic of Germany," 9 AM. J. COMP. L. 
29 (1960). See also von Mehren, "Constitutionalism in Germany -The First Decision of 
the New Constitutional Court," I AM. J. COMP. L. 70 (1952); Nagel, "Judicial Review in 
Germany," 3 AM. J. CoMP. L. 233 (1954); Dietze, "Judicial Review in Europe," 55 MICH. 
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task and responsibility of authoritative interpretation of the Basic 
Law, it occupies a unique place in the constitutional structure. 
The Federal Constitutional Court has been described as standing 
at the apex of the judicial pyramid248 and, in distinction from the 
other courts, it is recognized by statute as a constitutional organ.249 
The Court's jurisdiction is defined by Article 93 of the Basic 
Law as follows: 
"(I) The Federal Constitutional Court decides:-
!. on the interpretation of this Basic Law in the event of 
disputes concerning the extent of the rights and duties of a 
supreme federal organ or of other parties concerned who have 
been endowed with independent rights by this Basic Law or 
by Rules of Procedure of a supreme federal organ; 
2. in case of differences of opinion or doubts on the formal 
and material compatibility of federal or Land law with this 
Basic Law, or on the compatibility of Land law with other 
federal law, at the request of the Federal Government, of a 
Land Government or of one-third of the Bundestag members; 
3. in case of differences of opinion on the rights and duties 
of the Federation and the Lander, particularly in the execu-
tion of .f:deral law by the Lander and in the exercise of federal 
supervision; 
4. on other disputes of public law between the Federation 
and the Lander, between different Lander or within a Land, 
unless recourse to another court exists; 
5. in the other cases provided for in this Basic Law. 
"(2) The Federal Constitutional Court shall also act in 
such cases as are otherwise assigned to it by federal law." 
The Court's jurisdiction as thus defined is very broad and 
encompasses authority to deal with all problems that raise ques-
tions of interpretation of the Basic Law. Moreover, this grant of 
jurisdiction also defines who are proper parties to raise certain 
kinds of constitutional questions. Finally, it should be emphasized 
that the effect of these provisions is to vest the Court with original 
jurisdiction in dealing with the specific categories of disputes and 
cases here enumerated. 
L. REv. 539 (1957). See also Cole, "Three Constitutional Courts: A Comparison," 53 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 963 (1959). 
For an excellent German text on the Federal Constitutional Court, see GEIGER, GESETZ 
UBER. DAS BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT (1952). 
248 Rupp, "Government Under Law in Germany," 9 ANNAi.ES DE LA FACULTEE DE 
DRorr D'IsrANBUL 101 at 110 (1959). 
~i9 Statute on the Federal Constitutional Court, §1 (1). 
1164 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 58 
The constitutional provisions respecting the Court's juris-
diction have been implemented by the Statute on the Federal 
Constitutional Court, (Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetzf50 which 
defines the organization of the Court, the methods of raising ques-
tions before it, and the procedure to be followed by it. 
Pursuant to the Basic Law and the statute, constitutional issues, 
depending on the nature of the question and the parties raising 
the question, may come before the Court in the following principal 
ways:251 
I. By a proceeding initiated directly before the Court by a 
supreme federal organ, such as the Bundestag, the Bundesrat, the 
President, the Federal Government, or a political party, to secure 
an interpretation of the Basic Law in the event of a dispute con-
cerning the rights and duties of the parties concerned (Organ-
streit ).252 In other words the Court has jurisdiction to determine 
disputes between the executive and legislative departments.253 
2. By a proceeding initiated directly before the Court by 
the Federal Government, a Land Government or one-third of the 
Bundestag members to determine the validity of Federal or Land 
laws ( abstrakte N ormenkontrolle ).254 
250For the text of the statute, see FoRSTHOFF, OFFENTLICHES R.ECHT-SAMMLUNG 
STAATS· UND VERWALTUNGSRECHTLICHER GESETZE 195 et seq. (1956). 
251 For an excellent discussion of these various procedures, see Rupp, "Judicial Review 
in the Federal Republic of Germany," 9 AM. J. CoMP. L. 29 (1960). 
Apart from the general types of proceedings enumerated in the text, the Federal 
Constitutional Court is also vested with authority to deal with specific matters in special 
types ·of proceedings. Mention may be made, for instance, of its jurisdiction to decide 
on the constitutionality of parties under Art. 21 of the Basic Law and its disciplinary 
authority over federal judges under Art. 98. 
252 For the purpose of this jurisdiction, a faction of the Bundestag, indeed, even 
an individual member of the Bundestag, is recognized to have standing to raise the kind 
of questions contemplated by Art. 93, § (1) 1fl. See I BVerfGE 351 and 372 (1952); 4 
BVerfGE 144 (1955). See also Rupp, "Judicial Review in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many," 9 AM. J. COMP. L. 29 at 43 (1960). 
253 See Rupp, "Judicial Review in the Federal Republic of Germany,'' 9 AM. J. CoMP. 
L. 29 at 42 (1960). 
254 The phrase "abstrakte Normenkontrolle" does not admit of any adequate English 
translation. This proceeding is designed to furnish a speedy method for securing an 
adjudication by the Court in case of differences of opinions or doubts as to the validity 
of federal or Land law. No dispute or controversy is required. On the other hand, the 
Court's opinion in a case coming before it in this way should not be confused with an 
advisory opinion. The question respecting validity of a statute can be raised before the 
Court only after the statute has been enacted. And, more importantly, §31 of the Statute 
on the Federal Constitutional Court gives the force of law to the Court's opinion in a 
proceeding of this character and makes it binding on all organs of government. 
At an earlier time the Federal Constitutional Court was authorized to render advisory 
opinions, but this authority was repealed in 1956 by amendment of the Statute on the 
F<;deral Constitutional Court. 
Relatively few cases have come before the Court in the exercise of its abstrakte 
Normenkontrolle jurisdiction. Judge Rupp states that as of June 30, 1959, only eight out 
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3. By a proceeding initiated directly before the Courts by 
the Federation or by a Land or Lander in case of disputes of public 
law between the Federation and the Lander, or between different 
Lander, or within a Land. 
4. By a complaint proceeding initiated directly before the 
Court by an individual who claims that one of his constitutional 
rights has been violated by the exercise of governmental authority. 
(V erfassungsbeschwerde J.255 
5. By a proceeding originating in another court, if this court 
considers unconstitutional a law, the validity of which is relevant 
to its decision, where the matter concerns a violation of the Basic 
Law, including a violation of the Basic Law by Land law or the 
incompatibility of a Land law with a federal law.256 
Before proceeding further with respect to the Constitutional 
Court, a comparison may be made at this point between the basic 
jurisdiction of the Federal Constitutional Court and of the Su-
preme Court of the United States. The Supreme Court's juris-
diction is limited by the definition of judicial power under Article 
III which provides that the federal judicial power extends to 
cases arising under the Constitution, treaties and laws of the 
United States (federal question jurisdiction) and to cases turning 
on the nature of the parties, such as suits between states, cases 
to which the United States is party, suits between citizens of 
different states, and cases affecting ambassadors, other public 
ministers and consuls. 
of a total of 4,203 cases were in this category, but they all related to very important issues. 
See his article, "Judicial Review in the Federal Republic of Germany," 9 AM. J. CoMP. 
L. 29 at 36, n. 26 (1960). 
255 This complaint proceeding, known as V erfassungsbeschwerde, is not directly pro-
vided for under Art. 93, § (1). It is authorized by §90 of the Statute on the Federal 
Constitutional Court in accordance with the provision of Art. 93, § (2) of the Basic Law. 
A thorough treatment is found in PFEIFFER, DIE VERFASSUNGSBESCHWERDE IN DER PRAXIS 
(1959). For an excellent English discussion of this complaint procedure, see Barnet, 
"Protection of Constitutional Rights in Germany," 45 VA. L. REv. 1139 (1959). Pro-
fessor Barnet states that of the thousands of petitions considered since 1951 only a small 
number have resulted in decisions favorable to the complainant. In the five-year period 
from 1951-1956, only seven complaints were held to be both admissible on jurisdictional 
grounds and justifiable on the merits. Id. at 1157. Many of the complaints filed have 
been frivolous in character. Moreover, a large number have been dismissed on the ground 
that the complainant had not previously exhausted other remedies available to him, as 
required in the usual case by §90, 1f2 of the Statute on the Federal Constitutional Court. 
See also on this matter, Cole, "The West German Federal Constitutional Court: An 
Evaluation After Six Years," 20 J. PoL. 278 at 287-289 (1958). 
256 This procedure is directly authorized by Art. 100 of the Basic Law. For a helpful 
discussion of the mechanics of this procedure, see Rupp, "Judicial Review in the Federal 
Republic of Germany," 9 AM. J. COMP. L. 29 at 32-35 (1960). 
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The Supreme Court as the highest court in the federal system 
in tum possesses original jurisdiction in only a limited category 
of cases, namely, cases to which a state is a party and cases affect-
ing public ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls. In all 
other cases it has appellate jurisdiction subject to such exceptions 
as Congress shall make.257 In view of this limitation, the major 
part of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is appellate in character, 
i.e., it reviews cases arising in the lower federal or in the state 
courts dealing with federal questions or other types of cases 
coming within the scope of the federal judicial power and turning 
on the nature of the parties. Moreover, most of the Supreme 
Court's appellate jurisdiction is discretionary in the sense that it 
is free to decide which cases to review on a writ of certiorari. 
This brief description points up at once several basic dif-
ferences between the jurisdiction of the Federal Constitutional 
Court and that of the United States Supreme Court. First, where-
as the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is principally appellate in 
character, the Federal Constitutional Court's jurisdiction has been 
described as being entirely original.258 Secondly, whereas the 
Federal Constitutional Court is limited in its jurisdiction to dealing 
with constitutional questions (including the compatibility of laws 
of a Land with federal laws), the United States Supreme Court 
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may review all cases 
arising in either the federal or state courts dealing with federal 
questions, i.e., questions arising under the Constitution, treaties 
or laws of the United States as well as cases arising in the lower 
courts where jurisdiction is founded on the nature of the parties. 
Thus all questions dealing with the interpretation of federal 
statutes come within the court's appellate jurisdiction. In short 
it has a much wider jurisdiction and is not simply a special tribunal 
to pass on constitutional questions. On the other hand, the Su-
preme Court has a wide discretion in determining which cases to 
review whereas the Federal Constitutional Court is required to 
hear and determine all cases coming within its jurisdiction.259 
257U.S. CoNST., Art. III, §2, 1[2. 
258See Rupp, "Judicial Review in the Federal Republic of Germany," 9 A:M. J. COMP. 
L. 29 at 30 (1960). The first four classes of cases listed above in the text clearly fall 
into this category. It is more questionable whether the fifth type of proceeding, involving 
a referral to the Federal Constitutional Court of a constitutional issue decided by another 
court, should be classified as original jurisdiction. American lawyers would probably 
regard this as an exercise of appellate jurisdiction. 
259 Although the Federal Constitutional Court has no choice in determining which 
cases to hear, it must necessarily devote a substantial effort to the preliminary tasks of 
determining whether in a proceeding initiated before it the formal and jurisdictional 
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It should be emphasized also that the United States Supreme 
Court, like the lower federal courts, may deal with questions only 
in the contest of adversary proceedings, i.e., in cases or contro-
versies representing parties with adverse legal interests.260 It must 
be remembered that the power of judicial review is not expressly 
authorized under the Constitution of the United States, that it is 
derived by implication from the grant of judicial power in a setting 
of separation of powers under a document viewed as fundamental 
law,261 and that according to the classical American theory courts 
do not deal with constitutional issues in the abstract but only as 
they are relevant to the disposition of controversies that come 
before them.262 Thus whether a given constitutional issue ever 
reaches the Supreme Court depends on the uncertain and hap-
hazard process of litigation. The case or controversy limitation, 
coupled with the requirement that a person have the proper legal 
standing or interest263 to raise a constitutional issue, limits much 
more closely the opportunity to raise constitutional issues under 
this system than that afforded under the Basic Law. 
It is true that when the Federal Constitutional Court hears 
a complaint from an aggrieved party that a constitutional right has 
been violated or deals with a constitutional issue extracted from 
an adversary proceeding before another court, the constitutional 
review process operates within the framework of an adversary 
proceeding. Likewise cases coming before the Court involving 
disputes between organs of the government (Organstreit) are ad-
versary proceedings in the sense that there is a concrete controversy 
between opposing parties. This is not the case, however, with 
respect to the proceedings that come before the Federal Constitu-
tional Court in the exercise of its abstrakte N ormenkontrolle juris-
diction. Thus upon request of a Land government, it has juris-
diction to pass on the question of compatibility of a federal law 
with the Basic Law, and upon the request of the Federal Govern-
ment or of one-third of the Bundestag to pass on the compatibility 
of a Land law with the Basic Law or with a federal law. It seems 
requirements are satisfied and whether substantial issues are raised. See Cole, "The West 
German Federal Constitutional Court: An Evaluation after Six Years," 20 J. PoL. 278 at 
288-289 (1958). 
260 Art. III, §2 of the Constitution limits the federal judicial power to "cases" or 
"controversies" involving federal questions or turning on the nature of the parties. 
261 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137 (1803). 
262 See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911). 
263 See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. 
TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939). 
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clear that no corresponding suits would be entertained in our 
federal courts. In the first place, this type of proceeding does not 
satisfy the "case or controversy" requirement, since no dispute 
between adversary parties is required. It is sufficient that there is 
difference of opinion or doubt as to the validity of a federal or 
Land law. Secondly, the parties competent to request the Court 
to decide the question would not be recognized by American 
conceptions to have standing as proper parties in interest to raise 
the question. Thus a state has no standing to raise a question 
about the validity of a federal statute unless the state shows damage 
to its own legal interests,264 and in turn neither Congress nor the 
President have standing to question the validity of a state statute. 
Whether the problem is stated in terms of the case or controversy 
limitation or of the party-in-interest limitation, the same result 
would follow.2611 
A similar party-in-interest problem would be raised under 
American law with respect to the Federal Constitutional Court's 
authority to decide disputes between organs of government. The 
Court may at the instance of the Bundestag consider the validity 
of an act of the Federal Government. But a controversy between 
Congress and the President would not give rise to a justiciable 
dispute between these two parties in the federal courts. Thus the 
validity of President Truman's seizure of the steel mills, even 
though it turned on questions of the separation of powers between 
the President and the Congress, was decided in a case initiated by 
the steel companies who were the proper parties in interest since 
their property rights were affected by the seizure.266 
In all cases decided by it dealing with the validity of legisla-
tion the Federal Constitutional Court declares the statute valid or 
void. (The term statute as used in this context includes the 
Rechtsverordnungen, i.e., administrative ordinances having the 
force of law.) Its decisions arising in the course of certain types of 
proceedings are declared by statute to have the force of law and 
must be published in the Federal Gazette.267 The Court annuls 
any statute which it finds invalid, and in this case the statute is 
2i!4 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), holding that a state could 
not challenge the validity of a federal statute on the ground that Congress had authorized 
the expenditure of federal funds for a purpose not within the constitutional competence 
of the federal government. 
265 On the question whether the Federal Constitutional Court's opinion in this type 
of proceeding should be characterized as an advisory opinion, see note 254 supra. 
266 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
267 Statute on the Federal Constitutional Court, §31 (2). 
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treated as void ab initio.268 But to avoid the difficulties and con-
fusion that would arise from re-examination of past acts and 
determinations founded on the void statute, the statute provides 
that such past acts shall stand but are unenforceable. Thus in a 
case where a tax statute is declared invalid, the government is not 
required to make refunds of taxes already paid, but on the other 
hand unpaid tax liability may not be enforced. In the case, how-
ever, of a person convicted of crime under a statute declared 
invalid, he may on application secure a new trial.269 
According to the classic theory of American constitutional law, 
a court in finding a statute invalid does not repeal or annul the 
statute but simply refuses to take the statute into account as an 
element of the case.270 The statute remains on the books and may 
in effect be revived later if the decision finding it invalid is later 
overruled or if other elements enter later to validate the statute. 
Moreover, since the court is deciding a case or controversy before 
it, the decision that the statute is invalid has a formal relevancy 
only with respect to the parties before the court, although as a 
practical matter the statute becomes unenforceable on the assump-
tion that the court will reach a like result in other cases coming 
before it. So far as the effect of adjudication is concerned, the 
Supreme Court has said that an unconstitutional statute gives rise 
to no rights or obligations and is the same as a statute never 
passed.271 But this theoretical view does not govern in practice. 
Thus the doctrine of res judicata may be applied to prevent the 
re-examination in a collateral proceeding of a prior determination 
based on the statute later declared invalid.272 On the other hand, 
it is clear that a person held in prison under authority of a 
statute later held invalid may secure his release in a proper pro-
ceeding.273 In terms of the concrete problems presented by the 
question of retroactive application of a finding of unconstitution-
ality it may be doubted whether the overall results are much 
different under the American system of judicial review from that 
of the German system, despite the radically different conception 
under the German system that the Court operates directly on a 
statute much like a legislative body as contrasted to the American 
view that the Court acts only to decide the case before it. 
268 8 BVerfGE 51 (1958). 
269 Statute on the Federal Constitutional Court, §79. 
270 See Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137 (1803). 
271 See the statement in Norton v. Shelby County, ll8 U.S. 425 at 442 (1886). 
272 Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940). 
273 Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880). 
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B. Composition and Organization 
The Basic Law provides that the Federal Constitutional Court 
consists of federal judges and other members, and that half of 
the members of the Court are elected by the Bundestag and half 
by the Bundesrat.214 The Basic Law does not, however, define 
the size or otherwise determine the composition of the Court. 
These matters are governed by the Statute on the Federal Con-
stitutional Court276 which was enacted under the authority of 
Article 94 of the Basic Law which provides that the Court's con-
stitution and procedure will be regulated by a federal law. Pur-
suant to this statute the Court consists of two divisions (Senate). 
Although each Senat originally consisted of twelve members, this 
was later reduced to ten members each. The Statute on the 
Federal Constitutional Court now definitively provides that each 
Senat consists of eight members,276 but the reduction from ten to 
eight will not become effective until September I, 1963.277 Three 
members of each Senat are chosen from practicing judges of the 
higher federal courts.278 
The Bundestag, in making its elections, acts through a twelve-
man electoral committee on which the several political parties are 
represented according to their voting strength in the Bundestag. 
The Bundesrat in electing members of the Court acts as a plenary 
body. In both cases a two-thirds majority vote is required.279 
The judges from the higher federal courts appointed to the 
Federal Constitutional Court are automatically appointed for life 
since this is a continuation of their status as federal judges. By 
statute the other members of the Court are appointed for eight-
year terms.280 The Basic Law recognizes that the judges appointed 
for life are subject to age retirement requirements as fixed by 
law.281 
The Basic Law states that the judges are independent and 
subject only to the law.282 If a federal judge, in his official capacity 
or unofficially, infringes upon the principles of the Basic Law or 
274Art. 94, § (1). 
276 See note 250 supra. 
276 Sec. 2 (2). 
277 Art. 2, § (I) of the GESETZ ZUR ANDERUNG DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTSGESETZES, 
SAMMLUNG DES BUNDESRECHTS, Part III, p. 123 (1959). 
278 Statute on the Federal Constitutional Court, §4 (I). 
279 Id., §§6 and 7. 
280 Id., §4 (2). 
281 Art. 97, § (2). 
282 Art. 97, § (I). 
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the constitutional order of a Land, the Federal Constitutional 
Court may decide by a two-thirds majority, upon the request of 
the Bundestag, that the judge be transferred to another office or 
placed on the retired list, and in case of an intentional infringement, 
his dismissal may be ordered.283 
Under the United States Constitution the composition of the 
Supreme Court is left to Congress. Although the number of justices 
on the Supreme Court has varied, for many years now it has been 
fixed by statute at nine. Congress has never authorized or directed 
the Supreme Court to sit in divisions, and the Court has never 
operated in this way. It deals in plenum with all the cases before 
it. Indeed, a question may be raised whether the Constitution 
does not contemplate that the Court sit and hear cases as a plenary 
body. 
The justices of the Supreme Court are appointed by the Pres-
ident with the advice and consent of the Senate,284 and in this 
respect no distinction is observed between Supreme Court justices 
and other federal judges. Unlike the Basic Law, which requires 
that a part of the Federal Constitutional Court consist of persons 
drawn from the higher federal courts, the Constitution does not 
recognize any special qualifications for those appointed to the 
Supreme Court. In the past the appointment as Supreme Court 
justices of persons with prior judicial experience, whether on 
federal or state courts, has been the exception rather than the 
general rule. The recognition of the Court's role in dealing with 
questions of broad political significance has led to the appoint-
ment in most cases of men who have been prominent in public 
life.285 In view of the place of the Federal Constitutional Court 
in the constitutional system, its close identification with political 
disputes because of the wide scope of its review power and the 
easy access to the Court for the judicial solution of disputes, it is 
understandable that the persons appointed to the Court, except 
those drawn from the federal judiciary, have been prominent in 
German political life as well as persons who have been distin-
guished in the academic world.286 
283 Art. 98, § (2). 
284 U.S. CONST., Art. III, §2. 
285 President Eisenhower in his recent appointments has followed his announced 
policy of appointing to the Supreme Court persons with prior judicial experience, but it 
is not to be supposed that this will fix a permanent policy in this matter. 
For discussion of the subject, see Frankfurter, "The Supreme Court in the Mirror of 
Justices," 105 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 781 (1957). 
286 See Cole, "The West German Federal Constitutional Court: An Evaluation After 
Six Years," .20 J. PoL. 278 at 286 (1958). 
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All of the federal judges in the United States, by virtue of 
explicit constitutional provision, are appointed for life and are 
subject to removal only by impeachment proceedings before the 
Senate of the United States.287 Because of this provision Congress 
may not even require the retirement of federal judges at a specified 
age, although, of course, it may authorize voluntary retirement. 
Finally, it may be noted that whereas the Supreme Court 
determines its procedure by its own rule-making power, the pro-
cedure of the Federal Constitutional Court has been spelled out 
in detail by legislation as authorized by the Basic Law. · 
Judged by formal requirements, it appears that on the whole 
the United States Supreme Court occupies a somewhat more in-
dependent position than the Federal Constitutional Court. Con-
gress has no voice in the appointments except as the Senate's 
approval of the President's appointments is required, the justices 
are appointed for life, subject only to impeachment by the Senate, 
and the Court has control of the procedures under which it oper-
ates. Both courts are vulnerable to legislative manipulation in the 
sense that the size of the tribunal is dependent on the legislature. 
In one respect the Supreme Court is more vulnerable because of 
the control Congress has over its appellate jurisdiction as com-
pared with the direct grant of jurisdiction to the Federal Consti-
tutional Court under the Basic Law. Actually, however, in only 
one conspicuous instance has this control been exercised in order 
to keep the Court from passing on an important constitutional 
issue.288 Similarly, it should be noted that although the fixed term 
of office of most of the Federal Constitutional Court members sug-
gests the possibility of replacement of judges in order to secure men 
more in sympathy with legislative objectives, experience to date 
has demonstrated substantial stability in the composition of the 
Federal Constitutional Court as the result of a general practice of 
re-electing men whose terms have expired.289 
C. Operation of the Federal Constitutional Court 
A few general observations may be noted with respect to the 
way in which the Federal Constitutional Court has carried on its 
287 U.S. CONST., Art. III, §1. This section further provides that the salaries of judges 
may not be reduced during their term of office. 
288 See Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. (74 U.S.) 506 (1869). 
289 Cole, "The West German Federal Constitutional Court: An Evaluation After Six 
Years," 20 J. PoL. 278 at 285-286 (1958). 
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work, although a thorough examination of the subject is not 
feasible within the limitations of this article. 
In the presentation of important cases before the Court, stress 
is placed on oral argument of counsel, although written briefs are 
also submitted. No time limits are placed on the oral arguments, 
and in some of the important cases decided by the Court the 
arguments have extended over several days. This practice is 
reminiscent of the practice in the early days of the Supreme Court 
of the United States and contrasts with the Court's present prac-
tice which places fairly strict limits on the time allowed for oral 
presentation, with the result that correspondingly greater im-
portance attaches to the written briefs. 
In accordance with the usual German practice, a decision of 
the Federal Constitutional Court is a corporate decision. The 
opinion is the opinion of the Court and no individual judge's 
name appears as the author of the opinion, unlike an opinion of 
the United States Supreme Court which is the opinion of the 
justice who was assigned the task of stating the Court's judgment 
and delivering an opinion on behalf of the Court. Since the 
decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court are corporate opin-
ions, dissenting and separate concurring views are not published, 
although a judge may privately record a dissent as part of the 
Court's own records.290 This is in striking contrast to the freedom 
of the justices of the United States Supreme Court to express in-
dividual views in dissenting or individual concurring opinions, a 
freedom reflected in the multiplicity of opinions in recent years. 
The German practice has the advantage of stressing the Federal 
Constitutional Court's function as an impersonal collegiate body, 
and the rendering of a single opinion adds greater weight and 
authority to the Court's judgment. On the other hand, the 
American practice has much in its favor, despite any impairment 
of the Court's prestige that may result from the publicly-recorded 
expression of division within the Supreme Court, since the ex-
pression of divergent views, as demonstrated by American consti-
tutional history, often points the way to the future development 
of the law. In support of the Federal Constitutional Court's prac-
tice of rendering the single corporate judgment and opinion, it 
should be emphasized that the Court is a very young institution 
and has faced the task at the outset of gaining public respect and 
290See Nadelmann, "The Judicial Dissent: Publication v. Secrecy," 8 AM. J. Co:MP. 
L. 415 (1959). 
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confidence. It may well be that once the Federal Constitutional 
Court feels it has securely established itself in its important role 
as defender of the Basic Law, it will find it desirable to permit the 
expression of divergent views. 
The Supreme Court of the United States, sensitive to the 
significance of judicial review in a democratic system that accords 
a central place to the legislative process, has developed a series 
of self-restraints designed to minimize the area in which its im-
portant review power is effective. Thus it has formulated and ap-
plied the category of "political questions" in which it refuses to 
intervene,.291 has insisted that parties raising constitutional ques-
tions have proper standing to do so, has refused to pass on consti-
tutional questions unless necessary to the disposition of the case 
before it, interprets statutes if possible to avoid constitutional 
questions, asserts respect for the legislative determination, and 
presumes the constitutionality of legislation.292 In mentioning 
these self-imposed restraints it is well to note that there is nothing 
to force the Court to keep within these bounds, that the applica-
tion of these ideas is not always clear, and that the Court's members 
frequently disagree on whether these restraints have been observed. 
In view of the power expressly granted it and the scope of 
its jurisdiction as constitutionally defined, the Federal Constitu-
tional Court is not in a position to develop similar self-restraints 
in the same measure. The Court's express authority and duty to 
decide controversies between supreme federal organs with respect 
to their competence and rights and duties forces the Court to deal 
with some problems which would be recognized as political ques-
tions by our Court.293 Again, in dealing with the party-in-interest 
problem, the Court is required to recognize standing of parties 
291 See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939). 
292See Justice Brandeis' concurring opinion in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 at 
345-348 (1936), and Justice Rq.tledge's opinion in Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of 
City of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549 (1947). On the presumption of constitutionality, see 
Justice Brandeis' opinion in O'Gorman and Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 
U.S. 251 at 257 (1931). On the respect to be accorded the legislative determination, see 
Justice Stone's dissenting opinion in United States v. Butler, 291 U.S. 1 at 78 (1936); Justice 
Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162 (1950). 
293 Mention may be made, for instance, of the questioi;is raised in respect to the 
reorganization of the southwest territory, 1 BVerfGE 14 (1951), the validity of Lander-
sponsored referenda on the question of equipping the armed forces with atomic weapons, 
8 BVerfGE 104 (1958), the declaration that the Communist Party was unconstitutional, 
5 BVerfGE 85 (1956), and the questions relating to the Federation's participation in the 
European Defense Community Treaties, 1 BVerfGE 396 (1952). For comment on the last 
cited case which was dismissed by the Court on procedural grounds, see Loewenstein, 
"The Bonn Constitution and the European Defense Community Treaties: A Study in 
Judicial Frustration," 64 YALE L. J. 805 (1955). 
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to raise a question in cases where clearly our Court would reject 
the suit for lack of requisite interest. But other facets of the self-
restraint concept are manifest in the Court's action. It will not 
deal with a constitutional question unless it becomes necessary 
to do so. Thus where questions have been referred to it by other 
courts that have found statutes invalid, the Court has avoided the 
constitutional issue by finding that the statute could be interpreted 
to preclude the constitutional question.294 It has declared as a 
general principle that statutes are to be presumed valid and, where 
legislative authority to deal with a problem rests on the deter-
mination of certain conditions and findings, the Court has stated 
that a determination of this kind is a legislative matter which the 
Court cannot disturb.296 To put the matter summarily, it seems 
fair to say that in the interpretation of the general legislative 
powers of the Federation as enumerated in the Basic Law, the 
Federal Constitutional Court, like the United States Supreme 
Court, is likely to resolve the doubts in favor of the validity of the 
legislation. 
A feature of the opinons of the Federal Constitutional Court 
that may strike the American observer is the Court's tendency to 
discuss at length issues and questions presented as part of a case 
properly before it but which in view of the decision reached by 
the Court are not relevant to the final disposition of the case. The 
United States Supreme Court has repeatedly said that it will avoid 
expressing opinion respecting matters on which decision is not 
required.296 By contrast, and to illustrate a tendency of the 
Federal Constitutional Court to go beyond the issues strictly 
necessary to the disposition of the case, attention is again called 
to the Court's important decision in the Concordat case297 dealing 
with the question whether the Lander in regulating instruction 
in the public schools were required to respect the provisions of 
the Concordat between Hitler and the Vatican respecting religious 
instruction for Catholic children. In the end the Court held that 
since under the Basic Law education was a matter reserved for 
control by the Lander, they were not bound by this treaty. In 
view of this disposition of the case, it was unnecessary for the 
Court to consider at length as it did the questions relating to the 
294 See, e.g., 2 BV erfGE 181 (1953). 
295 See Rupp, "Judicial Review in the Federal Republic of Germany," 9 AM. J. CoMP. 
L. 29 at 38 (1960). 
296 See, e.g., Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955); Kent and Briehl v. Dulles, 357 
U.S. 116 (1958). 
297 6 B V erfGE 309 (1957). 
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continued validity of the Concordat as an international agreement 
which the Federation was required to respect in its capacity as 
successor to the Hitler regime. 
Dealing with issues not essential to the disposition of the case 
may result in future difficulties and embarrassment for a court, 
and a good case may be made for the United States Supreme 
Court's practice of refusing to deal with questions not necessary to 
the decision. But it must be kept in mind in this connection that 
the Federal Constitutional Court is operating under a new consti-
tution and that perhaps the gratuitous assertion of some ideas and 
principles is inevitable in the formative stage of interpretation. 
The United States Supreme Court in its earlier days did not follow 
a rigorous policy of self-restraint in refusing to pass on questions 
unnecessary to the decision of the case. We recall important 
opinions by Chief Justice Marshall in some leading cases where 
he went beyond the problems of the case to state basic views which 
would serve as guides to future interpretation and development.298 
Since the Federal Constitutional Court does not operate within 
the framework of a legal system that places emphasis upon concrete 
holdings as the source of law, the principle of stare decisis as-
sumes no formal doctrinal significance. The Court does make 
frequent references to its prior opinions but for the purpose 
primarily of extracting general propositions rather than for com-
paring or distinguishing the facts or holdings in the earlier cases.299 
Although freedom from any formal doctrine in respect to ad-
herence to precedent gives the Court a flexibility in its interpre-
tation and further emphasizes its reliance upon propositional law, 
the assertion may be hazarded that the Court's practice of writing 
opinions dealing at length with the issues before it, coupled with 
the desired objective of stability-an objective reflected in the 
Basic Law itself, will over the long run give its decisions an 
authority not lightly to be disregarded. Certainly the Court by 
298 See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316 (1819), where the Chief 
Justice developed a broad doctrine of federal immunity to state taxation even though the 
case might have rested on the narrower ground that the Maryland tax was discriminatory; 
Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. (28 U.S.) 419 (1827), where he laid the foundation for 
the doctrine that the states may not tax commerce even though it would have been suffi-
cient to rest the decision on the ground that the Maryland tax was invalid under the 
imports-exports clause. 
299 The Federal Constitutional Court has not shown any tendency to cite constitu-
tional decisions arising under other constitutional systems in which judicial review plays 
a prominent role and which raise common or related problems of interpretation. Frequent 
references to the United States Supreme Court's decisions are found in the opinions of 
the Australian, Canadian and Indian courts. See Tripathi, "Foreign Precedents and 
Constitutional Law," 57 CoL. L. REv. 319 (1957). 
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its decisions and opinions is building up a body of law which in 
time will become the authoritative gloss on the written text. 
Again the differences in this respect between the Federal Consti-
tutional Court and the Supreme Court are probably more formal 
than real. The Supreme Court has stated, and certainly its prac-
tices in recent years confirm this, that in the field of constitutional 
adjudication the principle of stare decisis has much less validity 
than in other areas and that the Court should consider itself 
relatively free to overrule earlier decisions when it is perceived 
that these decisions rested on an erroneous basis or that new cir-
cumstances require fresh consideration of the problem.800 
The Federal Constitutional Court's opinions are thoroughly 
and carefully written, and in general reveal a judicial process 
which relies upon formal conceptual analysis and the formulation 
of propositional law. By comparison we may point to the pragma-
tism evident in the contemporary work of the United States Su-
preme Court with its conscious explication and appraisal of basic 
constitutional values, absorption with the policy and functional 
aspects of the problem before it, the employment of the balancing 
process in the weighing of competing interests, and reliance on the 
empirical approach, inherent in the judicial method of the common 
law, as a basis for constructing a body of general principles. Indeed, 
in some important areas of constitutional law of current importance, 
the Supreme Court's ad hoc method of decision has invited the 
criticism that the Court has lost sight of its responsibility for 
formulating meaningful and coherent general principles of inter-
pretation.801 
In comparing the judicial methods of the two courts, it should 
not be forgotten that a major part of the Supreme Court's decisions 
arise under broad language like that of the commerce and due 
process clauses which afford wide opportunities for judicial maneu-
vering and furnish a natural setting for judicial subjectivity in 
the identification, appraisal and weighing of relevant interests. 
The more precisely drafted Basic Law does not leave as much 
room for free play in the judicial process. Moreover, the type 
of proceeding whereby an important part of the Federal Consti-
tutional Court's cases come before it, namely, on certification of a 
800 See Justice Brandeis' opinion in Burnet v. Coronado Oil &: Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 
at 405-411 (1932); Justice Reed's opinion in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 at 665 
(1944); Douglas, "Stare Decisis," 49 CoL. L. R.Ev. 735 (1949). 
801 See Wechsler, "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law," 73 HARv. L. 
REv. 1 (1959). 
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question of constitutional law extracted from a case before another 
court, necessarily forces the Court to formulate objective principles 
of interpretation rather than deal empirically with a total case 
before it. 
But it is easy to overstate formalism and conceptualism in 
the decisional processes of the Federal Constitutional Court. What-
ever the formal reasoning process may be, and no matter how 
precisely the fundamental law is drafted, policy considerations can-
not be ignored in the process of constitutional adjudication. To 
mention only a single instance, one cannot escape the conviction 
that important policy considerations entered into the Federal 
Constitutional Court's decision holding invalid Lander statutes 
directing the holding of advisory public referenda on the question 
of arming the military forces with atomic weapons.302 Likewise 
it should be noted that the Court in dealing with statutes regulating 
business activities has not hesitated to employ economic data and 
fall back upon empirical considerations and data in attempting 
to give a meaningful interpretation of constitutional limitations.303 
Similarly in the Communist Party case the Court had to draw 
upon underlying factual considerations of a political, social and 
economic nature in arriving at its characterization of the Party's 
nature and objectives.304 Finally, it is fair to say, in view of the 
express enumeration of basic rights and the Court's duty to protect 
these rights, coupled with the express recognition that many of 
these rights are subject to legislative restriction, the Court cannot 
avoid the subjectivity implicit in the pragmatic process of balanc-
ing the right against the asserted claim of a competing public 
interest. As evidenced by the Court's decisions dealing with a 
person's right to choose and pursue his calling,305 a consideration 
of the validity of legislation impinging upon this right entails a 
a large measure of subjective judgment. 
Probably the most interesting feature of the Federal Constitu-
tional Court's assertion of its function in protecting basic rights 
302 8 BVerfGE 104 (1958). 
303 See 9 BVerfGE 39 (1958), 73 (1959). See also the discussion in the text, p. 1130 
supra. 
304 Professor McWhinney writes that the Court's opinion in this case "demonstrates 
that the constitution is not to be regarded as establishing philosophic absolutes, but 
standards capable of varying application in varying societal conditions, thus opening the 
way to a pragmatic, balancing-of-interests approach that is quite novel to German public 
law jurisprudence and clearly owes much to the influence of American legal ideas and 
techniques during the Allied occupation period." See his article, "The German Federal 
Constitutional Court and the Communist Party Decision," 32 !ND. L. J. 295 at 308 (1957). 
305 See the discussion in the text, pp. 1128-1131 supra. 
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and one which refutes a strictly objective and positivistic interpre-
tation of a written text has been the suggestion that the Basic Law 
itself is subject to extra-constitutional norms, derived from natural 
law considerations, and by reference to which express constitu-
tional provisions may be held unconstitutional.306 Such a view 
rests on the assumption that certain human rights are superior to 
and precede the written constitution, and that no positive law, not 
even a constitution, can be permitted to violate them. The 
Federal Constitutional Court has not had frequent occasion to 
express this idea, and in no case has it rested a decision squarely 
on this kind of reasoning.307 The notion that the constitution 
itself is subject to a transcendent natural justice had its inspiration 
in the post-war German legal and juridical thinking that reacteµ 
strongly against the philosophy of legal positivism identifiable 
with the concept of "legality" which furnished a cloak for legit-
imizing the outrageous invasion of personal rights during the 
Hitler regime.308 A decline in natural justice thinking has become 
apparent by this time, however, and it may be doubted whether 
it will have substantial significance as a factor in future constitu-
tional interpretation. But the recognition of the idea by the Federal 
Constitutional Court is in itself significant. Recourse to natural 
justice and natural rights thinking by the United States Supreme 
Court in the interpretation of the Constitution and particularly 
in the formulation of the "fundamental rights" interpretation of 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been a 
familiar feature of American constitutional history.309 It is not 
surprising to Americans, therefore, to find an expression of this 
thinking also in the thinking of the Federal Constitutional Court 
in view of the important role committed to it. But the use of the 
natural law concept to question the validity of an express constitu-
tional provision goes beyond reliance upon natural rights thinking 
by the United States Supreme Court in the process of constitu-
tional interpretation. Certainly it would be regarded as extraor-
dinary and unprecedented if the Supreme Court were ever to 
say that a provision of the Constitution, whether included in the 
306 See the Court's opinion in 3 BVerfGE 225 (1953). 
307 See Dietze, "Unconstitutional Constitutional Norms? Constitutional Development 
in Postwar Germany," 42 VA. L. REv. 1 (1956). 
308 See Bodenheimer, "Significant Developments in German Legal Philosophy Since 
1945," 3 AM. J. COMP. L. 379 (1954). 
soo See Corwin, "The 'Higher Law' Background of American Constitutional Law," 
42 HARv. L. REv. 149, 365 (1928, 1929). 
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body of this document or added by amendment, was itself un-
constitutional by reference to extra-constitutional norms. 
D. Conclusions 
In view of its broad jurisdiction, derived directly from the Basic 
Law, which places upon it the responsibility for umpiring the 
federal system, protecting basic rights, and resolving conflicts be-
tween the various organs of state, the Federal Constitutional Court 
occupies a pivotal role in preserving the integrity of the consti-
tutional order. Like the Supreme Court of the United States, 
it is in a strategic position to make a genuine and creative contribu-
tion to the furtherance of a democratic society resting on the rule 
of law. 
The exercise of a broad power of judicial review that includes 
an authority to declare legislation invalid and to resolve disputes 
between political organs of the state poses delicate and difficult 
tasks for a judicial tribunal operating within the framework of 
a society dedicated to democratic principles. The Federal Consti-
tutional Court, still an infant institution concerned with estab-
lishing itself in public confidence and respect, faces the task of 
discharging its duties in a responsible way while at the same time 
avoiding the excesses of judicial power that lead to government 
by the judiciary at the expense of the governmental organs charged 
with the making of laws and the determination of political issues. 
The power to review legislation necessarily vests any tribunal 
with an authority that transcends the ordinary limits of judicial 
power. The Federal Constitutional Court's task in attempting to 
pursue a path free from entanglement with political questions and 
encroachment upon the proper sphere of legislative discretion in 
the determination of basic policy is a formidable one. The United 
States Supreme Court, by comparison, is in a much more enviable 
position in this respect. Since the Court itself has postulated its 
power of review as a power implied in the constitutional structure, 
it is free to develop its own self-imposed limitations on the exercise 
of this power. Moreover, the requirements that constitutional 
questions come before it in the context of genuine adversary pro-
ceedings and that only persons with proper standing or interest 
be allowed to raise constitutional questions, and the further con-
siderations that the important constitutional issues come before 
the Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction and that 
with respect to the major part of its appellate jurisdiction the 
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Court is free to decide what cases to hear and decide, all combine 
to insulate the Court in a substantial way from the political over-
tones of the issues that come before it. The Federal Constitutional 
Court, on the other hand, is under obligation to pass on types of 
political questions that would not reach the United States Supreme 
Court, and because of its original jurisdiction and duty to take 
the case its decision in point of time is less readily dissociated from 
the political overtones of the controversy. Much more so than in 
the case of the United States Supreme Court, the Federal Consti-
tutional Court, by virtue of the role expressly thrust upon it, 
may be characterized as a super political-judicial tribunal.310 
It is fair to say, however, that in the discharge of its constitu-
tional obligations, the Federal Constitutional Court has to date 
pursued a creditable course. Although it has resolutely discharged 
its task of interpreting and defending the Basic Law as evidenced 
in part by its decisions holding federal and Lander statutes in-
valid, 311 its work reflects no tendency toward aggrandizement or 
abuse of its important powers. It has rendered decisions which 
by reference to American concepts would be characterized as 
political decisions, but the Basic Law leaves the Court no choice 
except to hear and decide these cases. This is the Court's business. 
If any major criticism may be expressed in regard to the Court's 
work, it is that the Court invites unnecessary difficulty by not 
confining itself to issues strictly necessary to the determination of 
cases before it. 
One further comment may be ventured in this connection. 
The Federal Constitutional Court's role and the relative ease of 
access to it by organs of the government for the determination of 
constitutional issues makes it readily possible to shift to the Court 
the responsibility for decisions on important political matters. 
The Federal Constitutional Court is vulnerable to the "passing 
of the buck." Its position and reputation as a disinterested judicial 
tribunal will, therefore, depend not only upon the Court's self-
imposed limitations but also in substantial part upon the sense 
of self-restraint cultivated by the other organs of government in 
respect to the demands made upon the Court. 
310 On the comparable function and role of the Italian Constitutional Court, see 
Treves, "Judicial Review of Legislation in Italy," 7 J. PUB. L. 345 (1958); Cassandro, 
"The Constitutional Court of Italy," 8 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 at 10-12 (1959). 
311 Until Sept. I, 1959, the Federal Constitutional Court had declared 16 federal and 
18 state statutes unconstitutional. Rupp, "Judicial Review in the Federal Republic of 
Germany," 9 AM. J. CoMP. L. 29 at 37, n. 31 (1960). 
1182 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 58 
VII. THE AMENDING PROCESS 
The significance of judicial review under a written constitu-
tion is vitally affected by the relative ease or difficulty with which 
the constitution is amended. Substantial hurdles are placed in the 
path of amending the Constitution of the United States. A two-
thirds vote of both Houses of Congress is required to propose an 
amendment, and the vote of three-fourths of the state is necessary 
to ratification.312 But except for the provision that no state may 
be deprived of its representation in the Senate there appears to 
be no limit to what the amending process may achieve by way of 
alteration of basic policies or rights under the Constitution. The 
Basic Law states both formal and substantive limitations on the 
amending process. In the first place it can be amended only by a 
law which expressly amends or supplements the text thereof.313 
This provision becomes meaningful in light of the practice during 
the period of the Weimar Constitution of enacting laws by the 
majority required for constitutional amendment and which were 
considered as amendments to the extent they were inconsistent 
with the constitution.314 A law to amend the Basic Law requires 
the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of the Bundestag 
and two-thirds of the votes of the Bundesrat.315 In terms, then, 
of the formal limitations, the Basic Law can be amended more 
easily than the Constitution of the United States. More interesting 
are the substantive limitations. Article 79 declares inadmissible 
any amendment of the Basic Law affecting the division of the 
Federation into Lander, the participation in principle of the 
Lander in legislation, or the basic principles laid down in Articles 
1 and 20.316 These limitations sharply distinguish the amending 
process under the United States Constitution. Any comparison on 
this score should, however, take account of the consideration that 
amendment of the Basic Law is a legislative act, whereas amend-
ment of the American Constitution is based upon the will of the 
people as reflected in the action taken by the states in voting 
whether, to approve or reject a proposed amendment. 
312U.S. CONST., Art. v. 
313 Art. 79, §1. 
314 See von Mehren, "Constitutionalism in Germany-The First Decision of the New 
Constitutional Court," I AM. J. CoMP. L. 70 at 73 (1952). 
315 Art. 79, § (2). 
316 See the text of Articles 1 and 20 quoted in the text, p. 1094 supra. 
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A CONCLUDING WORD 
The descriptive survey undertaken in this article documents 
the assertion made at the outset that while basic principles and 
institutions are shared in common under the Basic Law of Ger-
many and the Constitution of the United States, notable dif-
ferences are evident particularly in the application of the federal 
principle and in the institutional apparatus for exercise of the 
power of judicial review. But no mention has been made of what 
is the greatest practical difference, and that is that the Basic Law 
has been in operation only eleven years whereas the Constitution 
has functioned over a period of one hundred and seventy-three 
years. The Constitution, as Chief Justice Marshall said, was "in-
tended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted 
to the various crises in human affairs."317 With credit due to the 
way in which it was drafted and the flexibility of interpretation 
in response to new conditions, the time-honored Constitution, 
heavily crusted with a large body of interpretation, has weathered 
a number of crises, has served its purpose remarkably well and 
continues to serve as an effective instrument of government, despite 
the difficulties of the amending process and the relatively small 
number of amendments that have been adopted.318 The fledgling 
Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, it must be 
remembered, was intended as a transitory constitution for West 
Germany pending reunification of Germany and the adoption 
at the time of reunion of a permanent constitution. It is for this 
reason that it is characterized as a Grundgesetz (Basic Law) and 
not as a Verfassung (Constitution). Whether and when reunifi-
cation will take place are questions for which the future holds the 
answers. In the meantime government has functioned effectively 
under the Basic Law.319 Over the long run it may become ap-
parent that the Basic Law is too rigid a document, that the demands 
made upon the Federal Constitutional Court are too great and 
that some modification of its jurisdiction will be required, and 
317 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316 at 415-416 (1819). 
318 Twenty-two to date. The first twelve amendments were adopted within sixteen 
years after the Constitution went into effect. The following ten amendments were adopted 
over an eighty-nine year period, beginning with the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865 and 
concluding with the Twenty-Second Amendment in 1951. 
The Basic Law has been amended nine times since it went into effect in 1949. 
319 See Dietze, "The Federal Republic of Germany: An Evaluation After Ten Years," 
22 J. POL. 112 (1960). 
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that other changes will be necessary. More important, however, 
is the question, not yet put to the test, whether the constitutional 
order established by the Basic Law will prove adequate in time of 
crisis. To date it has faced no such critical test, thanks to the 
prosperous economic conditions and the political stability West 
Germany has enjoyed in the post-war period. Any crisis that may 
arise to test the strength of the constitutional order under the 
Basic Law will even more significantly test the question whether 
the constitutional system reflects the political understanding and 
habits of the people and commands their loyalty. The Basic Law 
provides on the whole a good skeleton structure for the functioning 
of a democratic society. But the flesh and blood required to make 
it a living organism and to endue it with the toughness that 
withstands stress and strain must be supplied at the grass-roots 
level by citizens devoted to the basic values that give meaning to 
a constitutional democracy and disciplined to the demands that 
a self-governing society makes upon them. 
